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ARTICLE
CONSTRUCTING THE CO-ED MILITARY†
Elaine Donnelly††
I. INTRODUCTION
The armed forces of the United States are organizationally strong. All
branches and communities have proud histories, cultural traditions, and
members motivated by patriotism as well as personal career goals. The
institutional strength of the military, however, also makes it vulnerable to
political pressures that can undermine its culture. Because everyone must
follow orders, the armed forces are a prime venue for social engineering.
Some civilians believe in “social constructionism”the idea that
fundamental human characteristics, including gender differences other than
obvious anatomy, are learned behaviors that can be radically changed.
Some want to construct a new gender-free military, putting to the ultimate
test theories about the interchangeability of women and men in all roles.
Independent review of social change in the armed forces is critically
important. Our gender-integrated volunteer force is at war and undergoing
radical organizational and cultural change at the same time. Individual men
and women stand between our nation and enemies who would do us harm,
but the success of their mission depends on a complex organization that is
more demanding than anything in civilian life. This institution asks
courageous men and women to surrender their individuality and
independence, many of their personal rights, and sometimes their very
lives. The rest of us should lend support by guarding the strength and
integrity of the institution in which they serve.

† This article was originally published as Elaine Donnelly, Constructing the Co-Ed
Military, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 815 (2007). It is reprinted here with the permission
of the author and the Duke Journal of Gender Law and Policy.
†† Elaine Donnelly is President of the Center for Military Readiness, an independent,
non-partisan public policy organization that specializes in military personnel issues. In 1984,
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger appointed her to the Defense Advisory Committee
on Women in the Services (DACOWITS) for a three-year term, and in 1992, President
George H.W. Bush appointed her to the Presidential Commission on the Assignment of
Women in the Armed Forces.
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A. The Importance of Objective Analysis
On January 27, 1967, a deadly accident occurred that could have stalled
America’s program of space exploration indefinitely. During a pre-launch
test of the Apollo One spacecraft,1 an electrical spark ignited the pureoxygen atmosphere inside the cramped capsule, killing astronauts Virgil
Grissom, Edward White, and Roger Chafee.2 Critics demanded to know
why the mechanical and electrical engineers of the National Aeronautic and
Space Administration (NASA) failed to recognize the inherent dangers of
operating in a pure-oxygen environment. In the aftermath of that tragedy,
NASA made choices that are instructive to another institution today: the
United States military. In 1967, a pure-oxygen atmosphere was thought to
be the best for sustaining human life in orbit; pure-oxygen systems weighed
less than mixed-gas systems and had been deployed successfully in the
Mercury and Gemini missions.3 This basic assumption would prove to be
both flawed and fatal. Moreover, indicators of trouble immediately
preceding the fire—including communication problems, a “sour smell” in
the spacesuit loop, and a sudden, unexplained rise in oxygen flow to the
1. Apollo One is the official name given retroactively to the Apollo/Saturn 204 (AS204) spacecraft. See National Air and Space Museum, Apollo One Summary of Events, Jan.
27, 1967, http://www.nasm.si.edu/collections/imagery/apollo/AS01/a01sum.htm (last visited
May 1, 2007).
2. Mary C. White, NASA History, Detailed Biographies of Apollo 1 Crew—Epilogue
(Aug. 4, 2006), http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/Apollo204/zorn/epilog.htm.
3. Conversation with Capt. Walter M. Schirra, U.S. Navy (Ret.), one of the original
seven Mercury astronauts, in San Diego, Cal. (Mar. 1994); see also NASA, REPORT OF
APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD, at pt. IV (Apr. 5, 1967), available at
http://history.nasa.gov/Apollo204/content.html (“The test was conducted with . . . a 100percent oxygen atmosphere.”); id. at app. D-11-9.
The purge with 100-percent O2 at above sea-level pressure contributed to the
propagation of fire in the Apollo 204 Spacecraft. . . . This was the planned
cabin environment for testing and launch, since prelaunch denitrogenation is
necessary to forestall the possibility of bends at the mission ambient pressure of
5 pounds per square inch absolute. A comprehensive review of the operational
and physiological trade-offs of the various methods of denitrogenation is in
progress.
Id.
The Apollo One tragedy had been foreshadowed six years earlier, in 1961, when Valentin
Bondarenko, a Soviet cosmonaut trainee, was horribly burned and killed in an accidental fire
inside an isolation chamber with a high-oxygen environment. The USSR concealed that
calamity from the public for many years. James Oberg observed, “The mere knowledge that
a Soviet oxygen-rich fire had killed a cosmonaut might have been enough to forestall an
American repetition of the disaster.” See JAMES E. OBERG, UNCOVERING SOVIET DISASTERS:
EXPLORING THE LIMITS OF GLASNOST 170 (1988).
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spacesuits—were noted but disregarded. Tragically, only eight seconds
after Grissom reported fire in the cockpit, the astronauts perished in a
fireball that melted and fused their spacesuits.4
NASA temporarily suspended the Apollo program and conducted a full
investigation. During that critical time, NASA engineers could have
defended their previous assumptions regarding the benefits of a pureoxygen atmosphere in orbit. They could have defined as their goal the
perfection of spacecraft machinery—that is, using pure-oxygen
atmospheres in all orbiting spacecraft, with “zero tolerance” of sparks.
Instead, NASA engineers challenged and objectively reevaluated the basic
assumptions that had guided the space program prior to the fire. As a result,
the pure-oxygen system aboard the Apollo spacecraft was replaced with a
less volatile mixed-gas atmosphere. Furthermore, redundant backup
systems that presumed both imperfection and potential failures were built
into all spacecraft systems and machinery. Less than two years after the
Apollo One fire, in December 1968, Apollo Eight became the first manned
mission to successfully orbit the moon.
This episode in American history teaches lessons that are applicable not
only to rocket science but also to social science. The mechanical engineers
of NASA objectively reevaluated their basic assumptions, analyzed their
mistakes, and implemented steps to prevent predictable and avoidable
disasters. By contrast, social engineers out to change the culture of
America’s military have refused to reevaluate their basic assumptions and
have disregarded the negative consequences of their own mistakes. Young
men and women are being asked to risk their lives in the equivalent of a
volatile, pure-oxygen atmosphere—an environment that social engineers
insist will “work” as long as the military enforces zero tolerance of
“sparks.” This theoretical hubris disregards human failings, which are even
more common than imperfections in spacecraft machinery. Like NASA, our
military cannot operate on presumptions of perfectionespecially when
lives and national security are at risk.
In recent years of accelerated cultural change in the military, social
engineers have taken advantage of certain political sensitivities to stifle
objective analysis. To a certain extent, reticence about social problems in
the military is understandable—Americans are enormously proud of the
men and women who serve in the All-Volunteer Force. Nevertheless,
straightforward debate about military social policies does not constitute
criticism of men and women in uniform. In many ways, these men and
women are like courageous astronauts who do not themselves make the
4. National Air and Space Museum, supra note 1.
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decisions and policies under which they will live, and sometimes die, in the
pursuit of a noble cause.
Pride in our astronauts does not preclude criticism of NASA. When
flawed presumptions and engineering mistakes lead to unnecessary disaster
and death, Americans and their elected representatives have the right—and,
indeed, the responsibilityto demand objective analysis, unflinching
candor, accountability for violations of law and policy, and constructive
steps to remedy problems that elevate risks. In the same way, Americans
have every right to question the flawed assumptions of social engineers
who demand radical change in the culture of the military.
There is reason for concern about civilian and military advocates who
want to order female soldiers into or near direct ground combat,
institutionalize different standards in training and disciplinary matters, and
force the acceptance of open homosexuality in military units that offer little
or no privacy. Members of Congress have the constitutional responsibility
to question such policies, both before and after they are implemented. There
are no compelling reasons to elevate risks unnecessarily, or to make
military life more difficult and dangerous for the men and women who
volunteer to serve.
B. Standard of Review
There has not been an official, comprehensive analysis of social policies
involving women in the military since 1992, when Congress established the
Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed
Forces (“Presidential Commission”).5 Congress directed the Presidential
5. See generally PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE ASSIGNMENT OF WOMEN IN THE
ARMED FORCES, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: WOMEN IN COMBAT (1992) [hereinafter
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT]. The fifteen retired military and civilian members of the
Presidential Commission, appointed by then-President George H.W. Bush, included both
advocates and opponents of women in combat. As a result, the Commission’s findings were
comprehensive and not limited to a predetermined “consensus.” Commissioners requested
and received testimony and detailed documents from the Department of Defense and all of
the service communities throughout twenty-seven days of transcribed meetings in
Washington, D.C., Chicago, Los Angeles, and Dallas. Retired officers, enlisted men and
women, family-support professionals, members of Congress, combat veterans, religious and
cultural leaders, foreign military representatives, training instructors, physiologists, military
historians, and active duty men and women testified or spoke to commissioners during
twenty-seven field trips to military locations. Members of the military were encouraged to
express their opinions freely on either side of a wide variety of issues, provided that they had
a rationale. A majority of commissioners voted against the deployment of women in air
combat, most direct ground combat communities, and submarines, but they did not object to
the presence of women on large surface ships such as aircraft carriers. Commission votes on
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Commission to report findings and develop recommendations on a wide
range of issues surrounding the deployment of women in ground, sea, and
air combat.6 Furthermore, the Presidential Commission intensely debated
the standard of review to be applied in formulating recommendations—that
is, whether higher priority should be assigned to military readiness or to
other concerns such as “diversity” and equal employment opportunity. A
majority of commissioners supported a resolution assigning higher priority
to overarching, classic concerns such as military necessity and effectiveness
in time of war.7 Some commissioners, however, were reluctant to endorse
even a non-binding resolution assigning higher priority to military necessity
than to equal opportunity and other considerations.8
major recommendations occurred on November 3, 1992, the same day that President Bill
Clinton was elected. Congress did not schedule hearings on the Presidential Commission’s
recommendations and substantive findings, many of which remain relevant to close combat
issues in the news today.
6. The issues considered included the history and nature of warfare, physiology,
psychology, sociology, family and cultural values, the legal consequences of a change in
regulations affecting military women, and, most importantly, the overarching, classic
concerns of the military itself—namely, combat readiness, unit cohesion, and military
effectiveness.
7. A consistent case against women in combat was set forth in the “Alternative Views”
section of the Presidential Commission Report. See PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 5, at 43-79. This section advocated a standard of review articulated by thenSecretary of Defense Richard Cheney on March 26, 1992:
[I]t’s important for us to remember that what we are asked to do here in the
Department of Defense is to defend the nation. The only reason we exist is to
be prepared to fight and win wars. We’re not a social welfare agency. . . . This
is a military organization. Decisions we make have to be taken based upon
those kinds of considerations and only those kinds of considerations.
Id. at 43 (alteration added); see also Center for Military Readiness, The Case Against
Women in Combat (Dec. 12, 2001), http://www.cmrlink.org/printfriendly.asp?docID=65
(summarizing the Alternative Views section of the Presidential Commission Report). The
Presidential Commission Report also contained statements of individual commissioners who
supported women in combat. See PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 80121.
8. See Transcript, Meeting of the Presidential Commission, Wash., D.C., Oct. 22,
1992, 6:00 p.m. EST to adjournment (on file with author). Commissioner Kate O’Beirne,
sponsor of the non-binding resolution, said, “It seems to me appropriate to adopt a standard
of review that our decisions are based on the needs of the military. That’s what [is]
paramount in our mind.” Id. Commissioner Meredith Neizer disagreed on the need for such a
resolution: “It’s military readiness, it’s military effectiveness, but that’s not always the only
criteria.” Id. Commissioner Darryl Henderson said, “I don’t think we have a mutually
exclusive situation here.” Id. Commissioner Donnelly added, “[C]oncern about military
necessity does not preclude concern about equal opportunity. It’s a matter of priorities.
People who are not convinced that women should be in combat are sometimes accused of
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Differences of opinion on issues involving gender in the military hinge
on the standard of review applied. Some activists expect the military to pay
any price and bear any burden to promote careers, equal opportunity, or
“diversity” as a primary goal. For example, Lt. Col. Anthony D. Reyes,
appointed Chief of an Army Diversity Office established in 2005, advocates
a complete repeal of women’s exemptions from all forms of direct combat
as a way to promote “workforce diversity” in the ranks of flag officers.9
Other activists promote the cause of homosexuals in the military as a civil
rights and equal opportunity issue, a stance that assigns higher priority to
the desires of individuals than to the needs of the military.
Regardless of the gender-related issue in question, social engineers
suggest that “leadership” and “sensitivity training” can solve all problems.10
being opposed to the rights of women, and it’s not so. That’s not the intent of the
resolution.” Id. Some commissioners voting against the resolution said they would have
preferred a resolution using the phrase “combat effectiveness,” a phrase used in the
commission’s authorizing legislation. Id. Others noted that federal courts frequently have
used the phrase “military necessity” in rulings deferring to the military, and that some
policies that are not consistent with military necessity, such as gender-based recruiting
quotas, have nothing to do with combat effectiveness. Id. Subsequent votes and statements
by some commissioners favoring the integration of women into all combat communities
indicated a preference for equal opportunity as the priority consideration, even when
“performance” was cited as the primary goal. See, e.g., PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 5, at 90-92 (presenting a “Dissent on Ground Combat” signed by three
commissioners).
9. LT. COL. ANTHONY D. REYES, JOINT CENTER FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STUDIES,
MILITARY FELLOW RESEARCH REPORT, STRATEGIC OPTIONS FOR MANAGING DIVERSITY IN
THE U.S. ARMY ix (June 2006), available at http://www.jointcenter.org/publications1/
publication-PDFs/TonyReyes.pdf. Lt. Col. Reyes noted that only seven to eight percent of
black officers enter the combat branches, which account for fifty-nine percent of the Army’s
generals. Id. at 1-2. He argued that giving women access to the combat “pipeline” would
increase diversity in the senior ranks. Id. at 2; see also Kelly Kennedy, Women in Combat
Arms?, ARMY TIMES, Nov. 27, 2006, at 16.
Officers holding any grade of admiral or general are referred to as “flag officers” because
they are entitled to have a flag designating their rank displayed at their place of duty.
10. See, e.g., 1 SEC’Y OF THE ARMY, SENIOR REVIEW PANEL REPORT ON SEXUAL
HARASSMENT 2-3, 15-25 (July 1997) (examining problems with sexual misconduct at
Aberdeen Proving Ground and Army training facilities generally; recommending an extra
week of “sensitivity” training for all recruits, conducted by diversity experts with a mandate
to expand and engineer equal-opportunity programs); see also Tranette Ledford & G.E.
Willis, After Aberdeen, ARMY TIMES, Sept. 22, 1997, at 3-4, 6; Sean D. Naylor, Values
Instruction To Be Added to Basic Training, ARMY TIMES, Sept. 22, 1997, at 4 (noting that
the planned extra week of training would cost the Army the equivalent of “three battalions
worth of soldiers”); Philip Shenon, Army’s Leadership Blamed in Report on Sexual Abuses,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1997, at A1; Editorial, America’s Lovesick Military, N.Y. POST, Sept.
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This is tantamount to suggesting that perfect machines are sufficient to
prevent sparks and combustion in a pure-oxygen environment. This Article
will analyze policies that have needlessly complicated social policies in
America’s military and weakened the foundations of a structure that must
remain strong. Objective analysis is the only way to prevent problems that
vitiate readiness, discipline, and morale in the only military we have.
II. DOUBLE STANDARDS INVOLVING WOMEN (DSIW)
UNDERMINE MILITARY STRUCTURE
Studies of gender in the military usually center on women, but the
subject cannot be discussed without also analyzing the men who make and
implement the policies designed by social engineers. When feminists and
their allies demand policies “for women,” Pentagon policymakers appear to
become defensive and lose perspective. Men, it seems, cannot objectively
deal with issues involving women. In turn, social engineers take advantage
of the Pentagon’s defensiveness by trying to suspend, circumvent, or
redefine standard principles, including the concept of “equality.” The idea
of equality has been rendered almost meaningless because of inconsistent
policies that this Article will refer to as “Double Standards Involving
Women,” or “DSIW.” The acronym applies in many situations created in
the pursuit of what feminists envision as a “gender free” or “ungendered”
military.11

15, 1997, at 22. Several reports on sexual misconduct at the service academies have
advocated more hours of diversity or sensitivity training to increase acceptance of female
cadets and midshipmen. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE DEFENSE TASK FORCE ON SEXUAL
HARASSMENT & VIOLENCE AT THE MILITARY SERVICE ACADEMIES 37-41 (June 2005)
[hereinafter DEFENSE TASK FORCE REPORT], available at http://www.sapr.mil/contents/
references/high_gpo_rrc_tx.pdf. Homosexuals are not eligible to serve in the military, but on
September 8, 1994, the Department of Defense and the military services were official cosponsors of a “Diversity Day Training Event,” which invited civilian advocates to promote
“tolerance” of the homosexual lifestyle and cause with lectures, panel discussions, and
videos. See infra note 411 and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., Madeline Morris, By Force of Arms: Rape, War, and Military Culture, 45
DUKE L.J. 651, 751 (1996) (“[T]here is much to be gained and little to be lost by changing
this aspect of military culture from a masculinist vision of unalloyed aggressivity to an
ungendered vision combining aggressivity with compassion.”). In a February 1993 interview
with Vogue magazine, Barbara S. Pope, former Assistant Navy Secretary for Manpower and
Reserve Affairs, commented on reports that investigations of the 1991 Tailhook scandal had
become abusive. “We are in the process of weeding out the white male as norm,” she said.
“We’re about changing the culture.” See Stephanie Guttman, Sex and the Soldier, NEW
REPUBLIC, Feb. 24, 1997, at 20.
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The military is a prime venue for social engineering because everyone in
the chain of command must follow orders, and all are ultimately under
civilian control. Some advocates suggest that the duty to follow orders is so
absolute that dissent on social policies is unprofessional at best and
mutinous at worst.12 If the same standard were applied to the Pentagon’s
decisions about weapon systems, officers would have to remain silent about
poorly designed equipment that creates unnecessary risks or detracts from
the effectiveness of military missions. Although the U.S. Constitution
properly assigns control of the military to civilians, political correctness
within the Pentagon has become a formidable, vitiating force. Despite these
political pressures, policy makers should be held accountable for policies
that they tolerate or impose on the military—particularly the various,
demoralizing forms of DSIW that are harmful to women, men, and the
military as a whole.
It must be noted that female soldiers are not the primary cause of DSIW
and should not be held responsible for its consequences. Most military
women do not make policy—any more than most military men do. The
problems evident in gender-integrated units—on land, at sea, and in the
airare usually caused when policymakers depart from sound principles
that are applied in all other defense policy matters.
In previous decades, the military proudly led the way for positive social
change in matters of civil rights. President Harry Truman signed an
Executive Order banning racial segregation in the military13—an egalitarian
move that advanced the needs of the military without simultaneously
requiring changes in the military standards, principles, or culture.14 To the
contrary, the history of gender integration in the military has been marred
by convoluted double standards, which are only worsened by official
denials that such double standards even exist. Many “experts” fail to
acknowledge the double standards that are common knowledge among
12. Military personnel evaluation forms have a checkbox indicating support for equal
opportunity (EO) programs. Personnel expressing dissent on EO matters for any reason have
been subject to career penalties, including denial of promotions, demotion, or dismissal. See,
e.g., Becky Garrison, Carkhuff Will Stay, but Will He Fly Again?, NAVY TIMES, Sept. 11,
1995, at 17 (reporting the case of Lt. Cmdr. Ken Carkhuff, a Navy helicopter pilot who was
almost dismissed from the Navy because he expressed reservations—but did not disobey
orders—regarding women in combat aviation); Rowan Scarborough, Grounded Navy Pilot
Calls Nonflying Jobs Career-Ending, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1995, at A2 (same).
13. See Exec. Order No. 9981, 13 Fed. Reg. 4313 (July 26, 1948) (“There shall be
equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without regard to
race, color, religion or national origin . . . .”).
14. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at C-40 (Findings 1.33, 1.33A).
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military personnel. Pervasive forms of DSIW—which feminists constantly
say they oppose but expect to be implemented anywayvitiate sound
principles necessary to support a strong and ready volunteer force.15 The
best way to improve the status of women would be to end all forms of
DSIW in the military, and to restore high, uncompromised standards and
sound priorities that benefit women, men, and the armed forces as a whole.
A. Current Department of Defense (DoD) Regulations and Law
Prior to March 2003, America had little experience with female soldiers
in or near direct ground combat. The 1991 Persian Gulf War was the largest
deployment of female soldiers in modern history, and women served
effectively in support roles.16 Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm,
however, were relatively brief, and the Department of Defense was not able
to draw conclusions about the abilities of women in combat roles.17
Nevertheless, lessons learned in the Persian Gulf War could have been
useful in formulating policies that would advance both the interests of
15. See, e.g., BRIAN MITCHELL, WOMEN IN THE MILITARY: FLIRTING WITH DISASTER 99122 (1998). In a chapter titled “DACOWITS 1, Army 0,” Mitchell described the earnest
attempt by Army Chief of Staff Gen. Edward C. “Shy” Meyer to analyze the role of female
soldiers and establish objective standards for performance commensurate with the demands
of given military occupational specialties (MOS) in time of war. His “Women in the Army”
(WITA) study began in May 1980 and was initially presented to the Defense Advisory
Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS) in August 1982. At first DACOWITS
welcomed the study, but three months later civilian and former military feminists
successfully pressured DACOWITS to oppose the WITA recommendations as “barriers” to
women’s careers. By the fall of 1983, Gen. Meyer had retired and a civilian civil rights
lawyer with no military experience was appointed Assistant Secretary of the Army for
Manpower and Reserve Affairs. As a result, most of the WITA recommendations to close
certain positions to women, and to establish objective standards for physically demanding
military occupations specialties, were repealed, made optional, or dropped. Following what
Mitchell called the “emasculation” of WITA, there have been no attempts in the Army to
establish objective standards for physically challenging occupational specialties; nor are
there likely to be any additional attempts in the near future. Instead, the armed forces and
military service academies have adopted various gender-norming techniques that evaluate or
grade female trainees differently. Gender-normed standards—considered more “fair” for
women—give credit for “equal effort” rather than equal results. (Brian Mitchell’s book was
originally published in 1989 under the title Weak Link: The Feminization of the Military.)
16. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at C-47 (Finding 1.55).
Approximately 37,000 Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Force women deployed in the war. The
Commission also received data from the various services indicating that servicewomen
experienced a rate of non-deployability of approximately 3:1 in comparison to men in each
of the services, largely due to pregnancy. Id. at C-120 (Finding 3.54).
17. Id. at C-40, C-49 (Findings 1.35, 1.63, respectively).
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women and the needs of the military. That opportunity was lost in
September 1991, when a sex scandal embarrassed the Navy and put
Pentagon officials on the defensive.
1. The Tailhook Turning Point
a. Defensiveness and DSIW
At the 1991 Tailhook Association convention in Las Vegas, a group of
male and female naval aviators celebrated the end of the Persian Gulf War
by partying wildly. On June 24, 1992, Navy Lt. Paula Coughlin tearfully
told ABC News that she had been harassed and physically assaulted by
male aviators lined up in a hotel corridor “gauntlet.”18
Disciplining the male aviators for “conduct unbecoming” and changing
Navy culture to prevent a recurrence certainly was justified, but media and
political pressures on the Navy became excessively intense. Feminists, their
allies in Congress, and the media essentially demanded that all men present
at Tailhook ’91 be punished, whether they were guilty of misconduct or
not.19 When a preliminary report on Tailhook was prematurely leaked to the
media, then-Secretary of the Navy H. Lawrence Garrett III resigned.
Dissatisfied congressional feminists, led by Rep. Patricia Schroeder (DColo.), berated the Joint Chiefs for “not getting it.”20 Senior House Armed
Services Committee member Schroeder and other angry members of
Congress, such as Rep. John Murtha (D-Pa.) and Sen. Arlen Specter (RPa.), also threatened to withhold appropriation funds for personnel and
weapons systems, and to block military promotions, if Navy officials did
not make amends for Tailhook.21
18. Transcript, ABC World News Tonight (ABC television broadcast June 24, 1992,
6:30 p.m. EST); John Lancaster, A Gantlet of Terror, Frustration: Navy Pilot Recounts
Tailhook Incident, WASH. POST, June 24, 1992, at A1.
19. See Rowan Scarborough, Open Season on Navy, WASH. TIMES, July 20, 1992, at A1.
20. See, e.g., Helen Dewar, Senate Women Lose Fight To Pull Rank, WASH. POST, Apr.
20, 1994, at A1 (published with an Associated Press photograph of Rep. Schroeder and eight
more congresswomen walking to the Senate to oppose the retirement in rank of Adm. Frank
B. Kelso, who was the Chief of Naval Operations during the Tailhook controversy); William
Matthews, The Woman the Pentagon Loves To Hate, ARMY TIMES, Sept. 7, 1992, at 8; James
Webb, Witch Hunt in the Navy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1992, at A23.
21. See, e.g., Scarborough, supra note 19 (“Rep. Patricia Schroeder, Colorado
Democrat, is using Tailhook to promote the women’s movement.”); Matthews, supra note
20 (“‘[Schroeder] has broken a lot of ground for women in the military and a lot of women
really respect her. But military men? She threatens them. She is a woman in a position to
control the fate of boys’ toys.’” (quoting Cathryn Schultz of the Center for Defense
Information) (alteration added)).
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When the investigation was shifted from the Navy to the Department of
Defense Inspector General, the situation began to spin so out of control as
to violate the due process rights of the male aviators. In the rush to obtain
convictions, overzealous prosecutors gave immunity to junior officers in
exchange for testimony against senior commanders, and standard legal
safeguards were suspended during intense, abusive interrogations.22
Newspapers nationwide began to report on what became known as the
Tailhook “witch-hook”i.e., unfair punishments of Navy men but not
women, even after some men had been cleared of misconduct.23
Although most cases were dismissed immediately for lack of evidence,
thirty-nine male officers received nonjudicial punishment for various types
of misconduct, drunkenness, and false statements.24 Cases involving
22. Webb, supra note 20; Rowan Scarborough, Tailhook Judge Fires Prosecutor for
Misconduct, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1994, at A3; Editorial, End the Witch Hunt, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., Feb. 19, 1992, at G2; Peter J. Boyer, Admiral Boorda’s War, NEW YORKER,
Sept. 16, 2006, at 72-75; Col. W. Hays Parks, Tailhook: What Happened, Why & What’s To
Be Learned, U.S. NAVAL INST. PROC., Sept. 1994, at 89-103. Col. Parks described various
threats and unnecessarily degrading or intrusive questions used to extract evidence. Id. at
102. Regarding the conduct of the Tailhook investigators, Judge Robert E. Wiss of the U.S.
Court of Military Appeals wrote:
The assembly-line technique in this case that merged and blurred investigative
and justice procedures is troublesome. At best, it reflects a most curiously
careless and amateurish approach to a very high-profile case by experienced
military lawyers and investigators. At worst, it raises the possibility of a
shadiness in respecting the rights of military members caught up in a criminal
investigation that cannot be condoned.
Samples v. United States, 38 M.J. 482, 487 (C.M.A. 1994).
23. Webb, supra note 20; Boyer, supra note 22, at 74 (“The Department of Defense
regularly granted immunity to junior officers in the hope of ensnaring their squadron
commanders, who thus became permanently ‘implicated’ even if they were subsequently
cleared of wrongdoing.”); see, e.g., Richard Cohen, Keelhauling Commander Stumpf, WASH.
POST, Jan. 12, 1996, at A15; see also Robert J. Caldwell, Closing Tailhook’s Bleeding
Wound, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Dec. 15, 1996, at G-1 (reporting that one officer, Lt. John
Cooney, U.S. Navy, was “implicated” and punished despite his insistence that he was not
even at Tailhook and despite later verification of his alibi with dated receipts); Editorial, The
Navy’s Anita Hill, DETROIT NEWS, Oct. 24, 1993, at 2B.
24. Parks, supra note 22, at 101-03 (noting that the DoD Acting Inspector General had
forwarded 140 cases for review—not “referred” them for prosecution—and that more than
half were dismissed immediately for lack of evidence or the lack of commission of a
criminal offense); see also Gregory Vistica, Tailhook Snagging Men Only, Lets Women Off,
Say Attorneys, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Aug. 27, 1993, at A1; Rowan Scarborough, Navy
Morale Sunk by Tailhook Probe, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1993, at A1; and Rowan
Scarborough, Only 3 Assault Cases in Tailhook Scandal, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1993, at
A1.
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misconduct by women, however, were treated with a gender-based double
standard that had been established by the DoD Inspector General. For
example, while men were punished for indecent exposure and engaging in
suggestive leg shaving, a female officer known to have been partying
topless and several other women who also had participated in heavy
drinking, inappropriate touching of men, and the leg shaving ritual, were
not punished.25 The same double standard was applied in cases of adultery
at Tailhook.26 A female officer told investigators from the Inspector
General’s office that three officers attempted to gang rape her.27
Subsequently, she admitted that she had lied, stating that she had
consensual sex with one of the officers in question but did not want her
fiancé to know of her activities.28 The men were punished, but the female
officer was not held accountable for her dishonest accusation.29
25. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, THE TAILHOOK REPORT, at VIII-1–2 (1993)
[hereinafter TAILHOOK REPORT]; Parks, supra note 22, at 101 (“DoD IG [Inspector General]
policy established for the Tailhook investigation was that it would not include misconduct
by female officers.”).
26. Parks, supra note 22, at 101.
27. Id. at 101; Vistica, supra note 24; Elaine Donnelly, The Tailhook Scandals, NAT’L
REV., Mar. 7, 1994, at 61.
28. See Editorial, Tailhook Fever, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 1996, at A18; Rowan
Scarborough, Tailhook Witness Told Lies, WASH. TIMES, July 23, 1993, at A1. This
statement also is based on numerous interviews with key Navy officials who were involved
in or implicated by the Tailhook investigation, including former Navy Judge Advocate
General Rear Adm. John “Ted” Gordon, U.S. Navy (Ret.), former Commander of the Naval
Investigative Service (NIS) Rear Adm. Duval M. Williams, U.S. Navy (Ret.), Rear Adm.
Riley Mixson, U.S. Navy (Ret.), Cmdr. Robert E. Stumpf, USN, and several others who
were unjustly punished in various ways.
29. Parks, supra note 22, at 101; Donnelly, supra note 27. Several flag officers also
were unfairly scapegoated in media reports. See Parks, supra note 22, at 96-98; Donnelly,
supra note 27, at 59-60 (based on personal interviews and correspondence in 1993 with Rear
Adms. Mixson, Williams, and Gordon). Acting Navy Secretary Sean O’Keefe falsely
claimed at a September 1992 news conference that Rear Adms. John Gordon and Duval
Williams were retiring as a matter of “conscience.” In truth, Adm. Gordon was scheduled to
retire at that time; he did not resign due to Tailhook. Four weeks later, Acting Secretary
O’Keefe issued a memorandum clearing Rear Adms. Williams, Gordon, and George W.
Davis, the Navy Inspector General, of wrongdoing. On Feb. 14, 1995, Sen. Sam Nunn (DGa.) inserted a statement in the Congressional Record correcting misinformation about the
retirement of Rear Adm. Gordon, the former Navy Judge Advocate General, making it clear
that Gordon had not done anything to warrant adverse actions. 141 Cong Rec S2667 (1995)
(statement of Sen. Nunn).
In one of the more egregious cases of Tailhook injustice, a career-ending letter of censure
was issued to Rear Adm. Riley Mixson in 1993, punishing him for Tailhook convention
arrangements made by others in 1991. Rear Adm. Mixson was busy elsewhere at that time,
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In February 1994, Capt. William T. Vest, a Navy judge, blasted DoD
officials for bungled, amateurish witness interview reports that could not
stand up in court.30 Judge Vest justifiably threw out the last of three
pending courts-martial due to violations of due process. The Association of
Naval Aviation (ANA) reported that at least 152 Navy officers were
directly affected by Tailhook-related letters of censure, non-judicial
punishments, career-ending correspondence, fines, adverse evaluations,
forced resignations, and other adverse actions.31 Since there were only three
courts-martial, however, dissatisfied feminists created the false impression
that the men had gotten off easy.32
b. Feminists Take Advantage of Navy Scandal
Rep. Patricia Schroeder (D-Colo.) wasted no time seizing upon the
Tailhook scandal to force the embarrassed Navy to accept female pilots into
tactical aviation. The liberal congresswoman sponsored and passed an
amendment in the House version of the 1992 Defense Authorization bill,
serving as Commander Battle Force Red Sea, leading a three carrier battle force and
numerous allied ships in the air/surface campaign in Operation Desert Storm. In 2003, Navy
Secretary Gordon England convened a board of review, which cleared Mixson’s name and
removed the unwarranted letter of censure from his file.
In June 2002, another prominent Tailhook target, former Blue Angel Cmdr. Robert E.
Stumpf, finally received his deserved promotion to the rank of captain, which had been
bureaucratically ensnared in the Senate’s “Tailhook Certification” process. Capt. Stumpf, an
exemplary officer who probably would have achieved flag rank, celebrated his retroactive
promotion on the same day that he retired from the Navy.
30. Scarborough, supra note 22; Donnelly, supra note 27, at 59-60. Rear Adm. John
Gordon, the Navy Judge Advocate General, predicted that numerous violations of due
process rights by the Acting DoD Inspector Gen. Derek J. Vander Schaaf, including bungled
interviews, would result in the dismissal of all court martial cases. In an interview with The
San Diego Union-Tribune, Gordon commented, “[T]he politicians took charge, taint[ing]
evidence and the process. Improper command influence ruined the investigations and ruined
the prosecutions.” See Robert J. Caldwell, Hollywood’s Half-True Tailhook, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., May 28, 1995, at G1. The dismissal of the last three pending courts martial on
February 8, 1992, proved Gordon to be correct.
During subsequent litigation brought by Lt. Paula Coughlin against the Tailhook
Association and Hilton Hotels, Judge Philip M. Pro, a United States district court judge in
Las Vegas, criticized the DoD Inspector General’s investigatory techniques and ruled that
the report was “largely conclusory and based upon hearsay indicating its lack of
trustworthiness.” Coughlin v. Tailhook Ass’n, No. 93-044 (D. Nev. Sept. 2, 1994); see also
John F. Harris, U.S. Judge Says Tailhook Report Won’t Fly, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 1994, at
A8.
31. Jerry Unruh, The Flight Plan: Impact of Tailhook, WINGS OF GOLD (Ass’n of Naval
Aviation), Summer 1996, at 12-13.
32. Ellen Goodman, The Navy Got Away with It, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 11, 1994.
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which repealed the law that exempted women from combat aviation.33 She
saw the acceptance of female pilots as the first step in transforming the
unruly “culture” of the male-dominated aviation community.34 Rep.
Schroeder’s harsh criticism of the Navy pressured the organization to rush
the training of women in combat aviation, with tragic consequences.35 Yet,
Rep. Schroeder’s demands presented a cultural contradiction. In essence,
she and the advocates of women in combat were arguing that violence
against women in a Las Vegas hotel corridor was wrong, but combat
violence against women, at the hands of the enemy, was perfectly all right.
The illogic of Rep. Schroeder’s position escaped the attention of House
Armed Services Committee members who, without prior hearings, hastily
approved her amendment to open combat aviation to women. On June 18,
1991, the Senate Armed Services Committee did conduct a comprehensive
and balanced hearing on the Schroeder amendment. Several advocates
testified in favor of the change, but members of the Joint Chiefs testified in
opposition to the legislation.
The Senate legislation that was proposed as a substitute for the
Schroeder bill called for the establishment of a presidential commission to
study all aspects of the issue. Just prior to the floor vote, then-Secretary of
Defense Richard Cheney expressed support for the presidential commission
legislation, but equivocated on Rep. Schroeder’s amendment to put women
in combat aviation. Taking a “ready, fire, aim” approach, the Senate passed
legislation repealing the law regarding women in combat aviation,36 while
simultaneously establishing a presidential commission to analyze and report
on what that would mean.37
c. The 1992 Presidential Commission Study and Report
Throughout 1992, while the Presidential Commission on the Assignment
of Women in the Armed Forces conducted its study, the administration of
President George H.W. Bush refrained from assigning women to combat
33. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, Pub. L. No.
102-190, § 531, 105 Stat. 1290, 1365 (1991) (opening naval aviation to women and
repealing 10 U.S.C. § 8549 (1956), which barred Air Force women from assignment to
“duty in aircraft engaged in combat missions”).
34. Women in the Military: The Tailhook Affair and the Problem of Sexual Harassment:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Mil. Personnel & Compensation of the H. Comm. on
Armed Servs. & Def. Pol’y Panel, 102d Cong. 25 (Sept. 14, 1992) (statement of Rep.
Schroeder).
35. See infra Part II.D.
36. Pub. L. No. 102-190, § 531, 105 Stat. at 1365.
37. Id. § 541, 105 Stat. at 1450.
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aviation. On November 3, 1992, the day that the Presidential Commission
voted to oppose the use of women in most types of combat, including
aviation, President Bush lost his bid for re-election. Thereafter, in 1993,
Congress was preoccupied with then-President Bill Clinton’s demand that
homosexuals be allowed to serve openly in the military. Although there
were no full-scale hearings on the extensive findings and recommendations
of the Presidential Commission, Congress repealed the law that exempted
women from service on combatant ships.38 Navy officials embarrassed by
the Tailhook scandal were reluctant to oppose the legislation. With most
combatant ships and aircraft opened to women, nothing remained except
Department of Defense regulations exempting women from involuntary
assignments in or near direct ground combat units, such as the infantry.
However, Congress was clear in that it did not want the Pentagon to
order women into direct ground combat.39 The National Defense
Authorization Acts for Fiscal Year 1994 and subsequent years have
included language safeguarding congressional oversight on matters of
women in combat.40 If the Pentagon wants to change these regulations
regarding women in ground combat, the Secretary of Defense must approve
and formally notify Congress thirty consecutive legislative days
(approximately three months) in advance.41 Such notice must include an
38. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-160,
§ 541, 107 Stat. 1547, 1659 (1993) (repealing 10 U.S.C. § 6015 (1991), which barred
women from assignment to “duty on vessels that are engaged in combat missions (other than
as aviation officers as part of an air wing or other air element assigned to such a vessel)” and
from assignment to “other than temporary duty on other vessels of the Navy except hospital
ships, transports, and vessels of a similar classification not expected to be assigned combat
missions”).
39. JEANNE HOLM, WOMEN IN THE MILITARY: AN UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 118-19
(1983). Contrary to popular belief, Congress never enacted a statute that specifically
exempted women from ground combat. Unlike specific ships and aircraft on combatant
missions, ground combat units were more difficult for Congress to define. Members also
trusted that the Pentagon would never assign women to ground combat units such as the
infantry.
40. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 103-160, § 541, 107 Stat. at 1659.
41. Id. § 542, 107 Stat. at 1659-60. The FY 1994 congressional notification law
regarding direct ground combat was reinforced and expanded in the FY 2001 and 2002
NDAAs. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Pub. L. No. 106398, § 573, 114 Stat. 1654, 1654A-136 (2000) (enacting 10 U.S.C. § 6035 (2000) (requiring
the Secretary of Defense to give Congress a thirty-day notice before either assigning women
to serve aboard submarines or configuring submarines to allow for women’s service));
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-107, § 591, 115
Stat. 1012, 1125 (2002) (amending the law from FY 1994). The notification law regarding
direct ground combat was restated in the FY 2006 NDAA. See National Defense
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analysis of the effect of the proposed changes on the exemption of young
women from Selective Service obligations,42 which the Supreme Court
previously has tied to their exemption from ground combat.43
d. The Aspin Regulations
On April 28, 1993, then-Secretary of Defense Les Aspin issued a
memorandum announcing that he was going to begin the training of female
pilots for tactical aviation, promote repeal of the remaining law regarding
combatant ships, and make significant changes in DoD regulations
regarding the assignment of servicewomen in or near close combat.44 On
January 13, 1994, Secretary Aspin followed up on his plan by issuing a
two-page memorandum setting forth regulations that would govern the
assignment of women in or near direct ground combat. In addition, the
memorandum provided a definition of what constitutes direct ground
combat.45 The 1994 regulations, known as the Aspin rules, apply to all the
military services and remain in effect today.
With identical letters dated January 21, 1994, Secretary Aspin officially
reported the rule changes to the Chairmen and Ranking Members of the
House and Senate Armed Services Committees.46 The new rule and
definition of direct ground combat provided:
A. Rule. Service members are eligible to be assigned to all
positions for which they are qualified, except that women shall
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 541(a)(1), 119 Stat. 3136,
3251 (2006) (enacting 10 U.S.C. § 652 (West Supp. 2007)).
Legislation sponsored by Rep. Roscoe Bartlett (R-Md.), and enacted as part of the FY
2001 and 2002 NDAAs, mandated official notice to Congress at least thirty legislative days
(when both Houses are in session) before women are assigned to submarines as well as
direct ground combat.
42. 10 U.S.C. § 652.
43. See generally Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
44. See Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Les Aspin to the Secretaries of the
Army, Navy, and Air Force et al., Policy on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces
(Apr. 28, 1993) [hereinafter Policy on the Assignment of Women].
45. See Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Les Aspin to the Secretaries of the
Army, Navy, and Air Force et al., Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule
(Jan. 13, 1994) [hereinafter Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule],
available at http://cmrlink.org/cmrnotes/lesaspin%20dgc%20defassign%20rule%20011394.
pdf.
46. See Letters from Secretary of Defense Les Aspin to House Armed Services
Committee Chairman Ronald V. Dellums and Ranking Member Floyd Spence, and to Senate
Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn and Ranking Member Strom Thurmond
(Jan. 21, 1994).
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be excluded from assignment to units below the brigade level
whose primary mission is to engage in direct combat on the
ground, as defined below:
B. Definition. Direct ground combat is engaging an enemy on
the ground with individual or crew served weapons, while being
exposed to hostile fire and to a high probability of direct physical
contact with the hostile force’s personnel. Direct ground combat
takes place well forward on the battlefield while locating and
closing with the enemy to defeat them by fire, maneuver, or
shock effect.47
The new combat definition permitted four additional restrictions on the
assignment of women:
x

Where the Service Secretary attests that the costs of
appropriate berthing and privacy arrangements are
prohibitive;

x

Where units and positions are doctrinally required to
physically collocate and remain with direct ground combat
units that are closed to women;

x

Where units are engaged in long range reconnaissance
operations and Special Operations Forces missions; and

x

Where job related physical requirements would necessarily
exclude the vast majority of women service members.48

On July 28, 1994, Aspin’s successor, William J. Perry, approved lists of
units that would be opened or closed to women, in compliance with the
Aspin regulations announced on January 13.49
The most significant changes set forth in the Aspin regulations were: (1)
the elimination of the so-called “DoD Risk Rule,”50 which exempted
47. Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule, supra note 45.
48. Id.
49. Memorandum from Secretary of Defense William Perry to the Secretaries of the
Army, Navy, and Air Force et al., Application of the Definition of Direct Ground Combat
and Assignment Rule (July 28, 1994) [hereinafter Application of Direct Ground Combat
Definition and Rule], available at http://cmrlink.org/cmrnotes/wjperry%20letter%20072894.
50. The Department of Defense established the Risk Rule in 1988 to help standardize
the services’ assignment of women to hostile areas. In evaluating whether a non-combat
position should be closed to women, each service interpreted the DoD Risk Rule according
to its own mission requirements. The Risk Rule read as follows:
[R]isks of direct combat, exposure to hostile fire, or capture are proper criteria
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women from assignments in close proximity to close combat units, and (2)
the removal of the phrase “substantial risk of capture” from the definition of
direct ground combat. In general, the DoD Risk Rule had made it possible
for women to volunteer for military service without being forced to serve in
units operating in or near the front lines of direct ground combat. Although
not a perfect standard, the Risk Rule reflected the then-prevailing view that
female soldiers in support units should not be needlessly exposed to risk of
injury, death, or capture while serving in close proximity with close combat
units such as the infantry, armor, field artillery, Marine infantry, and
Special Operations Forces.
Eliminating the DoD Risk Rule and changing the definition of direct
ground combat made available to women hundreds of military occupational
specialties and approximately 80,699 positions on land, as well as a total of
259,199 positions in all the military services, since 1993.51 These newly
opened positions included some brigade-level headquarters of direct ground
combat units, and support units that do not routinely “collocate” with direct
ground combat units at the battalion level.52 The Aspin regulations
continued to exempt female soldiers from assignments in smaller direct
ground combat battalions, such as the infantry, armor, field artillery, Marine
infantry, Special Operations Forces such as the Rangers and Navy SEALS,
and Special Operations Forces helicopters. Lastly, the Aspin regulations
exempted women from assignment in support units that constantly
“collocate” or embed with direct ground combat units such as the infantry.53

for closing non-combat positions or units to women, when the type, degree, and
duration of such risk are equal to or greater than the combat units with which
they are normally associated within a given theater of operations.
See PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at C-36 (Findings 1.16, 1.17); see also
Center for Military Readiness, Policy Analysis: Why American Servicewomen Are Serving at
Greater Risk (Apr. 2003), http://cmrlink.org/CMRNotes/M38V8CCMRRPT16.pdf.
51. See Dep’t of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Public Affairs News
Release No. 449-94, Positions and Occupations Open to Active Duty Women by Service, As
of October 1, 1994 (July 29, 1994); Lists of open and closed positions submitted by the
services and approved by Defense Secretary William J. Perry on July 28, 1994 (on file with
author); Table provided by Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel & Readiness titled
“Positons Opened Since April 1993” on July 28, 1994 (on file with author); see also GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GENDER ISSUES: INFORMATION ON DOD’S ASSIGNMENT POLICY AND
DIRECT GROUND COMBAT DEFINITION (1998), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/
ns99007.pdf.
52. Larger brigades, which are composed of several battalions, are composed of
approximately 3600 to 3900 soldiers. Smaller battalions usually include 700 to 800 soldiers.
53. See infra Part II.A.2.b.
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e. Female Soldiers Serving at Greater Risk
The full effect of the rule changes that constituted the Aspin regulations
did not become apparent until nine years later. On March 23, 2003, four
days into the ground war in Iraq, the 507th Maintenance Unit, operating
with a Patriot Missile Battery of the 3rd Infantry Division, took a wrong
turn on the road near the city of Nasiriyah and was ambushed.54 Absent the
DoD Risk Rule, which was abolished in 1994, the gender-integrated
support unit was part of a column of support troops accompanying the
aggressive 3rd Infantry Division on its way to liberate Baghdad.55
Within hours the nation witnessed on television the frightened face of
captured Army Spec. Shoshana Johnson on Al Jazeera TV, together with
four fellow soldiers. The Iraqi video also showed the bodies of several dead
American soldiers, some of whom appeared to have been shot at point
blank range.56 Among the missing were Pfc. Lori Piestewa, a young single
54. See Richard S. Lowry, The Story of Jessica Lynch: What Really Happened in
Nasiriyah, DAILY STANDARD (online), Apr. 24, 2007, http://www.weeklystandard.com/
Content/Public/Articles/000/000/013/568yzaz.asp. Lowry described the actions of Marines
who fought at Nasirayah and Army Sergeant Donald Walters, whose vehicle got stuck in the
sand. See id. Walters was caught fifteen miles behind enemy lines and “resisted for as long
as he could. He probably ‘fought to his last bullet.’ He was captured alive and taken to an
Iraqi stronghold and later murdered.” Id. Lowry added,
The story of the Marines’ battle to secure Nasiriyah is an amazing saga that
everyone should read. The battle was filled with individual acts of heroism. A
Distinguished Flying Cross, two Navy Crosses, a handful of Silver Stars, and a
larger handful of Bronze Stars were awarded for valor in the battle. Sergeant
Donald Walters was awarded a Silver Star, as well. Donald was a sandy-haired
young man. Some believe that it was an intercepted Iraqi radio report of his
ordeal that was somehow attributed to Jessica Lynch, the only blond female in
the unit.
Id.; see also Jane McHugh, Navigation Error Led to Attack on Convoy, ARMY TIMES, July
21, 2003, available at http://www.armytimes.com/legacy/new/0-ARMYPAPER-2009767.
php; Howard L. Rosenberg, Nightline: The Real Story of Pfc. Jessica Lynch’s Convoy (ABC
television broadcast June 17, 2003) (transcript available at http://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/
story?id=128387 (Part 1); http://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/story?id=128389 (Part 2)); Laura
Cruz, 507th “Fought Hard,” EL PASO TIMES, July 9, 2003, at 1A.
55. If the DoD Risk Rule had still been in effect, it is possible that this and similar
support units would have been all-male or, if gender-integrated, assigned elsewhere until the
completion of direct ground combat operations, i.e., the direct ground combat attack on
Baghdad.
56. Paul Martin, U.S. Calls Footage of POWs “Disgusting,” WASH. TIMES, Mar. 24,
2003, at A01.
There were conflicting accounts of how many bodies were visible on the video
[broadcast on Al Jazeera], but all agreed that at least four persons could be seen
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mother of two toddlers, and nineteen-year-old Pfc. Jessica Lynch.57 This
was a surprise to many Americans, including the parents of female soldiers,
who thought there were rules against women in close combat.58
Nine days later, Marines and Special Operations Forces found the body
of Pfc. Piestewa in a shallow grave near the civilian hospital where they had
rescued Pfc. Jessica Lynch.59 In a front page Washington Post story that
captivated the world, Pfc. Lynch was initially and erroneously described as
a teenage “Girl Rambo” warrior who had fired all her ammunition killing
Iraqis before she was captured.60 Some feminists hailed the capture of
Shoshana Johnson and the “GI Jane” image of Pfc. Lynch as examples of
women’s ability to fight in combat, which they considered justification for
advancement of other feminist goals.61 Although doctors who had examined
in U.S. Army uniforms, some of them lying in pools of blood. At least two of
them appeared to have died from wounds to the head. The video also showed
individual interviews with five prisoners, several of whom appeared to be
extremely frightened. The one woman among the prisoners [Spc. Shoshawna
Johnson] had a large bandage around her ankle, and one of the men was lying
on a blanket and had to be assisted to sit up.
Id.; see also Lowry, supra note 54.
57. Chris Roberts, Associated Press, Texas Army Post, Kin Horrified About POWs,
WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 2003.
58. See Lowry, supra note 54; Kari Huus, POW Video Reopens Gender Debate,
MSNBC.COM, Mar. 25, 2003, http://www.msnbc.com/news/890275.asp; Cathy Booth
Thomas, Taken by Surprise: This Single Mom Joined the Army To Be a Cook. How Did She
Become a POW?, TIME, Apr. 7, 2003, at 64-65.
59. See Lowry, supra note 54 (describing this as the first successful rescue of an
American POW since WWII; what made it even more remarkable is that it occurred in the
center of a war-torn city and was precisely executed without a single casualty); see also Bill
Gertz, Military Begins Effort To Identify 11 Bodies: Remains Found in Rescue of Lynch,
WASH. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2002, at A1; Joyce Howard Price, Military Identifies Recovered
Bodies, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2003, at A1 (in which Air Force Maj. Gen. Gene Renuart of
U.S. Central Command in Qatar said, “They did not have shovels in order to dig those
graves up, so they dug them up with their hands.”).
60. Susan Schmidt & Vernon Loeb, She Was Fighting to the Death, WASH. POST, Apr.
3, 2003, at A1. A flag-bedecked photo of a smiling Jessica Lynch in her uniform highlighted
the article, which was republished worldwide. On April 20, 2003, The Washington Post
ombudsman Michael Getler wrote in an article that the story was thinly sourced and
probably not true. Michael Getler, Ombudsman, Reporting Private Lynch, WASH. POST, Apr.
20, 2003, at B06; see also Lowry, supra note 54 (writing that Lynch and Piestewa were
initially taken to the Tykar Military Hospital, which was near the ambush site and later
identified as the headquarters of Saddam Hussein’s henchman “Chemical Ali,” where
hundreds of gas masks, protective chemical suits, and a torture chamber were found).
61. See, e.g., Editorial, The Pinking of the Armed Forces, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2003, at
A14; Anne Applebaum, When Women Go to War, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 2003, at A17;
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Pfc. Lynch in Germany knew otherwise, they and Pentagon officials did not
correct the hyped-up legend that had grown up around her. It was not the
fault of Pfc. Lynch that her story became distorted—in fact, she
courageously told the painful truth in a network television interview and in
her book, I Am a Soldier Too.62
Pfc. Lynch and her friend Pfc. Piestewa were injured during the ambush
and horribly abused in the hours immediately following their capture.
According to medical reports, Pfc. Lynch was anally raped, many of her
bones were broken, and she barely survived.63 Lynch was unconscious for
approximately four hours following the ambush attack on her Humvee.
Sexual assault probably occurred during that time, and most likely in the
first building where she and other captives were taken, described in some
news reports as a Fedayeen headquarters building that included a medical
aid station.64 At some point the severely injured Pfc. Lynch was taken to the
civilian Hussein hospital in Nasiriyah, where she awakened. Iraqi doctors
Richard Sandomir, Citing Role of Women in War, Burk Raises Pressure on Augusta, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 27, 2003, at S1 (describing Martha Burk’s campaign to convince the Augusta
National Golf Club to admit women because female soldiers were serving in the war).
62. RICK BRAGG, I AM A SOLDIER TOO: THE JESSICA LYNCH STORY (2003).
63. Prime Time Live (ABC television broadcast Nov. 11, 2003) (transcript on file with
author). Medical records from the American hospital in Germany indicated that “[Lynch]
was a victim of anal sexual assault . . . [her] body armor and bloody uniform were found in a
house near the ambush site.” Id. The records also noted “the traumatic nature of her peri-anal
lesions.” Id.
64. Bill Gertz, Coalition Forces Uncover Iraqi Torture Chambers, Graves, WASH.
TIMES, Apr. 23, 2003, at A11 (reporting that U.S. Marines had uncovered a torture chamber
near Nasiriyah on April 8; in a “hospital room,” the Marines found a car battery next to a
metal bed frame that apparently was used as an electric-shock device; and photos of burned
and tortured bodies were found nearby); see also Intelligence Tip, Local Iraqis Help Cited in
POW Rescue, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2003, at A10. Most reports failed to acknowledge that
there were two locations involved, though some reports said the captives were initially taken
to a Fedayeen headquarters with a small medical facility placed inside to deter air attacks.
The Washington Times quoted MSNBC correspondent Kerry Sanders, who accompanied
U.S. troops investigating what happened after the ambush, as stating:
The forces found a bloodied U.S. uniform, of a kind used by female soldiers,
when they seized another hospital, used by Iraqi forces, in Nasiriyah last week,
Mr. Sanders said. MSNBC reported that Pfc. Lynch originally was held at the
nearby hospital where Marines found the bloody uniform. They also found a
room with a bed and large battery next to it, indicating that it had been used as
a torture chamber.
Id. Pfc. Lynch, who was reportedly unconscious for approximately four hours at the first
building, has no memory of that time. Id. It is possible that video of the captured soldiers,
including some who had been shot at point-blank range, was taken at this building, which
was subsequently destroyed.
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and nurses said they comforted and cared for Lynch until April 1, 2003,
when she was rescued by a combined Special Operations Forces Team.65
On December 30, 2003, NBC News briefly aired a video obtained from
an Iraqi source, which was probably taken at the first facility where the
captives had been taken.66 The video, which received little public notice
when it aired, showed the bloody and bruised faces of Pfc. Lynch and Pfc.
Piestewa, the single mother of two toddlers, while in captivity.67 Pfc. Lynch
appears deathly pale and unconscious, her eyes nearly closed and rolled
back, lying on a bed next to her friend, Pfc. Piestewa, who would soon
become the first female soldier killed in Iraq. Pfc. Piestewa’s battered and
loosely bandaged face is shown grimacing in pain when a gloved hand jerks
her body around to make her face more visible to the camera.68
In her ABC Prime Time Live interview with Jessica Lynch, Diane
Sawyer asked the wounded soldier whether it was difficult to include the
truth in her book. Out of the mouth of a former Army private came words
that star-studded generals have not had the courage to say. “Yes, it was,”
Pfc. Lynch responded. “But, you know, if it did happen, then people need to
know that that’s what kind of people that they are, and that’s how they treat
65. See Lowry, supra note 54; Alan Feuer, Aftereffects: A Hospital Ward; Rescued
Soldier’s Iraqi Doctors Doubled as Her Guardians, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2003, at A12;
Dana Priest, William Booth & Susan Schmidt, A Broken Body, a Broken Story, Pieced
Together, WASH. POST, June 17, 2003, at A1; Michael Getler, Ombudsman, A Long, and
Incomplete, Correction, WASH. POST, June 29, 2003, at B06; Sources Say Jessica Lynch Has
Amnesia, FOXNEWS.COM, May 4, 2003, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,85936,00.
html; John Kampfner, Saving Private Lynch Story “Flawed” (BBC News broadcast May 15,
2003) (transcript available at http://newsw.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/correspondent/
3028585.stm). At some point Pfc. Lynch was taken to the Saddam Hussein General Hospital
in Nasiriyah, where she received adequate care prior to her rescue. News accounts about Pfc.
Lynch were generally confused for several reasons: the initial hype about Lynch’s heroism,
the failure of hospital officials in Germany to correct those erroneous news reports, Lynch’s
own amnesia, gag orders imposed on the Special Operations Forces troops who rescued
Lynch, and European suspicions that the rescue had been staged.
66. Richard Engel, Tape Confirms Iraqis Tried To Save U.S. POWs (NBC television
broadcast Dec. 30, 2003). The headline on this news report is misleading and inconsistent
with the troubling Iraqi video, which showed light bandages on the battered faces of the two
women. Pfc. Lynch appeared pale and unconscious, while Pfc. Piestewa appeared to be in
pain and near death. At the time of the NBC News report, legitimate Iraqi doctors who
treated Pfc. Lynch at the Hussein hospital in Nasiriyah were insisting in news interviews that
they had given Pfc. Lynch the best care possible. The previously undisclosed Iraqi video
apparently was taken of the female captives elsewhere, probably at the first building where
Pfc. Lynch and Pfc. Piestewa were taken immediately after the ambush.
67. See id.
68. See id.
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the female soldiers that are over there.”69 Feminists suddenly dropped
Lynch as their hero and remained largely silent as the death toll of military
servicewomen continued to mount.
Americans have been enormously impressed by the courage, loyalty to
duty, and patriotism of women who have volunteered to serve in the current
war. Support for women in the military is not an issue. Nevertheless, there
are questions of policy that remain largely unexamined and unresolved. The
Bush Administration has failed to direct Pentagon officials to find a way
that female soldiers can proudly serve our country without exposing them
to greater, unequal risk.
2. Ground Combat: Violations of Policy and Law
a. The Definition of “Combat”
Definitions are important, and the word “combat” is frequently misused.
Although Department of Defense (DoD) regulations regarding combat are
not solely tied to “front lines,” they do draw important distinctions based on
the mission of each different unit. For instance, in the current war, all
deployed soldiers are “in harm’s way,” but direct ground combat (DGC)
troops are specifically trained to engage and attack the enemy, while under
fire, with deliberate offensive action.
DoD regulations exempt female soldiers from direct ground combat
units. Under the associated “collocation rule,” also set forth in the 1994
Aspin regulations, female soldiers are exempt from assignment in support
units that are “collocated,” or “embedded,” with direct ground combat
battalions below the brigade level. The “collocation rule,” therefore, serves
to exempt female soldiers from combined infantry/armor maneuver
battalions in the Army’s newly “transformed” modular brigade combat
teams (BCTs),70 which used to be called “units of action” (UAs). Even in
69. See Prime Time Live (ABC television broadcast Nov. 11, 2003); see also Elaine
Donnelly, Jessica Lynch Reality Shatters Amazon Myths, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Nov. 30,
2003, at G1.
70. In the early 1990s, following the Persian Gulf War, the Army began to “draw down”
and “transform” itself. Army divisions were reorganized as smaller, modular organizations,
which were designed to be more flexible and agile than traditional divisions. These modular
organizations, initially called “units of action” (UAs), later were named brigade combat
teams (BCTs). Units operating with wheeled vehicles were called Interim Brigade Combat
Teams (IBCTs), and later Stryker Brigade Combat teams (SBCTs). A typical maneuver
battalion in a brigade combat team combines infantry and heavy armor troops (tanks) with a
collocated forward support company (FSC), which provides immediate support to the
maneuver battalion. Brigade-level support troops come and go intermittently, but collocated
FSCs constantly remain with the ground combat maneuver battalions.
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modular units, and battlefields that do not have “front lines,” the collocation
rule is applicable and should be enforced.
All soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan are “in harm’s way,” but the
missions of infantry, armor, Marine infantry, Special Operations Forces,
multiple launch rocket systems, and other specialized units, such as Military
Transition Teams that train Iraqi men in combat skills, have not changed.
Nor did DoD regulations regarding women in combat change during the
Army’s transformation to modular brigade combat teams. Brigade-level
troops provide support to combat battalions intermittently, coming and
going from larger forward operating bases (FOBs). In contrast, collocated
support troops and forward support companies are embedded and remain at
the smaller battalion level one hundred percent of the time. Brigade-level
units are open to women, but combat-collocated support troops, at the “tip
of the spear” battalion level, are required by regulation to be all-male.71
The offensive missions of infantry and Special Operations Forces have
not changed, but there are some borderline military occupational specialties
that should be reevaluated. For example, military police units in Iraq have
taken on new duties that involve more than traditional military law
enforcement. That occupation should be reevaluated and possibly divided
with occupational titles that reflect actual mission requirements. Gender
assignment codes also should be reviewed and revised to comply with
existing DoD regulations. If the Army wants to change those rules,
Congress must receive notice of proposed changes well in advance, in
compliance with laws mandating congressional oversight.72
Some female soldiers and Marines have been assigned to assist infantry
units by searching Iraqi civilians in “female search teams” (FSTs). Women
performing this duty are in harm’s way and courageous, but since they are
not trained to attack the enemy, their mission is not designated “direct
ground combat” under the DoD definition. The use of female soldiers and
Marines to assist in searches of female Iraqi civilians, or to participate in
humanitarian missions, does not justify incremental repeal of women’s land
combat exemptions.73 Nor is it prudent to keep assigning American women
to perform this role, without training Iraqi women to do female security
searches at a future time.
71. Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule, supra note 45.
72. See supra note notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
73. Sandra Jontz, Marine Raid Breaks Gender Barrier, STARS & STRIPES (Mideast ed.),
May 4, 2005, available at http://stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=
28044&archive=true. This article shows female Marines handing out stuffed animals to
children and conducting female civilian searches, among other things.
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b. Why the Collocation Rule Matters
The collocation rule improves chances for survival and mission
accomplishment in direct ground combat missions, such as the battles to
liberate Baghdad in 2003 and Fallujah in November 2004. Soldiers and
Marines in those fierce battles benefited from advanced technology, but
their tasks still required them to have the ability to carry physical burdens
that lie beyond the capabilities of most women.74 A collocated maintenance
soldier is not trained to attack the enemy in deliberate offensive action, but
he may be needed to physically lift and evacuate a wounded infantryman or
Marine who has been injured and might die without immediate medical
help. Ground combat soldiers today carry between eighty and one hundred
pounds on their backs—about the same weight that Roman legionnaires
carried in the days of Julius Caesar.75
74. See William Gregor, Not Equipped for Rigors of War, KANSAS CITY STAR, July 16,
2005, at B7. Dr. Gregor, a retired Army Lieutenant Colonel and military training expert who
testified before the Presidential Commission on September 12, 1992, wrote:
The public may not understand the debate over the assignment of women to
direct combat roles. After all, Army women have been killed and wounded in
the fight in Iraq. However, being subject to hostile fire is not the same as being
assigned a direct combat role. The commuters on London’s Tube were subject
to hostile fire and so are children on the streets of Baghdad . . . . The 1982
Women in the Army Policy Review observed that only eight percent of women
were capable of performing jobs in the heavy work category and proposed a
test for recruits to measure physical potential to be used in assigning
occupational specialties. Because the test would have limited career field
choices, feminists strongly objected, and it was dropped.
Id.; see also MITCHELL, supra note 15, at 104-22; infra note 77 and accompanying text.
75. See Elizabeth Weise, Soldiers in Iraq Carry Extra Load: Back Pain, USA TODAY,
Nov. 21, 2005, at 6D (reporting on a study that found “[m]ore than half of U.S. soldiers who
have been medically evacuated from Iraq and treated at two of the military’s large pain
treatment centers suffer not from battle wounds but from bad backs”). “Inherent in being a
soldier is carrying large weights. Historically, the ideal ‘carry weight’ is a third of your body
weight,” said Lt. Col. (Dr.) Frank Christopher, chief of deployment health at Fort Bragg,
North Carolina. Id. However, many troops in the field carry much more than that—up to 180
pounds, in some cases. See also Matthew Cox & Rick Maze, Troops Get Extra Armor,
ARMY TIMES, Jan. 23, 2006, at 14 (reporting that side plates in the new “Interceptor” body
armor system have nearly doubled the weight of protective vests from sixteen to thirty-one
pounds since March 2003). Both Army and Marine officials have warned members of
Congress that “Every pound of protective gear hinders combat troops’ ability to hop over
walls, search house after house and—when necessary—dive for cover.” Id.
As new technologies emerge, the weight burden is likely to increase. See Matthew Cox,
Fielding the Future NOW, From GPS to Helmet-Mounted Displays, Land Warrior Brings
Cyberspace to Soldiers, ARMY TIMES, Sept. 11, 2006, at 14 (showing photos of soldiers in
full “Land Warrior” battle gear undergoing testing at Fort Lewis, Wash.). It is likely that
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There is no question that female soldiers are brave—this has been proven
many times in the current war. But body size, strength, and physical
closeness to direct ground combat troops during offensive operations, such
as the attacks on Baghdad in March 2003 and Fallujah in November 2004,
are factors that are important for survival and mission accomplishment.76 In
direct ground combat, women do not have an equal opportunity to survive
or to help fellow soldiers survive.77 Substituting women for men in combatcollocated support units increases danger for everyone, while introducing a
host of disciplinary and deployability problems that would detract from unit
cohesion, readiness, and morale.
soldiers will someday carry: (1) a helmet-mounted computer display; (2) an audio headset
with microphone; (3) a soldier-control unit for the Global Positioning System (GPS); (4) a
multi-function laser equipped with an infrared illuminator and pointer; (5) a large
rechargeable battery (to supply ten hours of power); (6) a navigation module with a GPS
map to track the wearer’s position and positions of fellow soldiers; (7) a voice/data radio
system for communications from platoon level up to unit headquarters; and (8) a microcomputer processor to manage information flow. Id. All of this equipment is estimated to
weigh seventeen pounds and will replace items currently in use, which weigh about eight
pounds. Id. In addition to these burdens, soldiers must also carry weapons, ammunition,
food, and water. Indeed, the only item that has gotten lighter in modern military history is
freeze-dried coffee.
76. Cox, supra note 75; Gregor, supra note 74 (“Any male who meets Army entrance
standards has the physical stature necessary to achieve the physical requirements for direct
combat roles . . . . The general population of women is not so physically equipped.”). Dr.
William Gregor, a retired Army Colonel and military training expert who testified before the
Presidential Commission on September 12, 1992, presented data showing a wide gap in
physical capabilities in Army ROTC cadets. See PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 5, at C-41 (Finding 1.39). Similar findings by Dr. Gregor, presented to the
Congressional Commission on Military Training and Gender-Related Issues, see infra note
290, on Dec. 2, 1998, are available at http://www.cmrlink.org/cmrnotes/gibtapdx.pdf (last
visited Apr. 21, 2007), at Appendix C. The Presidential Commission found that, “[i]n
general, women are shorter, weigh less and have less muscle mass and have a greater
relative fat content than men. . . . Female dynamic upper torso muscular strength is
approximately fifty-sixty percent that of males . . . [and] female aerobic capacity [important
for endurance] is approximately seventy to seventy-five percent that of males.” See
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at C-70 (Findings 2.1.1, 2.1.2, 2.1.3).
77. George Neumayr, Your Mother’s Army, AM. SPECTATOR, May 2005, at 27. A
Marine writing to Neumayr described an incident that occurred during his training of a
gender-integrated Marine Reserve unit:
During one training cycle . . . some of the women participated in an urban
warfare course. One of them promptly broke her leg doing a spider drop out a
window. Her smaller frame could not take the shock of landing after dropping
approximately 6 feet while weighed down with all the equipment a Marine is
expected to wear in battle.
Id.

2010]

CONSTRUCTING THE CO-ED MILITARY

643

Both women and men in the military have a right to expect official
compliance with policy and law. If Pentagon officials want to eliminate the
collocation rule or any other regulation affecting women, they should make
the case for those changes publicly—and in advance—as required by law.
c. The 3rd Infantry (Unit of Action) Brigade Combat Team
In March 2004, the U.S. Army began to depart from both DoD policy
and the notification law regarding women in or near ground combat. Local
commanders of a newly organized combined infantry/armor battalion,
which was based at Fort Stewart, Georgia, and part of the 3rd Infantry
Division, improperly assigned a female captain to command a forward
support company (FSC), which was collocated with a direct ground combat
battalion required by regulation to be all-male. The combined
infantry/armor maneuver battalion, part of the “3rd ID,” was one of the first
of the Army’s reorganized modular “units of action” to deploy to Iraq.78
The battalion-level forward support company in question was designed to
collocate or to embed, one hundred percent of the time, with the soldiers of
the 4th Battalion, 64th Armored Regiment, known as the 4-64th. As such,
the FSC fell under the extant DoD collocation rule, which required its
personnel to be all male.79
When the situation first became known in March 2004, the Office of the
Army General Counsel informed 3rd ID commanders that any attempt to
gender-integrate battalion level FSCs embedded with combined
infantry/armor direct ground combat battalions, including the 4-64th’s
forward support company, would constitute a violation of current policy
and the congressional notification law.80 Within weeks, the Army Chief of
Staff, Gen. Peter Schoomaker, intervened. The 3rd ID Commander, Maj.
Gen. William Webster, was told to bring the 4-64th infantry/armor
battalion’s FSC back into compliance with Army policy and law.
Appropriate reassignments were made, and the situation was resolved
satisfactorily for everyone concerned.
However, despite the compliance efforts and reassignments, a second
attempt to unilaterally gender-integrate the 4-64th infantry/armor maneuver
78. Correspondence between a known but confidential source at Fort Stewart, Ga., and
the author (on file with author).
79. Chain of Command Chart, 4th Battalion, 64th Armored Regiment (Apr. 15, 2004)
(on file with author).
80. Telephone conversation between a female judge advocate general (JAG) and the
author in Spring 2004; see also National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-107, § 591, 115 Stat. 1012, 1125 (2001) (amending the FY 1994 off-code provision
that was ultimately codified at 10 U.S.C. § 652 (West Supp. 2007)).
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battalion’s collocated FSC apparently was initiated by the DoD Office of
Personnel & Readiness, Army Human Resources Command officials, and
commanders of the 3rd Infantry Division. Shortly thereafter, soldiers of the
4-64th were ordered to administratively change their unit’s modified table
of organization and equipment (MTOE)81 in order to accomplish two
things: (1) administratively “assign” the FSC troops to the legally genderintegrated brigade support battalions, on paper only; and then (2) physically
“attach” the FSC troops back to the maneuver battalion.
In the 3rd ID and other divisions, brigade level positions that are “in
harm’s way”—but not collocated with direct ground combat units such as
the infantryare legally open to female soldiers. However, the smaller
battalion-level direct ground combat (DGC) units, and the support units
(FSCs) that collocate with them, are required to be all-male. Soldiers in the
formerly all-male forward support company, and the infantry/armor
maneuver battalion with which it was collocated, were well aware that the
unusual administrative paperwork was contrived as a way to circumvent
DoD policy and the congressional notification law.
In the 3rd ID and other reorganized “brigade combat teams,” known as
BCTs, modular direct ground combat maneuver battalions were ordered to
do the same thing. Contrary to the DoD collocation rule, an undisclosed
number of female soldiers have been “employed” in FSCs that are
physically collocated with direct ground combat battalions.82
81. An Army brigade is composed of approximately 3600 (infantry) to 3900 (heavy
armor) soldiers, and battalions include 700 to 800 soldiers. Each Army unit has a table of
organization and equipment (TOE) or modified table of organization and equipment
(MTOE), which lists every billet and piece of equipment that is assigned to that unit. The
MTOE computer chart for personnel includes a column for gender codes, as designated by
the Army’s “direct combat probability code” (DCPC) system. Units coded “P-1” are open to
males only. Units coded “P-2” are open to both genders. In the 3rd ID, soldiers were ordered
to remove combat-collocated FSC soldiers from the MTOEs of the combined infantry/armor
maneuver battalions. Instead, these personnel were included on the MTOE lists of legally
gender-mixed brigade-level support units. This was done even though FSC soldiers, some of
them female, were physically “attached” to all-male maneuver battalions. An Army briefing
titled “Combat Exclusion Quick Look Options,” dated May 10, 2004, admitted that this
administrative strategy could be seen as “subterfuge” to circumvent current policy and law.
See Dep’t of the Army, Combat Exclusion Quick Look Options 14 (May 10, 2004)
[hereinafter
Combat
Exclusion
Quick
Look
Options],
available
at
http://cmrlink.org/cmrnotes/ce-qlo%20051004.pdf.
82. E-mail correspondence from sources at Ft. Stewart, Ga. to author (beginning in Mar.
2004) (on file with the author); telephone conversations and meetings between Army and
DoD officials at the Pentagon and the author (Spring, Summer 2004); copies of modified
table of organization and equipment (MTOE) lists obtained from a confidential source (on
file with author). Throughout 2004, Army officials denied there were any female soldiers in
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d. Army Admits Strategy of “Subterfuge”
The rationale and blueprint for gender integration in the 3rd ID were set
forth in a twenty-two-page Army PowerPoint presentation, titled “Combat
Exclusion Quick Look Options.”83 Among other things, the May 10, 2004
presentation attempted to justify circumvention of the collocation rule by
drawing a distinction between the 1994 DoD regulations, promulgated by
Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, and “additional restrictions” that the Army
had in place two years earlier.84
This was an odd argument, for three reasons: (1) the 1992 Army
regulations in question, AR 600-13,85 were superseded by the DoD
regulations set forth by Secretary Les Aspin in January 1994;86 (2) the
Army’s plans to implement the Aspin regulations were approved by
Secretary Aspin’s successor, William J. Perry, whose July 28, 1994
memorandum, approving the Army’s list of open and closed units, has not
been overruled or changed by a successor;87 and (3) the Army’s 1992 rules
included a definition of “Direct Combat” that included a Risk Rule, similar
to that of the DoD, which exempted female soldiers from direct ground
combat and support units involving a “substantial risk of capture.”88
the ground combat-collocated FSCs. However, in an interview with a Boston Globe reporter
in January 2005, an Army spokesman finally admitted that “scores” of female soldiers were
being assigned to FSCs at Fort Stewart, Ga. See Bryan Bender, U.S. Women Get Closer to
Combat, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 26, 2005, at A1.
83. Combat Exclusion Quick Look Options, supra note 81, at 3-15.
84. Id. at 3, 13-15. This was a questionable attempt to justify or excuse the Secretary of
the Army acting on his own, in circumvention of DoD regulations, to place female soldiers
in ground combat-collocated support units. The “additional restrictions” in the Army’s 1992
rules were minor. See infra note 85. But even if variations in the language of 1992 Army
rules had been substantive, the 1994 Aspin regulations superseded them.
85. Army Policy for the Assignment of Female Soldiers, AR 600-13 (effective Apr. 27,
1992) [hereinafter Army Policy for the Assignment of Female Soldiers], available at
http://www.armyg1.army.mil/eo/documents/ar600_13.pdf. In its 1992 rules, the Army
defined Direct Ground Combat as:
Engaging an enemy with individual or crew served weapons while being
exposed to direct enemy fire, a high probability of direct physical contact with
the enemy’s personnel, and a substantial risk of capture. Direct combat takes
place while closing with the enemy by fire, maneuver, and shock effect in order
to destroy or capture the enemy, or while repelling the enemy’s assault by fire,
close combat, or counterattack.
Id.
86. Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule, supra note 45.
87. Application of Direct Ground Combat Definition and Rule, supra note 49.
88. Army Policy for the Assignment of Female Soldiers, supra note 85.
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Secretary Aspin abolished the Risk Rule with his January 1994
memorandum.89 Officials trying to claim that the Army’s 1992 rules are
still in effect have to explain why the former Risk Rule is not in effect as
well.
Despite this and other points of misinformation, the May 10, 2004
“Combat Exclusion Quick Look Options” presentation was surprisingly
candid about the Army’s intentions. At Fort Stewart, commanders of the 464th battalion conceded, in response to questions from soldiers, that the
sole purpose of the contrived administrative change was to assign female
soldiers to the ground combat-collocated FSC, without making formal
changes to the DoD rules and without giving prior notice to Congress as
required by law. The commanders’ actions were consistent with the May 10
“Quick Look Options” presentation, which included the “caveat” that this
course of action “could be perceived as subterfuge to avoid [the]
congressional reporting requirement.”90 Armor and infantry soldiers at Fort
Stewart were aware of the pretense, but it was their duty to follow orders
without comment or dissent.
In addition, the “Quick Look Options” presentation conceded that the
practice of administratively assigning the forward support company
personnel to the legally open brigade level “does not solve collocation
restrictions for female Soldier assignments.”91 Indeed, both this plan and a
later version of it presented in a November 2004 Pentagon briefing
depended on a subterfuge strategy.92 The entire plan constituted DSIW on
an unprecedented scale.
The May 10 “Quick Look Options” presentation suggested that there
might not be enough male soldiers to fill the land “combat-collocated”
forward support companies, but Army officials did not provide any
documentation to support those concerns.93 If a shortage of men is the
problem, breaking the rules to place young women in units required to be
all male is not the solution.
As of July 2005, there were more than fifteen million men of military
age—eighteen to twenty-four—in the United States.94 Given the size of this
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule, supra note 45.
Combat Exclusion Quick Look Options, supra note 81, at 14 (emphases added).
Id. at 11.
See infra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
Combat Exclusion Quick Look Options, supra note 81, at 5.
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION DIVISION, ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF THE
POPULATION BY SELECTED AGE GROUPS AND SEX FOR THE UNITED STATES: APRIL 1, 2000 TO
JULY 1, 2005, at T.2, available at http://www.census.gov/popest/national/asrh/NC-EST2005/
NC-EST2005-02.xls.

2010]

CONSTRUCTING THE CO-ED MILITARY

647

demographic, a straightforward request from the President, asking young
men to consider volunteering for the combat arms, would likely inspire
sufficient numbers to respond positively. There is no compelling need to
retain gender “goals” (i.e., quotas), which keep the numbers of women and
mothers in the military artificially high.95 An end to gender quotas in the
Army (which already have been dropped by the Navy) would allow and
encourage military recruiters to concentrate on young men who are needed
for the combat arms.96
e. Circumvention of the Congressional Notification Law
In June 2004, the Center for Military Readiness filed a formal request for
intervention with the DoD and Army Inspectors General. No apparent
action was taken to bring the Army back into compliance with DoD
regulations and the congressional notification law. Instead, female soldiers
reportedly have been placed in even more land combat-collocated support
units—not just in the 3rd ID, but also in the 101st Airborne, the 1st
Cavalry, and several more.97 Unaware female soldiers have been given
assurances that nothing significant has been changed, but men with combat
95. The effect of pressures to maintain gender quotas is illustrated in charts published
by the Chicago Tribune on March 20, 2005, which cite the DoD as the source. The graph
accompanied an article by Kirsten Scharnberg. See Kirsten Scharnberg, Stresses of Battle Hit
Female GIs Hard, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 20, 2005, at C1. A copy of the graph is available at
http://cmrlink.org/cmrnotes/actdtymilperwom032005a.pdf.
Despite personnel drawdowns in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War, the percentage of
female active duty personnel has stayed at approximately fifteen percent, with seven to ten
percent of the troops deployed to the Middle East being women. All Things Considered:
Wounded in War: The Women Serving in Iraq (NPR radio broadcast Mar. 19, 2005)
(transcript available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4534450);
Lizette Alvarez, Jane, We Hardly Knew Ye Died, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2006, § 4, at 1;
Women in Military Service for
America Memorial Foundation, Inc.,
www.womensmemorial.org (last visited Apr. 9, 2007).
96. Rick Maze, More Young Men Say They Are Likely To Join the Military, AIR FORCE
TIMES, Mar. 25, 2002, at 24. The DoD “Youth Attitude Tracking Survey” (YATS) of 10,000
young people found that the percentage of young men who said they were inclined to join
the military jumped sharply after September 11, 2001, to the highest level in a decade, but
the propensity to serve among women declined. Id.
97. Confidential conversations and e-mails between author and known male and female
soldiers in the 3rd ID at Ft. Stewart, Ga. (2004–2006), the 101st Airborne at Ft. Campbell,
Ky. (December 2004–April 2005), the 4th ID at Fort Hood, Tex. (2004–2007), the 89th
Truck Co., Ft. Eustis, Va. (2004–2005), a multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) unit
formerly based in Germany (2004–2005), and Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Target
Acquisition (RSTA) Squadrons at Ft. Riley, Kan., and Ft. Benning, Ga. (2005–2006) (on file
with author).
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experience are aware that regulations are being violated.98 In the same way,
reports of disruptive behavior and evacuations due to pregnancies are
accumulating, but sources have said that reporters rarely ask about such
problems, and men are reluctant to discuss them anyway, lest their careers
be ruined.99 As a result, rule violations and disruptive situations continue
with little notice.
In addition, Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS), and
Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Target Acquisition (RSTA) squadrons
operating with Stryker Brigade Combat Teams, have been quietly dropped
from an Army list of units coded to be all male.100 This was done without
the written approval of the Secretary of Defense and without the legally

98. See id. Spc. Stephanie Filus, a mechanic in the 101st Airborne at Fort Campbell,
Kentucky, learned in November 2004 that she was going to be assigned to an FSC and
deployed to Iraq in 2005. Spc. Filus was assured by local commanders that nothing
significant would change, but she understood and resisted the risks of collocation with a
direct ground combat maneuver battalion. That assignment was very different from the noncombat position that Spc. Filus had been promised by her recruiter. Spc. Filus’ request for
discharge was denied, and she was sent to Fort Polk, Louisiana, for training, which she
completed successfully. After her second request for discharge was denied, Spc. Filus
attempted suicide with pills in the presence of her commanding officer, and was
consequently hospitalized. Shortly thereafter, in May 2005, Filus received an honorable
discharge.
99. See id. According to confidential e-mail correspondence between the author and
known officers currently serving in Germany and Iraq (starting in Dec. 2006, on file with
author), evacuations due to pregnancy have already occurred in a formerly all-male FSC,
where one combat-experienced armor officer used to be assigned. A second known source, a
combat-experienced infantry officer, reported that a civil affairs unit had to be completely
replaced because a female captain became intimately involved with male Iraqi community
leaders, creating a security risk. This officer also noted that reporters and officials never ask
about such incidents, and that male officers would not risk comment even if they did.
100. Memorandum from the Army Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff (G-1) to
Commander, U.S. Army Training & Doctrine Command, Direct Ground Combat Position
Coding (DGCP) of the Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA)
Squadron of the Interim (now Stryker) Brigade Combat Team (Apr. 26, 2002), available at
http://cmrlink.org/cmrnotes/lemoyne%20memo%20042602.pdf. This memorandum, signed
by Lt. Gen. John M. LeMoyne, confirmed that RSTA squadrons, which came into existence
several years after the 1994 Aspin regulations were set forth, were to be coded “P-1” or
“male-only” in compliance with the Aspin regulations. However, the Women in the Army
Point Paper prepared for the Secretary of the Army on January 24, 2005, did not mention
RSTA squadrons as units required to be all male. The paper omitted MLRS and also
changed the wording of the DoD collocation rule, without authorization by the Secretary of
Defense. See infra note 106.
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required notice to Congress.101 Such actions by Army officials constitute
DSIW, which are likely to elevate risks and undermine trust. The most
important decisions regarding women in the military are being made
bureaucratically by unaccountable officials who use semantics and
sophistry to circumvent the plain meaning of law. If it is such a good idea to
order women and mothers into or near direct ground combat, Pentagon
officials should follow proper procedures, in accordance with the law.
3. The Congressional Debate: 2005
a. Army Changes Rules Without Authorization or Notice
On November 4, 2004, Pentagon officials assured staff members of the
House Armed Services Committee that the Army had no intention of
repealing the collocation rule.102 A subsequent closed-door briefing within
the Pentagon indicated that the Army was planning to do just that.103 When
that briefing was reported in The Washington Times,104 Lt. Gen. James
Campbell, Staff Director of the Army, issued a memo imposing restrictions
on internal documents and warning of “press leaks.”105 In January 2005,
HASC Chairman Duncan Hunter (R-Cal.) began conducting his own
investigation to determine what the Army was doing with its female
101. Under the Army’s Direct Combat Probability Code (DCPC) system, also known as
the Direct Ground Combat Position (DGCP) system, units required to be all male are
designated “P-1” on Tables of Organization & Equipment. Positions that are open to either
men or women are coded “P-2.”
102. Headquarters, Department of the Army, “Army Brigade Combat Team Unit of
Action and Gender Coding,” presented to senior House Armed Services Committee staff
members on November 3, 2004. This presentation was obtained by the author by e-mail
from a member of the HASC staff on November 17, 2004.
103. Col. (P) Robert H. Woods, Jr., Director, HRPD, “Patriotic Women of Excellence
Contributing to Our Force,” Nov. 29, 2004. According to a Pentagon source, this elevenpage (unnumbered) slide briefing was presented to Lt. Gen. James Campbell, Director of the
Army Staff (DAS), at the Pentagon.
104. Rowan Scarborough, Report Leans Toward Women in Combat, WASH. TIMES Dec.
13, 2004, at A1. An unclassified e-mail memorandum was sent from Lt. Gen. James
Campbell, DAS, to more than forty Army Pentagon officials, on the same day, December
13, 2004, at 10:21 a.m. EST. The message asked for help in dealing with the problem of
“Information Security” on pre-decisional internal materials. That is a legitimate concern
under normal circumstances, but the intent of this memo was suspicious. Lt. Gen.
Campbell’s memo appeared to be generated in response to the Washington Times report that
Army officials had said one thing about the collocation rule to congressional staff members,
but something different in a closed-door meeting at the Pentagon. A few days later, the
Army “gag order” became a news story in itself. See infra note 105.
105. Rowan Scarborough, Policy Leak Brings Army Order on Keeping Mum, WASH.
TIMES, Dec. 21, 2004, at A3.
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soldiers. Hunter’s investigation confirmed that the Army was placing
female soldiers in combat-collocated FSCs, while simultaneously claiming
that there was no need to inform Congress of such changes. This claim was
based on the administrative changes described above, signaled by a subtle
revision in DoD regulations. Army officials did not have authority to make
such revisions unilaterally, without authorization by the Secretary of
Defense.
The unannounced policy changes in question were reflected in a
“Women in the Army Point Paper,” prepared for the Secretary of the Army
on January 24, 2005, which misstated the DoD regulations as follows:
Department of Defense policy (1994) prohibits the assignment of
women to units below the brigade level whose primary mission
is direct ground combat. Army policy (1992) further prohibits
the assignment of women to positions or units which routinely
collocate with those units conducting an assigned direct ground
combat mission.106
This statement failed to note that Army rules (1992) were superseded by
DoD regulations (1994). The “Women in the Army Point Paper” also used
the word “conducting,” which does not appear in the 1994 DoD
regulations.107 That word, and variations of it that were used by Army
officials elsewhere, implied that female soldiers could be placed in or near
direct ground combat units, with the understanding that they would be
evacuated before the troops began “conducting,” “undertaking,” or
“performing” direct ground combat.
This semantically nuanced difference appears to explain several
astonishing statements made by Secretary of the Army Francis J. Harvey in
a meeting with this Article’s author on February 16, 2005. Secretary
Harvey showed the author a document listing twenty-four positions in a
typical FSC that would be open to women. When asked how this could be
justified, Secretary Harvey claimed that a problem did not exist, because

106. The four-page “Women in the Army Point Paper,” which was described as a “draft”
but was being implemented anyway, was obtained by the author from the Office of the
Secretary of the Army a few days after a meeting with Army Secretary Francis Harvey on
February 16, 2005 (emphasis added) [hereinafter Women in the Army Point Paper],
available at http://www.cmrlink.org/cmrnotes/women%20in%20the%20army%20point%
20paper%20021805.pdf.
107. For purposes of comparison, see Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment
Rule, supra note 45.
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the female soldiers would not be present when a battle began.108 In other
words, female soldiers would be evacuated from a combat-collocated FSC
just prior to a battle. This author expressed concern about commanding
officers who would be required to send female soldiers elsewhere at a time
when they would be needed most and further noted that most officers would
balk at doing so. Secretary Harvey insisted that soldiers would be required
to follow orders. The means by which the female soldiers would be
evacuated on the eve of battle was not made clear. In several speeches and
articles, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Peter Schoomaker and Secretary Harvey
both claimed that women would not be present when troops started
“conducting,” “undertaking,” or “performing” direct ground combat.109
Equivocal words such as this worked to mislead many members of
Congress, but not the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee,
Rep. Duncan Hunter.
b. The Hunter/McHugh Amendments
In May 2005, HASC Chairman Rep. Duncan Hunter (R-Cal.), together
with the HASC’s Military Personnel Subcommittee Chairman John
McHugh (R-N.Y.), co-sponsored amendments to the 2006 Defense
Authorization Bill that would have codified current DoD regulations and
required the Army to comply with them.110 The first Hunter/McHugh
amendment, approved by Chairman McHugh’s subcommittee on May 11,
108. Personal meeting notes (on file with author); see Women in the Army Point Paper,
supra note 106, at 1.
109. Gen. Peter Schoomaker, The Future of the U.S. Army, Address at the American
Enterprise Institute (Apr. 11, 2005) (transcript available at http://www.aei.org/events/
filter.all,eventID.1011/transcript.asp); see also Army Secretary Francis Harvey, A Message
from Army Leadership, SOLDIERS MAG. (U.S. Army), Mar. 2005, at 3; Testimony on the
Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2007 and the Future Years Defense
Program: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Armed Services, 109th Cong. (2006)
(statements of Sec’y Harvey & Gen. Schoomaker). At that hearing, in answer to a question
from SASC Chairman Sen. John Warner (R-Va.), Secretary Harvey mentioned the
collocation rule, and said that “we code positions in forward support companies and other
companies so that no women will co-locate with a unit performing direct ground combat.”
The wiggle word is “performing,” implying that female soldiers may be assigned as long as
the unit is not “performing” direct ground combat. Contrary to his insistence that this policy
is “totally consistent and compliant with DoD policy,” the DoD collocation rule does not
include “-ing” words such as “conducting” or “undertaking,” which could be cited to
authorize “employment” of women in land combat-collocated support units, provided that
they are evacuated prior to actual direct ground combat. Chairman Warner apparently
missed this point, asking only about women’s career “opportunities.”
110. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, H.R. 1815, 109th Cong.
(2005).
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2005, would have specifically applied current DoD regulations regarding
women to the Army’s new, modular brigade combat teams (BCTs), and
exempted female soldiers from placement in smaller forward support
companies (FSCs) that collocate or embed with direct ground combat
maneuver battalions one hundred percent of the time.111 These collocated
FSCs differ from larger gender-integrated support units at the brigade level,
where support personnel are “in harm’s way,” but come and go
intermittently.112
When the Hunter/McHugh amendment passed the Personnel
Subcommittee in a nine-to-seven partisan vote on May 11, 2005,
congressional feminists and their media allies were nearly apoplectic.113 In
response to the uproar, Hunter and McHugh substituted a new amendment.
The second version of the Hunter/McHugh amendment was less specific,
but broader than the original, because it would have codified DoD
regulations affecting women in all the services, and not just the Army.114
Properly enforced, the Hunter/McHugh amendment still would have
111. The first Hunter/McHugh amendment, approved by the Personnel Subcommittee on
May 11, 2005, provided in pertinent part:
(a) PROHIBITION—Female members of the Army may not be assigned to
duty in positions in forward support companies.
See Dana Wilkie & Otto Kreisher, Hunter Plan Bars Women from Army “Forward
Support,” COPLEY NEWS SERV., May 18, 2005; Andy Pasztor, House Panel Bars Women
from Direct Ground Combat, WALL ST. J. (online ed.), May 19, 2005; Stephen Dinan, Panel
Acts on Women in Combat, WASH. TIMES, May 19, 2005, at A1.
112. Army acronyms have changed several times during “transformation” of forces to
modular brigade combat teams, but the missions of reorganized direct ground combat (DGC)
troops, such as the infantry, armor, and Special Operations Forces, remain substantially the
same. The brigade-level units that are open to women under the current regulations are
sometimes referred to as brigade support battalions (BSBs), forward support battalions
(FSBs), main support battalions (MSBs), or Sustain Brigade Units of Action, equivalent to
Division Support Commands stationed on forward operating bases (FOBs). Female soldiers
currently are authorized to serve above the brigade level, including the headquarters of direct
ground combat units such as the infantry, but not in or collocated with smaller battalions that
engage the enemy with deliberate offensive action under fire.
113. See, e.g., Ann Scott Tyson, More Objections to Women-in-Combat Ban, WASH.
POST, May 18, 2005, at A5; Editorial, Chauvinism at the Battlefront, N.Y. TIMES, May 20,
2005, at A24.
114. The second Hunter/McHugh amendment, approved by the full House Armed
Services Committee on May 18, 2005, simply would have codified the language of DoD
regulations regarding women, including the collocation rule, as established on January 13,
1994, by Secretary of Defense Les Aspin. See “Women in Combat” Provision, Mark-Up of
H.R. 1815, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (May 18, 2005)
(provided by HASC; on file with author); supra note 45.
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required the Army to stop violating the 1994 DoD regulations with regard
to forward support companies and other direct ground combat-collocated
support units, and to refrain from redefining the Aspin regulations without
the approval of the Secretary of Defense and the legally required notice to
Congress in advance.
During an intense, late-night debate on May 18, 2005, Democrat
Committee members Rep. Ike Skelton (D-Mo.), Rep. Vic Snyder (D-Ark.),
Rep. Ellen Tauscher (D-N.Y.), and Rep. Loretta Sanchez (D-Cal.) offered
amendments that would have stricken or modified the legislation. In a
remarkable moment of clarity, Chairman McHugh threw down the gauntlet
by challenging his opponents to go ahead and make the case for allowing
the Army to assign women to ground combat units without Congress
having a say.115 The issue, as Chairmen Hunter and McHugh saw it, was the
critical need for civilian control and oversight of the military in this
important matter of public policy. That was and remains a perfectly
legitimate issue to debate in a major congressional committee—especially
since Army officials have provided legislators with constantly changing,
dissembling information about the physical placement of female soldiers in
or near direct ground combat.
Hunter and McHugh led the Republicans in defeating every crippling
amendment on narrow roll call or voice votes. Given the late hour,
Republicans stayed largely silent, but Chairmen Hunter and McHugh
secured approval of their amendment by the full House Armed Services
Committee at 11:08 p.m. EST.116 This surprised reporters, some of whom
had already filed stories that did not accurately report the debate.
Ultimately, the original Hunter/McHugh legislation was not enacted
because then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld pressured Chairman
Hunter to withdraw the legislation before it was voted on by the full House.
The third version of the Hunter/McHugh legislation, which was adopted
by the House on May 25, 2005, did not include language to codify current
DoD regulations.117 Instead, the House bill mandated a report from the
Secretary of Defense on the subject by March 1, 2006, which was later
changed in Conference to March 31, 2006. The approved Hunter/McHugh

115. Personal notes taken during HASC mark-up session, May 18, 2005 (on file with
author).
116. See Roll Call of House Armed Services Committee vote on Amendments 91, 92
(May 18, 2005) (provided by HASC; on file with author).
117. See Rowan Scarborough, GOP Retreats on Women-in-Combat Bill, WASH. TIMES,
May 26, 2005, at A1.
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legislation also reaffirmed the law mandating formal notice to Congress of
any changes in regulations affecting women in or near ground combat:
If the Secretary of Defense proposes to make any change . . . to
the ground combat exclusion policy . . . , the Secretary shall,
before any such change is implemented, submit to Congress a
report providing notice of the proposed change. Such a change
may be implemented only after the end of a period of 60 days of
continuous session of Congress . . . following the date on which
the report is received.
A change referred to in paragraph (1) is a change
that . . . opens to service by female members of the armed forces
any category of unit or position that at that time is closed to
service by such members . . . .118
c. Pentagon Resists Oversight by Congress
Contrary to some news reports, final passage of the Hunter/McHugh
amendment would not have removed female soldiers from any positions in
which they were legally authorized to serve.119 The amendment would have
only codified current DoD regulations adopted in 1994.120 Nevertheless, big
118. H. amend. 210 to H.R. 1815, 109th Cong. (2006) available at
http://www.rules.house.gov/109/specialrules/hr1815/109hr1815_hunter.pdf.
119. Several news articles inaccurately reported that the second version of the
Hunter/McHugh amendment would have allowed female soldiers to serve in FSCs. See, e.g.,
Thom Shanker, House Bill Would Preserve, and Limit, the Role of Women in Combat Zones,
N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2005, at A20. A codified collocation rule, however, would have had
the same effect as current DoD regulations. See also HASC Mark-up of National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, H.R. 1815, May 18, 2005 (provided by Chairman
Hunter; on file with author).
120. See supra note 45. A disingenuous Army Public Affairs news release issued on May
19, 2005, titled “Army Statement on Proposed Legislation,” ironically, concurred with this
view. See Dep’t of the Army, Public Affairs News Release, Army Statement on Proposed
Legislation (May 19, 2005), available at http://www4.army.mil/ocpa/read.php?
story_id_key=7353. Stating that the Army had reviewed existing law and DoD policies and
found itself in compliance, the news release added:
Furthermore, existing DoD and Army policies are in compliance with the
legislation being proposed under House Resolution 1815 [the Hunter/McHugh
amendment]. Thus, the proposed legislation contained in HR 1815 is
unnecessary, does not provide further clarification, and may in fact lead to
confusion on the part of commanders and Soldiers.
Id. This admission was inconsistent with a two-sentence letter sent to Chairman Hunter by
Lt. Gen. James L. Campbell, DAS, which made the unsupported claim that 21,950 positions
would be closed to women if the legislation passed. See infra note 133.
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guns from liberal media, some members of Congress with feminist views,
and officials of the Department of the Army denounced the
Hunter/McHugh amendment as if it would have ended the history of
women in the military.121 The campaign to criticize and derail the
Hunter/McHugh legislation benefited from months of neglect of the story
by major newspapers such as the Washington Post, the New York Times,
and even the Military Times. With few exceptions, these publications failed
to report on the significant events that had caused Hunter to investigate and
act in the first place—events that had been reported in some newspapers
since the fall of 2004. For many months, the Army had been bending,
breaking, redefining, or circumventing the rules on women in or near direct
ground combat, but most news organizations ignored the story until
Chairman Hunter took the initiative to sponsor legislation.122
121. On May 11, 2005, separate but identical letters were sent to Chairman Hunter by
Army Secretary Harvey and Army Vice Chief of Staff, Gen. Richard A. Cody. See Leo
Shane, III, Army Opposes House Panel’s Bid To Bar Women from Combat Support Units,
STARS & STRIPES (European ed.), May 12, 2005, available at http://stripes.com/article.asp?
section=104&article=28244&archive=true. A news release titled “Women Removed from
Combat Support Roles” was issued by Democratic members of the HASC on May 11, 2005.
Chairman Hunter also issued a statement on May 11, and on May 24, 2005, Hunter and
committee member Rep. Thelma Drake (R-Va.) called a news conference to clarify that the
legislation would not affect any female soldiers serving in positions authorized under current
DoD regulations. See Rep. Thelma Drake, Let Lawmakers Decide, USA TODAY, May 25,
2005, at 13A.
122. See, e.g., Lisa Burgess, Army Is Considering Adding Women to Its New “Units of
Action” Structure, STARS & STRIPES (European ed.), Oct. 23, 2004, available at
http://stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=24225&archive=true; Lisa Burgess, Army
Secretary Harvey: No Combat for Female GIs in “Transformed” Army, STARS & STRIPES
(European ed.), Jan. 15, 2005, available at http://stripes.com/article.asp?section=
104&article=25642&archive=true; Rowan Scarborough, Female Soldiers Eyed for Combat,
WASH. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2004, at A1; Rowan Scarborough, Army Charged with Ban Violation,
WASH. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2004, at A6; Rowan Scarborough, Combat Role for Women Confused,
WASH. TIMES (online ed.), April 18, 2005, http://www.washingtontimes.com/national/
20050418-125223-4270r.htm; Rowan Scarborough, Report Leans Toward Women in
Combat, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2004, at A1; Rowan Scarborough, Policy Leak Brings Army
Order on Keeping Mum, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2004, at A3; Rowan Scarborough, Women
in Combat Ban Again at Issue, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2005, at A1; Vince Crawley, Army
Plans To Officially Put Women on Front Lines, ARMY TIMES, Nov. 1, 2004; Bryan Bender,
U.S. Women Get Closer to Combat: Some Say Move Imperils Units, Violates Law, BOSTON
GLOBE, Jan. 26, 2005, at A1 [hereinafter Bender, U.S. Women Get Closer to Combat]; Bryan
Bender, Army Secretary Rejects Change in Policy on Women in Combat, BOSTON GLOBE,
Jan. 29, 2005, at A11; Robert Burns, In Unconventional War, Army’s Gender Rules Don’t
Keep Women out of Combat, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 26, 2005; Ann Scott Tyson, For
Female GIs, Combat Is a Fact, WASH. POST, May 13, 2005, at A1 [hereinafter Tyson, For
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In response to Chairman Hunter’s amendment, Army officials initially
denied that they were permitting the illicit assignments, but later they used
misleading terms and unlikely scenarios to justify the placement of female
soldiers in battalion-level units that were required to be all male.123 Four
equivocations have been used to circumvent policy and law, which could be
summarized as follows:
x

The Selective “Memory” Option. In the May 10, 2004
“Quick Look Options” briefing; the November 3, 2004
presentation to HASC staff members; and the November 29,
2004 briefing conducted at the Pentagon,124 the Army
claimed that it could operate under “additional restrictions”
in Army rules, effective in 1992.125 The 1992 regulation,
however, was superseded by the DoD (Aspin) regulations of
1994.126 The 1992 Army regulation also included a “Risk
Rule,” which is no longer in effect.127 Divergence from
extant DoD regulations cannot be justified by selectively
observing part of an obsolete rule—but not all of it.

x

The “Doublethink” Option. Field commanders were ordered
to skirt the rules by “assigning” women to gender-mixed
support units at the brigade level while physically placing
them in units “attached” to maneuver battalions required to
be all-male.128

Female GIs, Combat Is a Fact]; Ann Scott Tyson, More Objections to Women-in-Combat
Ban, WASH. POST, May 18, 2005, at A5; Ann Scott Tyson, Amendment Targets Role of
Female Troops, WASH. POST, May 19, 2005, at A4.
123. See Bender, U.S. Women Get Closer to Combat, supra note 122 (reporting that
officials of the Third Infantry Division publicly acknowledged they had “added scores of
female soldiers to newly created ‘forward support companies’”).
124. See supra notes 81, 102-03.
125. See supra note 85.
126. See supra notes 45, 50.
127. See supra note 85.
128. See supra notes 81-82. The Army Public Affairs News Release stated that “[f]irst,
the Forward Support Companies are not part of, nor do they work for, units below the
brigade level whose primary mission is direct ground combat, such as infantry and armor
battalions.” Army Statement on Proposed Legislation, supra note 120. This disingenuous
statement reflects the fiction that forward support company personnel would not be
physically collocated with infantry/armor ground combat battalions, due to administrative
assignment to a legally gender-integrated brigade level unit.
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The “Little Bit Pregnant” Option. Secretary Harvey’s
“Women in the Army Point Paper,” dated January 24, 2005,
showed arbitrary changes in the gender codes of twenty-four
of 225 positions in a typical FSC.129 Initial breaches in the
rules guaranteed more of the same.130

x

The “Beam Me Up, Scotty” Option. Secretary Harvey’s
“Women in the Army Point Paper” revised the collocation
rule so that it would only apply when a given unit is
“conducting” direct ground combat.131 However, without
extra vehicles and helicopters to evacuate female support
soldiers on the eve of battle, field commanders would have
more luck acquiring Star Trek “transporter” machines for
that purpose.
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During the HASC debate, the first in more than a decade, officials
continued to change estimates of the number of positions that might have
been closed to women if the Hunter/McHugh legislation passed, ranging
from a few dozen to a few hundred.132 However, on the day before the vote
was scheduled, Lt. Gen. James L. Campbell, Director of the Army Staff,
sent a vague, two-sentence letter to Chairman Hunter, which was released
to the media.133 The letter claimed, without any supporting documentation,

129. Women in the Army Point Paper, supra note 106, at 2-4. This document, obtained
from the Office of the Secretary of the Army, provided a specific gender code change list of
twenty-four of 225 positions in a typical 3rd ID Heavy Unit of Action Forward Support
Company (FSC). The number was small but the breach of regulations was significant. Either
the Army is in compliance with DoD policy or it is not. “Employing” female soldiers in a
support unit embedded with direct ground combat troops effectively repealed the collocation
rule without authorization and without the legally required notice to Congress. Having
broken that regulatory barrier, Army officials seem unwilling to enforce any regulations
regarding women in or near direct ground combat. See discussion infra Part II.B.1.c.–d.
130. See Women in the Army Point Paper, supra note 106, at 2-4; discussion infra Part
II.B.1.c.–d.
131. See supra notes 106-09.
132. Statements by Chairman Duncan Hunter and Subcommittee Chairman John
McHugh during House Armed Services Committee debate, May 18, 2005 (personal notes on
file with author).
133. Letter from Lt. Gen. James L. Campbell, Director of the Army Staff, to Chairman
Duncan Hunter (May 17, 2005) (on file with author). This letter, which was inconsistent
with the “Army Statement on Proposed Legislation” issued by Army Public Affairs on May
19, claimed that “a total of 21,925 spaces currently open for assignment to female Soldiers
would be closed.” The Army has yet to provide figures to justify this figure, which was
widely reported in The Washington Post and other media just before the House Committee’s
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that “21,925 spaces currently open to female Soldiers would be closed”134 if
the Hunter/McHugh amendment passed. The statement was not credible
because the legislation would have simply codified the extant Aspin
regulations, not altered them. The unsupported figure nevertheless was used
to stir up negative press and opposition to the legislation.135 Despite
repeated inquiries, details to back up the Army’s claim have not been
produced.
Army Secretary Francis J. Harvey and Vice Chief of Staff Gen. Richard
A. Cody sent letters and dispatched several advocates to block the
legislation before it arrived on the House floor.136 Then-Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld met privately with Chairman Hunter and
reportedly pressured him to withdraw the HASC-approved legislation and
replace it with language mandating a formal report to Congress on the
status of women in or near land combat.137 That report was mandated by the
FY 2006 Defense Authorization Act138 and was due on March 31, 2006.
However, Secretary Rumsfeld and his Under Secretary for Personnel and
Readiness, Dr. David S.C. Chu, disregarded the deadline.139 The task was
diverted to the Rand Corporation, which failed to produce a report in
2006.140 As this Article goes to press—more than a full year past the
deadline for the statute-mandated report to Congress—the Rand report has
not yet been released. This irresponsible delay has given Congress an
excuse to avoid convening oversight hearings for another full year, and
possibly two.
Consequential decisions affecting women are being made without
congressional oversight or accountability for the consequences.141 Some
May 18, 2005 vote. In the following week, Army officials continued to complain about
“confusion”—confusion that they themselves had created.
134. Id.
135. Id.; Ann Scott Tyson, Amendment Targets Role of Female Troops, WASH. POST,
May 19, 2005, at A4. The Campbell letter from Lt. Gen. Campbell was either a complete
fabrication or an admission that the Army had been violating current regulations to a greater
extent than was previously known.
136. See Army Statement on Proposed Legislation, supra note 120.
137. The result of this pressure was the third version of the Hunter/McHugh amendment,
as enacted in the NDAA for FY 2006. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 541(a)(1), 119 Stat. 3136, 3251 (2006) (codifying the
Hunter/McHugh amendment at 10 U.S.C. § 652 (West Supp. 2007)).
138. Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 218(c)(3), 119 Stat. at 3172.
139. Letter from Dr. David Chu to Sen. Carl Levin (Apr. 27, 2006) (on file with author).
140. Meeting of an official in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel
& Readiness and the author (Mar. 2, 2007).
141. See Drake, supra note 121.
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legislators on both sides of the aisle have taken this issue seriously, but
most seem unconcerned. Members of Congress frequently assert their right
to oversee and approve other national defense matters, but issues involving
military women are often treated as less important—except when sex
scandals occur. This type of double standard is disrespectful to military
women, who certainly deserve better.
B. Incrementalism + Consistency = Radical Change
1. Costs of Confusion
In response to a question from a group of journalists in January 2005,
President George W. Bush said that his policy was, “No women in [ground]
combat.”142 Nevertheless, the President has not intervened to restore the
Army to compliance with DoD policy and the congressional notification
law. The risks of allowing this situation to continue are high, especially
since social engineers cannot be relied upon to objectively evaluate the
results of their own recommendations and decisions.
a. Presidential Intent and Inattention
Even proponents of women in combat should feel uneasy about
controversial policies being implemented outside of current policy and law.
In May 2005, Stars and Stripes ran a story quoting female enlisted women
and junior officers saying that they should be allowed to make all decisions
about where they should serve.143 Another story in the Washington Post
quoted a female officer defending her decision to send a female medic to
serve with an airborne infantry company without asking permission: “Think
of the fallout if she had gotten wounded or killed,” the officer said. “I
probably would have been brought up on charges for defying Army
I unequivocally support the women in our military and their desires to serve our
nation honorably in the armed forces alongside our men. Military policy has
been to keep women off the front lines, and it is a policy that the Defense
Department should not unilaterally change. I believe any change in this policy
must be the responsibility of Congress, so that America’s elected officials can
be held accountable.
Id.
142. Rowan Scarborough & Joseph Curl, Despite Pressure, Bush Vows “No Women in
Combat,” WASH. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2005, at A1.
143. Sandra Jontz & Kevin Dougherty, Trust Us To Decide Our Role in the Army,
Female Servicemembers in Iraq Say, STARS & STRIPES (Mideast ed.), May 25, 2005,
available at http://www.stripesonline.com/article.asp?section=104&article=28530&archive=
true.
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policy.”144 Such insubordination is a recipe for chaos in a profession that
requires discipline and obedience to legitimate authority. It is not
acceptable to allow junior officers—or even four-star generals—to make up
the rules on their own.
b. Precedents, Compromises and Consequences
There are seven major categories of consequences, resulting from
continuation of the status quo, which should be of concern to the
Commander in Chief:
Morale. Soldiers are beginning to doubt the judgment of their leaders,145
although they are rarely asked or permitted to express their concerns
publicly. Ordering women into land combat also creates a moral and
cultural contradiction: violence against women is all right, as long as it
happens at the hands of the enemy.
Legal. Federal courts have repeatedly upheld young women’s exemption
from Selective Service obligations because women are not deployed in
ground combat. If the ground-combat policy is changed—deliberately or by
default—a future legal challenge, brought on behalf of men, would likely
succeed. As a result, women would be subject to Selective Service and
military obligations on the same basis as men, without a vote of
Congress.146
Political. Families, upon finding that their daughters must register with
Selective Service and be subject to combat deployment on the same basis as
men if they join the military, are likely to hold accountable all elected
officials who allowed these things to happen. Recruiting for the volunteer
force also could suffer.
Military Effectiveness. Military effectiveness will be directly affected
if—or, based on past experience, when—the training requirements are
changed to guarantee “success” for average female trainees in or near direct
144. Tyson, For Female GIs, Combat Is a Fact, supra note 122.
145. See supra note 99.
146. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at C-127–C-128 (Findings 4.3–
4.12). The 1981 Rostker v. Goldberg decision regarding Selective Service was reaffirmed by
the federal courts most recently in 2003. See Schwartz v. Brodsky, 265 F. Supp. 2d 130 (D.
Mass. 2003).
If a deeply-rooted military tradition of male-only draft registration is to be
ended, it should be accomplished by that branch of government which has the
constitutional power to do so and which best represents the “consent of the
governed”—the Congress of the United States, the elected representatives of
the people.
Id. at 135.
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ground combat. Proponents deny this would happen, while simultaneously
demanding gender-normed standards that measure “equal effort” instead of
equal results.147 Training in direct ground combat units will have to be
made less demanding for men, since female trainees suffer stress fractures
and other injuries at far greater rates. Ultimately, lives will be needlessly
lost when soldiers who are unable to cope with the physical demands of
direct ground combat are ordered (not merely allowed) into those units
anyway.148
Social/Cultural. Professional behavior between men and women is
always desired, but inappropriate relationships frequently occur on either
end of a spectrum between hostility and romantic involvements. Problems
on the hostility side lead to charges of harassment or worse. Entanglements
on the other side encourage breakdowns in discipline and unit cohesion, and
sex scandals cause personnel to be removed and units to be demoralized.149
Readiness/Deployability. Romantic relationships of the type mentioned
above frequently lead to pregnancies, escalating childcare costs, single
parenthood, family disruption and poverty, and personnel losses before and
during deployments.150
147. See MITCHELL, supra note 15, at 99-122 (discussing Gen. Myer’s attempt to
implement identical standards for men and women, which was derailed by both
DACOWITS and feminist critics).
148. The issue of women in combat is frequently discussed in permissive terms—i.e.,
should women be “allowed” to serve in combat? In reality, everyone in the military must
follow orders and go where they are ordered to go. The Presidential Commission determined
that, with the exception of special operations forces and specialized units, “voluntary”
combat for women only would not be a workable option, due to the demoralizing effect of
such a policy on unit cohesion. See PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at C127 (Finding 4.13).
149. In March 2007, NASA experienced turbulence such as this in an apparent love
triangle. Navy Capt. Lisa Marie Nowak, an astronaut, drove cross-country to confront Air
Force Capt. Colleen Shipman, a rival for the affections of Navy Cmdr. William Oefelein, a
space shuttle pilot. See NASA Fires Astronaut Nowak, CNN.COM, Mar. 7, 2007,
http://www.cnn.com/2007/TECH/space/03/07/nasa.nowak/index.html.
150. In February 2005, the Pentagon reported that between 1994 and 2003, a total of
26,446 women were discharged from the services due to pregnancy. It is not clear whether
these “unplanned loss” figures include military women who did not deploy or were
evacuated from the war zone due to pregnancy. See Memorandum from Dr. David Chu,
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel & Readiness, to Derek Stewart, Director of
Defense Capabilities and Management at the GAO (Feb. 7, 2005), reprinted in GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, MILITARY PERSONNEL: FINANCIAL COSTS AND LOSS OF CRITICAL
SKILLS DUE TO DOD’S HOMOSEXUAL CONDUCT POLICY CANNOT BE COMPLETELY ESTIMATED
42 (Feb. 2005) [hereinafter GAO FINANCIAL COSTS CANNOT BE ESTIMATED], available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05299.pdf. According to a confidential message from a
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Precedent. Once an unchallenged decision is made to place women in
some units coded to be all male, there is nothing to prevent extension of the
same practice to other direct ground combat units, including the Marine
infantry, artillery, armor, Special Operations Forces, Special Operations
Forces helicopters, and Military Transition Teams (MTTs). Indications are
that incremental changes in extreme directions are already happening.
c. Military Transition (Training) Teams (MTTs)
No one has provided data proving shortages of men for the combat arms.
Serious deficiencies could occur, however, if the institutional Army
continues to supply Central Command with an unsuitable “inventory” of
soldiers who are not eligible for direct ground combat.
Given the status of the Iraqi war at the beginning of 2007, the Army has
a great need for experienced combat soldiers who can train Iraqis to defend
and secure their own country. This training is being done by small Military
Transition Teams—sometimes called Military Training Teams, or most
often MTTs—composed of eleven to fifteen soldiers, officers, or Marines
with ground combat leadership experience.151 MTT soldiers are embedded
with Iraqi units for one year in order to teach them military skills and
combat tactics. Given the closeness of the Transition Training Team
relationship, and the fact that Iraqi units are usually poorly equipped and
under constant attack, MTT personnel are required to be all male.152
Specialized Army MTT training—which is considered career-enhancing for
volunteers—takes place at Fort Riley, Kansas. However, some soldiers are
assigned involuntarily to MTTs from battalions operating in Iraq or

soldier serving Iraq in 2006, one of the 3rd ID’s collocated FSCs—which used to be all male
under DoD regulations—already has experienced personnel losses and disruptions due to
pregnancies in the ranks.
151. Gina Cavallaro, Small Teams, Big Job, ARMY TIMES, Feb. 6, 2006, at 8. There are
several different types of MTTs, including Special Police Transition Teams, Border
Transition Teams, and, in Afghanistan, Embedded Training Teams. Some female soldiers
have been involved in such training, located at the Forward Operating Base (FOB) level, but
in support roles only. It would make sense for American women to train Iraqi women to
perform security searches of female civilians, but it is difficult to determine if this is being
done.
152. According to the Army Times, “Cultural sensitivities and the same gender rules that
apply to the ban on women in direct combat in the U.S. military mean female soldiers can’t
join a MITT. But women are involved in similar small-team training activities above the
brigade level.” Gina Cavallaro, MITT Duty a Career-Booster for Soldiers Who Make Team,
ARMY TIMES, Feb. 6, 2006, at 10.
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Afghanistan, without receiving special training.153 There has been some
controversy about soldiers who do not have the experience or training to
accomplish the critical mission of the MTTs. In an interview with Army
Times, Brig. Gen. Dana Pittard spoke very frankly about the failure of the
Army to provide the right type of soldiers for this important job. “Only
combat vets who inspire confidence,” he said, “need apply.”154
There are indications that, even though the small eleven- to fifteen-man
MTTs are required to be all-male, some deployed women may have been
ordered to serve in a battalion-level MTT—a clear violation of current DoD
Regulations.155 Given the Army’s practice of redefining rules without prior
notice, it is difficult to determine what is happening in the field, but there is
reason for concern. The MTT mission, which is extremely important,
should not be undermined by cultural conflicts caused by unauthorized,
incremental gender integration in units required to be all male. It is very
challenging and difficult enough to train new Iraqi combat troops without
forcing men of that culture to accept and embed with female soldiers. Iraqi
trainees respect all Americans, including our female soldiers, but MTTs are
combat schools, not charm schools. Terrorists who are determined to create
anarchy in Iraq by various means, including disruption of the
Iraqi/American Training Teams, could easily use cultural prejudice against
women and Western culture to alienate male trainees who abjure obedience
to women.156
Unneeded social tensions that encourage indiscipline or international
incidents could destroy trust, demoralize American/Iraqi training teams, and
seriously undermine efforts to “stand up” more Iraqi combat battalions.157
153. Gina Cavallaro, Additional Soldiers To Join Training Teams, ARMY TIMES, Dec. 11,
2006, at 10.
154. Gina Cavallaro, “We Could Be Better”: CO Wants Trainers To Be Better Caliber,
Get Higher Priority, ARMY TIMES, Dec. 4, 2006, at 30.
155. Confidential correspondence between a family member/soldier and author (Oct.
2006) (on file with author). This reference is to soldiers reassigned from already-deployed
units in Iraq, not those receiving specialized training at Fort Riley, Kansas.
156. The size of this cultural divide is no more visible than in ceremonies to hand over
security responsibilities to Iraqi police and soldiers in Najaf province. An event in December
2006 included warriors on horseback, martial arts demonstrations, and, at one point, the
tearing apart and eating of a live rabbit by Iraqi soldiers. “The leader bit out the heart with a
yell, and passed the blood-soaked remains to comrades, each of whom took a bite.” Fast
Track, AIR FORCE TIMES, Jan. 1, 2007, at 6 (illustrated with AP photo taken by Alaa AlMarjani on Dec. 20, 2006).
157. According to a known and reliable male source in Iraq, a female civil-affairs soldier
became romantically involved with male Iraqi community leaders, which required that the
entire unit be replaced. This demoralizing incident raised security concerns, since the sharing
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MTT field commanders want to accomplish their missions well, but they
will be blamed for the consequences of socially volatile conditions ignited
by predictable “sparks.” International scandals involving sexual
harassment, misconduct, or allegations of sexual assault between male Iraqi
trainees and American women could be set off by provocative photos or
interviews broadcast worldwide.
The Iraqi training mission must be accomplished successfully, so that
American troops can eventually withdraw. Combat is not a place for
military social experimentation with male troops of another culture who are
interested in survival, not sensitivity training.
d. Marine Infantry, Special Operations Forces, SEALS, etc.
Having allowed the Army to circumvent and ignore the DoD collocation
rule, what will Pentagon officials say when feminists inevitably demand
“career opportunities” in infantry battalions? The devil is not in the details
but in the standard of review used to determine policy. If the primary
standard and goal is the advancement of women’s careers (instead of
military necessity), demands for consistency in all other ground combat
units will be implemented incrementally. If Congress abdicates its right and
responsibility to provide oversight, further gender integration will have to
include Army and Marine infantry, armor, Special Operations Forces,
Special Operations Forces helicopters, and Navy SEALS. And if “equal
opportunity” is the primary consideration, regulations regarding submarines
will be next on the list.
Regardless of the consequences of the current unauthorized changes,
Marine infantry and other specialized combat communities will be unable
to make the case that they are different from units already integrated with
women. At that point, all of the seven consequences listed above will occur
at an accelerated pace. Incremental integration will impose all the
complications of gender relationships on close combat units, making
military life in the combat forces even more difficult and more dangerous
than it is now.

of operational plans with an Iraqi of questionable loyalty could increase security problems
and overall risks. Two female soldiers who have served under fire in Iraq, one opposed to
women in direct ground combat units and one in favor, wrote in e-mail correspondence with
this author that it would be a mistake to gender-integrate the MTT Iraqi combat-training
units. Confidential correspondence from sources in Iraq to author (Oct.–Nov. 2006; Apr.
2007) (on file with author).
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2. What Do Women Want?
a. DACOWITS Downplays Enlisted Women’s Views
The vocabulary of this Article acknowledges throughout that one
woman’s “exclusion” from close combat is another woman’s “exemption.”
On this issue, as on all issues, not all women think alike. Contrary to
opinions commonly expressed by the Defense Advisory Committee on
Women in the Services (DACOWITS) and civilian feminists, Army surveys
have indicated that the majority of military women are strongly opposed to
combat assignments.158 Women are especially opposed if they would be
forced into combat on an equal basis with men. Furthermore, in recent
decades, particularly during the 1990s, the former DACOWITS committee
constantly promoted the repeal of women’s combat exemptions and other
agenda items favored by feminists.159 The influential advisory committee
158. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE (ARI), ARMY PERSONNEL SURVEY OFFICE, DIRECT
COMBAT ASSIGNMENT POLICY: FINDINGS FROM THE FALL 2001 SAMPLE SURVEY OF MILITARY
PERSONNEL, at 1-2 (Fall 2001) [hereinafter ARI, SAMPLE SURVEY], available at
http://cmrlink.org/cmrnotes/arissmp3q01.pdf; see also Center for Military Readiness,
Enlisted Women Opposed to Military Assignments, CMR NOTES, July 2003, at 1, available
at http://www.cmrlink.org/viewarticle.asp?f=mcr677issue74.pdf.
159. See generally DACOWITS, Recommendations, http://www.dtic.mil/dacowits/table
recommendation_subpage.html (last visited May 7, 2007). At one time, DACOWITS served
a useful purpose, making recommendations on a variety of subjects to benefit women in the
military. In the 1990s, however, this tax-funded DoD advisory committee became a feminist
lobby, promoting women in combat and related causes that assigned priority to women’s
career opportunities over the needs of the military. The mostly civilian and female members
of DACOWITS routinely disregarded the advice of male military officers (but not female
officers assigned as advisors to the committee) and rarely reviewed the consequences of
their previous recommendations. In 1998, DACOWITS issued a report advocating gendermixed Army basic training. Committee members had visited several co-ed training bases,
but not the Marines’ separate-gender training base at Parris Island, South Carolina. See
Rowan Scarborough, Panel of Women Hits Training Sexes Apart, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 20,
1998, at A1.
In the spring of 1998, the committee also endorsed “career opportunities” for women in
multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) and Special Operations Forces helicopters like the
ones shot down in the 1993 “Black Hawk Down” incident in Mogadishu, Somalia. See
DACOWITS, Spring Conference 1998, Recommendations, http://www.dtic.mil/dacowits/
history_of_recommedations/hist-rec-spr-98.html (summarizing recommendations). In the
spring of 1999, DACOWITS demanded to know why the Navy does not assign female
sailors to submarines. Even though the comprehensive Report of the Science Applications
International Corporation had been prepared for DACOWITS in 1995, see SAIC REPORT,
infra note 178, and Navy officials reviewed that information for the committee,
DACOWITS recommended at its Fall 1999 and Spring 2000 meetings that (1) future
submarines be redesigned to accommodate mixed-gender crews; and (2) that female officers
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operated as a tax-funded feminist lobby primarily composed of civilian
women and a few ambitious female officers. Based on the author’s personal
observations as a member, the committee rarely heard from enlisted
women, even though they outnumber female officers by a ratio of five to
one.160
b. ARI Survey Shows Women Opposed
The unrepresentative nature of DACOWITS may explain why the
committee missed the message conveyed by a series of surveys conducted
by the Army Research Institute (ARI), which found that most military
women do not wish to participate in combat assignments.161 In 2001, for
example, question number sixty in the ARI “Sample Survey of Military
Personnel” asked military people whether women should be assigned to
direct ground combat, which was defined as “engaging an enemy on the
ground with individual or crew-served weapons, while being exposed to
hostile fire and to a high probability of direct physical contact with the
hostile force’s personnel.”162 A bar graph slide prepared by ARI further
indicated that the low number of enlisted personnel who were in favor of
placing women in combat on the same basis as men “had remained stable

be assigned to larger Trident ballistic missile (SSBN) submarines. See DACOWITS, Fall
Conference 1999, http://www.dtic.mil/dacowits/history_of_recommedations/hist-rec-fall99.html (summarizing recommendatations); Spring Conference 2000, http://www.dtic.mil/
dacowits/history_of_recommedations/hist-rec-spr-2000.html (same); see also Center for
Military Readiness, Issues: DACOWITS, http://www.cmrlink.org/dacowits.asp (last visited
May 7, 2007); Center for Military Readiness, End Preferential Treatment for Pentagon
Feminists, CMR NOTES, Apr. 2001, at 1, available at http://www.cmrlink.org/cmrnotes/
m7c81missue64a01.pdf.
At its 50th Anniversary meeting in the spring of 2001, the committee received statements
it had requested from the services in the fall of 2000 regarding the next item on their agenda:
deploying women in direct ground combat units. That meeting was the last to occur under
the committee’s original Charter; the Fall 2001 meeting did not take place due to the 9/11
attack on the Pentagon. A few months after the Charter was allowed to expire in February
2002, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz announced a new Charter for a smaller
advisory committee of the same name, which was directed to study family readiness and
related issues. See DACOWITS Charter, http://www.dtic.mil/dacowits/tablecharter_subpage.
html (last visited May 7, 2007).
160. Personal observation as a former member of the DACOWITS and participant or
observer of many committee meetings.
161. See ARI, SAMPLE SURVEY, supra note 158.
162. Center for Military Readiness, Enlisted Women Opposed to Combat Assignments,
Sept. 3, 2003, http://www.cmrlink.org/WomenInCombat.asp?docID=204.
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since the fall of 1993.”163 Among female and male officers, levels of
support—nineteen percent and twenty percent, respectively—were higher,
but still far less than a majority.164
ARI also asked whether current policy “should be changed so that
females can also be ‘involuntarily assigned’ [to combat units].”165 The
results, which should have given the Army pause, indicated that only ten
percent of enlisted women wanted the Army to order female soldiers into
combat units on an involuntary basis.166 Furthermore, when ARI’s
questionnaire inquired about combat assignments on a voluntary basis—a
hypothetical idea that is not a workable option167—responses in favor were
not much higher.168 Only twenty-six percent of enlisted women were in
favor of voluntary combat for women, as opposed to sixteen percent of the
men.169 Only twenty-nine percent and twelve percent of female and male
officers, respectively, were in favor of voluntary combat assignments for
women.170 When the question was asked in terms of “voluntary [combat]
assignments for both males and females,” the percentages in favor ranged
from a high of thirty-one percent (enlisted women) to a low of seven
percent (male officers).171
Such dismal survey results on the women in combat issue presented a
problem for Pentagon feminists. Obvious differences between the views of
enlisted women and outspoken female officers would undermine the
perception that military women uniformly desire “career opportunities” in
or near close combat. The answer to the problem was simple: If you do not
wish to hear the answer, then stop asking the question. In 2002, the ARI
163. See Army Personnel Survey Office, U.S. Army Research Institute (ARI), Slide
Presentation: Sample Survey of Military Personnel, at 2, 6 (June 10, 2003) (“Policy Should
Have Involuntary Assignment for Females Also: Officers,” “Policy Should Have
Involuntary Assignment for Females Also: Enlisted Personnel”) (on file with author).
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. The Presidential Commission determined that there is no practical way that women
could be assigned to combat units only on a voluntary basis. See PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 5, at C-127 (Finding 4.13).
168. See Army Personnel Survey Office, supra note 163, at 3-4, 7-8 (“Policy Should
Have Voluntary Assignment for Females: Officers,” “Policy Should Have Voluntary
Assignment for Both Males and Females: Officers,” “Policy Should Have Voluntary
Assignment for Females: Enlisted Personnel,” “Policy Should Have Voluntary Assignment
for Both Males and Females: Enlisted Personnel”).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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survey dropped the question about women in combat and substituted less
consequential inquiries.172
It is difficult to think of any other major defense issue where Pentagon
officials have such politically correct blinders firmly in place. The omission
served to convey the clear message that Army officials simply do not care
what men and women think about new combat rules under which they must
live—and possibly die.
Media reports about the experiences of women in the current war tend to
quote female soldiers who are enthusiastic about the idea of women in
combat173—estimated by the ARI surveys to be about ten to fifteen percent
of women.174 Even if that percentage is much higher among the female
officers who communicate with the media today, there is no evidence that
the majority of female soldiers—including those in the enlisted ranks—
want to be involuntarily assigned in or near close combat on the same basis
as men.
Even if polls and surveys among military personnel showed
overwhelming majorities in support of women in combat, the Congress and
Commander in Chief still should implement policies that rest on sound
priorities and put the needs of the military first.
C. Complications on Co-Ed Submarines
Unless the Commander in Chief fulfills his responsibility to enforce the
congressional notification law regarding women in land combat,175 a similar
statute mandating advance notice before assigning female sailors to
172. ARI, Sample Survey Fall 2002, Survey Instrument (on file with author). Unlike
previous ARI Surveys of this kind (in the fall of 1993, 1994, 1997, 1999, and 2001), this
survey did not ask any questions about women in combat.
173. Phillip Carter, War Dames, WASH. MONTHLY, Dec. 2002, available at
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2001/0212.carter.html (“The most important
reason [for the new role of women in the military] has been pressure from women within the
Army who need combat experience to advance their careers, nearly all of them in the officer
corps.”). In the summer of 2004, several male flag officers told this author during meetings
at the Pentagon that they favored the lifting of all combat barriers, because that would
advance the careers of their own daughters. No data is available, but there appear to be many
daughters of high-level military officials who are military service academy graduates and
who seek to follow in their fathers’ footsteps to flag rank. Even if career opportunities and
promotions were a problem for female officers—but figures presented to DACOWITS since
the 1980s indicate that they are not—that would not be sufficient reason to impose
involuntary combat obligations on enlisted women, on the same basis as men. See infra note
552.
174. ARI SAMPLE SURVEY, supra note 158.
175. See 10 U.S.C. § 652 (West Supp. 2007).
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submarines, enacted in 2000, will likely have no effect.176 And if high-level
Navy officials decide to yield to feminist demands for “career
opportunities” aboard submarines, serious harm could be done to the health
of female sailors, their children, male submariners, and the “Silent Service”
community as a whole.
1. Feminist Engineering and the “Silent Service”177
During the Administration of Bill Clinton, then-Secretary of the Navy
John H. Dalton issued a memorandum on April 29, 1994, directing the
Chief of Naval Operations to assess the cost of ship alterations to “give full
consideration to the importance of expanding opportunities for women into
the submarine field, as well as the cost effectiveness of the shipboard
modifications necessary to facilitate mixed gender crews.”178 The Science
Applications International Corporation (SAIC) prepared for the Navy an
eighty-three-page report titled Submarine Assignment Policy Assessment
(SAIC Report). The SAIC Report set forth definitive information on why it
would be unwise to assign female sailors to any class of submarine. This
study was given to DACOWITS in 1995, but it was not revealed to the
public until the fall of 1999.179
176. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-398,
§ 573, 114 Stat. 1654, 1654A-136 (2000) (enacting 10 U.S.C. § 6035 (2000) (requiring the
Secretary of Defense to give Congress a thirty-day notice before either assigning women to
serve aboard submarines or configuring submarines to allow for women’s service)).
177. John Howland, a Naval Academy alumnus and former submarine officer, described
the term “Silent Service” as follows:
“Silent Service” was a term coined in the World War II era to describe the
submarine service and the men who manned the boats in the Pacific.
Submarines were the first arm of the military to take the attack to the Japanese
following Pearl Harbor. By their nature, they are stealthy weapons. The silence
that they do and must maintain when they are in enemy territory is of life or
death importance. Submariners are also generally silent about their missions
and accomplishments.
E-mail from John Howland to author (Mar. 2007) (on file with author).
178. REPORT OF THE SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION (SAIC),
SUBMARINE ASSIGNMENT POLICY ASSESSMENT, at A-3 (Feb. 1, 1995) [hereinafter SAIC
REPORT], available at http://www.cmrlink.org/viewarticle.asp?f=sapa%20020195.pdf.
179. See Navy Responses, Fall 1999 and Spring 2000, infra notes 183, 186. The Center
for Military Readiness obtained the SAIC Report from a knowledgeable source sometime
after Secretary of the Navy Richard Danzig delivered a controversial speech advocating
gender-mixed submarines in June of 1999. See Robert A. Hamilton, 1995 Report Opposed
Putting Women on Subs, DAY (New London, Conn.), Oct. 23, 1999, at A1; Rowan
Scarborough, Mixed-Sex Sub Crews Panned by Navy Study, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1999, at
Al.
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On June 3, 1999, Secretary Dalton’s former Under Secretary and
successor Richard Danzig revived the issue during a speech before an
annual symposium of the Naval Submarine League in Norfolk, Virginia.180
Danzig accused the submarine community of being “a white male bastion”
and suggested that the Navy might lose political support in Congress if it
did not consider gender integration on submarines.181 The Chief of Naval
Operations, Adm. Jay Johnson, resisted Danzig’s pressure, responding that
all-male submarine crews were “the right thing for us.”182
a. DACOWITS
In the fall of 1999, the Navy responded to an inquiry from the Defense
Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS), which the
committee had submitted to the Navy following its spring 1999 meeting. In
their response, Navy briefers explained the rationale behind Adm.
Johnson’s position in written responses and a slide presentation before the
forty-seven-year-old DACOWITS.183 At the time, DACOWITS was a
group of twenty-five to thirty-five mostly civilian women appointed by the
Secretary of Defense to advise the Pentagon on all issues involving women
in the military.184 The committee disregarded the Navy’s briefing and
180. David Brown, Idea of Women on Subs Met with Varied Response, NAVY TIMES,
June 21, 1999, at 12.
181. Editorial, No Place for Women, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Dec. 1, 1999, at 22.
In a speech loaded with sociological gobbledygook, he [Danzig] warned the
“submarine community” last summer to accept women and more minorities or
risk being out of touch with society. “The most Narcissus-like thing about
creating something in your own image, about being in love with your own
image, is the continued and continuous existence of this segment of the Navy as
a white male preserve,” he told the Naval Submarine League.
Id.
182. Dale Eisman, Top Admiral Against Women on Subs, VIRGINIAN PILOT, Sept. 3,
1999, at A14; CNO Sinks Sub Changes . . . For Now, NAVY TIMES, Sept. 13, 1999, at 5.
183. Navy Response to DACOWITS, Fall 1999, San Diego, Cal., presented by Capt. Bob
Holland, U.S. Navy, Submarine Community Management, Nuclear Propulsion Program
Management: Submarine Personnel Assignment [hereinafter Navy Response, Fall 1999]
(consisting of twenty-nine unnumbered slides) (on file with author). Among other things,
Capt. Holland’s briefing explained that alterations to submarines to accommodate women
would further reduce the already below-standard habitability standards for all crew
members, while leaving less space for stowage of basic and special equipment required for
mission accomplishment. See Andrea Stone, Navy Resists Idea of Opening Submarines to
Women, USA TODAY, Sept. 14, 1999, at 14A; Robert A. Hamilton, Committee Urges
Female Crew for Subs, DAY (New London, Conn.), Oct. 29, 1999.
184. See supra note 159. For several decades after its founding in 1951, the original
committee’s research and recommendations were helpful to military women and consistent
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passed a resolution recommending that untold millions be spent to
accommodate mixed-gender crews on submarines.185
During DACOWITS’s spring 2000 meeting, the Navy presented
additional information explaining many reasons why the Navy does not
assign female sailors to submarines.186 Again, the DACOWITS disregarded
that information and reaffirmed its unrealistic Fall 1999 resolution,
recommending that smaller (Virginia-class) submarines be redesigned to
accommodate mixed crews in the future and that female officers be
assigned to larger Ohio-class (Trident) ballistic missile (SSBN)

with sound priorities. But starting in the 1990s, the mostly civilian women members
undermined the committee’s credibility by routinely endorsing problematic feminist
causes—particularly co-ed basic training, women in combat, and gender integration on
submarines. See supra note 159. These recommendations were primarily aimed at advancing
the careers of the female officers who, as military representatives to the committee, helped to
write them during biannual DACOWITS meetings. Full committee meetings were elaborate
four- or five-day affairs, hosted by the various services in Washington, D.C., and at military
bases around the country. Meetings involved extensive briefings, field trips, and formal
social events. Members making independent visits to military installations were treated with
the same protocol status as three-star flag officers. (In the opinion of this author, who was
appointed to the DACOWITS in 1984, some committee members took this status much too
seriously.) Issues raised during base visit focus groups sometimes led to formal “Requests
for Information,” which were answered at the next meeting with a written response or a
briefing from military service representatives. Following these responses, DACOWITS
would vote on formal recommendations, which usually included a “Rationale” stressing
career opportunities for women. Recommendations were submitted directly to the Office of
the Secretary of Defense, Under Secretary for Personnel & Readiness, and prominently
reported in the media on a regular basis. The circular process put pressure on representatives
of the military services to satisfy escalating expectations of the committee at each successive
meeting.
185. DACOWITS Recommendation No. 1 (Oct. 1, 1999) (“DACOWITS recommends
that, beginning now, plans for future submarine platforms (particularly the smaller Virginia
class subs), incorporate appropriate berthing and privacy arrangements to accommodate
mixed gender crews.”). It also recommended that gender-integration begin on larger Ohioclass submarines, armed with (Trident) ballistic missiles (SSBNs), starting with female
officers. See Recommendations, available at http://www.dtic.mil/dacowits; see also Stone,
supra note 183; Hamilton, supra note 183. This recommendation alarmed and agitated the
submarine community, which demanded action from Congress. The debate intensified in
October 1999, when the previously undisclosed SAIC Report came to light. See, e.g.,
Carlisle A.H. Trost, Not in Our Submarines, U.S. NAVAL INST. PROC., Sept. 2000, at 2.
186. Navy Response to DACOWITS, Spring 2000, Submarine Personnel Assignment:
Briefing Session, at 2 [hereinafter Navy Response, Spring 2000], available at
http://www.cmrlink.org/cmrnotes/navy-dacowits_0295.pdf. In its response, the Navy
referenced the 1995 SAIC Report, which had been given to DACOWITS in June 1999.
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submarines.187 In submitting both of these recommendations to the
Secretary of Defense, committee members put their own egalitarian agenda
ahead of the good of the Silent Service.188
The DACOWITS also ignored compelling information included in the
report of the Science Applications International Corporation, which had
been given to the committee in June 1999. Points made by Navy
representatives and by the SAIC Report, all of which remain equally valid
today, included the following:
x

“[Alterations for co-ed crews would] further reduce existing
below-standard conditions (for both genders); or require the
removal of equipment as a space and weight trade-off, which
would result in reduced operational capabilities of the ship;
or in the extreme, require lengthening of the ship to obtain
additional space and weight margin. This option would be
very costly.”189

187. See Andrea Stone, Too Cramped for Comfort?, NAVY TIMES, June 5, 2000, at 24;
Rowan Scarborough, Panel Asks Navy To Put Female Officers in Subs, WASH. TIMES, May
4, 2000, at A1. This recommendation and a similar one approved at the committee’s Fall
1999 meeting, see supra note 185, seriously discredited DACOWITS. In March 2001,
controversy about co-ed submarines was one of several issues raised when DACOWITS’s
charter was due to be renewed in 2001. Following months of controversy, the Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel & Readiness, Dr. David Chu, allowed DACOWITS’s
Charter to expire, but he later reconstituted the group with fewer than ten members and a
different agenda that focuses on family concerns and related issues, but not women in
combat.
188. SAIC REPORT, supra note 178, at 10-11. Characteristics of this community are
unique in the military:
A U.S. submarine provides stealth, mobility, and firepower and the mere
suspicion of its presence dramatically changes the military equation for enemy
commanders. U.S. submarines are able to operate alone, unsupported, and
undetected—even in enemy waters—for months at a time, limited only by food
supplies and the endurance of the crew. There are no onboard maintenance
personnel; the operating crew must handle any emergency, including repairs to
the most sophisticated equipment. The submarine carries an array of precision
weapons that can strike targets ashore, on the surface, or other submarines. It
requires no escorts; no tankers; no air cover; no supply ships; and there are no
manufacturers’ representatives on board. It is the platform of choice for many
Special Forces operations.
Id.
189. Navy Response, Fall 1999, supra note 183, at slide titled “Submarine Alterations—
Projected Costs”; see also Navy Response, Spring 2000, supra note 186, at 5.

2010]

CONSTRUCTING THE CO-ED MILITARY

x

Separate quarters for female sailors would further cramp
living spaces on all submarines, which already fail to meet
the habitability standards applied to surface ships—and to an
intolerable degree:190 fifty enlisted submariners use each
shower, compared to twenty-five surface sailors; an enlisted
submariner has less than half the storage space of his surface
counterpart (three cubic feet vs. seven-and-one-half cubic
feet); and vertical space between bunks measures only
eighteen inches on submarines, compared to twenty-four
inches on ships.191

x

Virginia-class attack subs (SSNs) were designed to be
smaller than the Seawolf in order to reduce costs. Extensive
redesign, as demanded by DACOWITS, “would have two
negative effects: further degrade habitability for both
genders and require removal of operational equipment
reducing warfighting effectiveness.”192

x

Ship alterations to accommodate women would cost
approximately $5 million per attack sub, not including
redesign costs of approximately $15 million per class, plus
an unknown amount for required system changes and
associated costs. The Navy’s minimum estimate is that
altering a submarine to accommodate women would cost

673

190. Navy Response, Spring 2000, supra note 186, at 5.
A driving factor in the privacy and habitability concerns onboard all
submarines is the collocation of showers and toilet facilities, necessitated by the
limited available space . . . . The common practice onboard some surface ships
of using a sign to indicate occupancy by a male/female crewmember would not
work satisfactorily for long periods onboard a submarine.
Id.
191. Id. at 4; SAIC REPORT, supra note 178, at 11-12, Table 2-1.
Submarine designers strive to minimize the size of the ship. This is important to
achieve maximum performance within a reasonable power plant design and to
avoid unnecessary construction costs. Submarine designers try to take
advantage of every cubic foot of space. Living spaces are integrated with
electrical and mechanical operating systems. The crew lives in and around the
submarine weapon systems.
Id.
192. Rowan Scarborough, Panel Asks Navy To Put Female Officers in Subs; Military
Memo Says the Move “Very Costly,” WASH. TIMES, May 4, 2000, at A1 (quoting Navy
Response Spring 2000, supra note 186, at 4).

674

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:617

seventy-eight times more per crewmember than would
making comparable alterations on aircraft carriers.193
x

More importantly, estimates of cost do not reflect the
operational hazards of degrading undersea performance
characteristics and combat capabilities, which are vastly
different from the surface fleet. The crew lives in and around
equipment—an existence that has been compared to living
inside a clock. “Critical electronic, hydraulic, and high
pressure air systems pass through submarine berthing
spaces.”194 Redesignation of space designed for operational
equipment could “potentially [impact] the ship’s endurance
and/or mission capability.”195

x

A plan to assign female sailors and officers only to larger
Trident submarines (SSBNs, also known as “boomers”)
would create an unacceptable two-tiered officer community:
one group that can serve on any submarine, and another that
can only be assigned to Tridents. Without the opportunity to
assign sailors to both types of submarines, in order to
broaden experience in each, it would become increasingly
difficult to maintain a properly balanced and experienced
officer community. This would disadvantage women in any
fair selection process for command. Additionally, assigning
women only to the larger Trident subs would create a
perceived inequity within the community.196

193. Navy Response, Fall 1999, supra note 183, at slides titled “Surface Ship Alteration
Costs,” “Submarine Alterations—Projected Costs.” It would cost $5 million, or $313,000
per person, to reconfigure a Los Angeles-class submarine for gender-mixed crews, compared
to $2 million, or $4000 per person, to make similar alterations to an aircraft carrier (CVN
68). “These estimates do not include one time design costs of approximately $15 million per
ship class. Nor do the projections consider required system changes and associated costs.
Therefore, projected costs may be significantly higher.” Id.; see also Navy Response, Spring
2000, supra note 186, at 5 (mentioning the considerable “opportunity costs” of taking
submarines off line to support major shipboard modifications to accommodate mixed gender
crews). All of the Navy’s estimated costs, which have not been adjusted for inflation, would
be considerably higher today.
194. Navy Response, Spring 2000, supra note 186, at 7; SAIC REPORT, supra note 178,
at 2-4.
195. See Navy Response, Spring 2000, supra note 186, at 7; SAIC REPORT, supra note
178, at 2-4.
196. Navy Response, Spring 2000, supra note 186, at 8-9.

2010]

CONSTRUCTING THE CO-ED MILITARY

675

b. The SAIC Report
The 1995 Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) Report
provided additional information on the complications of co-ed submarines,
including a simple drawing that was worth 10,000 words.197 The drawing
illustrated habitability concerns by superimposing the outline of a Boeing
747 aircraft fuselage over the cramped living spaces of an attack submarine.
The cabin of a 747 jetliner, in which passengers spend only a few hours
while in flight, appears roomier than the space in which submariners must
live, work, and sleep for extended periods.
The SAIC Report explained that nuclear powered SSBN “boomers” stay
submerged for as long as seventy-seven continuous days.198 SSN (attack)
subs deploy for as long as six months at a time, with infrequent port calls.199
The thought of spending seventy-seven days on a 747 should give pause to
any reasonable person. The SAIC Report also put the issue into perspective
by assigning priority to the needs of the Silent Service:
Considerations of mixed gender crews must be undertaken in
the context of the combat effectiveness of the submarine. The
Supreme Court has upheld that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, which ensures all individuals are treated equally before
the law with respect to civilian employment, does not apply to
the military profession.
Submarines are unique. They are able to operate alone—
submerged and unsupported—undetected in a hostile
environment for months at a time, limited only by food supplies
and the endurance of the crew.
The vital characteristics of submarines generate competing
design requirements, including safety of submerged operations,
quieting, equipment accessibility and density. The final design is
a trade-off that is dominated by operational effectiveness,
engineering constraints and cost.
In parceling out available space, structure and equipment
needed for submarine stealth, mobility, endurance and payload
take priority over habitability. Non-essentials stay ashore. The
197. SAIC REPORT, supra note 178, at 15. The SAIC Report was not made public until
1999, when a concerned source provided it to the Center for Military Readiness. See
http://www.cmrlink.org/viewarticle.asp?f=sapa%20020195.pdf.
198. Id. at 16.
199. Id. at 16-17.
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crew must live in and around equipment. There is virtually no
space for recreation.
Berthing and sanitary spaces are cramped. “Hot-bunking,”
wherein three crew members share two bunks in shifts, is
standard operating procedure on attack submarines.
The total living area for more than 130 people is equivalent to
a medium-size house. Unencumbered deck space in sleeping
areas, toilets, and showers, is about one-half to one-third that
afforded to a crew member on a small surface ship.
....
Efforts continue to be made to minimize hot bunking,
however the reality is that hot bunking is still required to
accomplish sea missions. To reduce the number of crew required
to hot bunk, commanding officers will often grant the option of
laying down mattresses in the torpedo room where there is some
unencumbered deck space. Generally, crew members prefer the
inconvenience and lack of privacy involved in these sleeping
arrangements to sleeping in shifts on permanent bunks.200
According to the magazine National Defense, “A nuclear submarine
embodies the highest form of integrated technologies in the world—more
complex than even space vehicles—and [it] must operate in a more hostile
environment.”201
Safety concerns that cannot be engineered away are even more daunting:
x

A submarine is analogous to an “undersea aircraft,” which
patrols the oceans for months at a time, unsupported and
undetected in an environment more hostile than space.
“When submerged, even a small breach in a seawater piping
system can threaten the ship and all aboard. The closed
atmosphere of a submarine creats physical risks. In case of
fire, for example, a submarine must quickly get to the
surface to evacuate smoke or toxic fumes.”202

x

Addressing the notion that submarines can be “stretched”
like town car wedding limousines, SAIC added the

200. Id. at 2, 12.
201. Richard H. Gwinn & Don Tanquin, Submarine Base Viability Relies on Interim
Program, NAT’L DEF., Nov. 1994, at 22, quoted in SAIC REPORT, supra note 178, at 10.
202. SAIC REPORT, supra note 178, at 16.
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following: “New sanitary facilities require more piping
modifications in submarines, and may in some cases require
additional seawater piping or hull penetrations. These are not
insignificant modifications . . . . Both berthing and sanitary
facility modifications require corresponding electrical
system changes as well . . . .”
x

“In both the Los Angeles and Seawolf classes, modifications
which attain compliance with the [habitability] standards
may not be possible without lengthening the ship . . . .” Reassignment of scarce sanitary facilities to female sailors—
restricting, in many cases, fifty percent of facilities to ten
percent of the crew—would cause inequities for the men.
Cross-rank, single-gender berthing arrangements would
disrupt prerogatives of rank in an already-stressful
environment.203

x

According to preliminary work done on the new Virginiaclass attack submarines, “additional facilities for women
would require an increase in length from the baseline design
and even then, the facilities [would not be] fully compliant
with the [habitability] standards.”204

There is no compelling reason to make submarine living spaces even
more cramped, but that is exactly what DACOWITS recommended.
c. Birth Defects and Medical Emergencies
The SAIC Report set forth one of the most compelling reasons why
submarines should remain all-male. Medical dangers inherent in
gynecological emergencies, and insurmountable risks of birth defects to
unborn fetus “passengers” who accompany their mothers to work on the
sub, could endanger crew members and undermine undersea missions.205
The only female sailors who could safely be assigned to submarines would
be women without the physical capability to have children.206
203. Id. at 25-27.
204. Id. at 26 (citing the Naval Sea Systems Command).
205. Id. at 32-36.
206. Id.; see also Letter from Rear Adm. Hugh Scott, MC, U.S. Navy (Ret.) to House
National Security Committee Chairman Rep. Floyd D. Spence, June 12, 2000 [hereinafter
Rear Adm. Scott letter], available at http://www.cmrlink.org/CMRNoteNotes/HPScott%
20061200.pdf. Dr. Scott, a former medical corpsman and an expert in the field of undersea
medicine, provided more detailed information on the high risk of birth defects for the
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There are several reasons why pregnancy would be a greater concern on
submarines than on surface vessels. First, the primary health risk to
pregnant females in submarines is not nuclear power (as might be
commonly assumed), but rather it is the constantly recycled air on
submarines. On June 12, 2000, Rear Adm. Hugh P. Scott, MC, U.S. Navy
(Ret.), an expert in the field of undersea medicine, wrote letters to House
and Senate Armed Services Committees, explaining in detail the medical
and operational hazards of assigning female sailors of child-bearing age to
submarines, due to risks of birth defects caused by elements in a
submarine’s constantly recycled atmosphere that are safe for adults but not
for unborn children. While undertaking clinical tests to conclusively
establish these hazards would be impossible without exposing women and
children to unacceptable risks in the process,207 Rear Adm. Scott’s advice
was not mere rhetoric: The Institute of Naval Medicine in the United
Kingdom, in a study done for the British Royal Navy in 1997,
independently came to similar conclusion.208
As a practical matter, certain atmospheric molecules, such as carbon
monoxide and carbon dioxide, cannot be reduced in a submarine’s closed
undersea environment to a level that is safe for unborn children. Fires,
smoking, equipment malfunction, and overheated insulation all produce
carbon monoxide, which presents a real threat to a female submariner’s
unborn child. According to several studies cited by the SAIC Report:
The fetus is most sensitive and at the greatest risk in terms of the
toxicological effects of the environment during the first three
months of gestation.
The major gases present and routinely monitored aboard
submarines include: carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide,
hydrogen, oxygen, fluorocarbon-12 and fluorocarbon-114.

children of female sailors assigned to submarines, especially in the earliest weeks when they
may not be aware of their pregnancy.
207. See Rear Adm. Scott letter, supra note 206.
208. A. Brittain, M.R. Dean, H.J. Holden, D.C. Brown & G.H.G. McMillan, Mixed
Manning in Submarines: Foetal Health, Dec. 1997, in INM REPORT NO. 97074 (1997) (on
file with author). This report was approved and released by G.H.G. McMillan, Surgeon
Commodore Royal Navy Medical Officer-in-Charge, The Institute for Naval Medicine,
Alverstoke, GOSPORT, Hampshire, PO12 2DL RESTRICTED, at 1. It was obtained by the
author from David Brown, Head of Submarine and Radiation Medicine Division, Institute of
Naval Medicine, on November 25, 1999.
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With regard to toxicological considerations, carbon monoxide
present in the closed environment of the submarine can have an
adverse effect on the development of the fetus. . . . While normal
adults have a reserve capacity and compensatory response . . . ,
the fetus under normal situations can be functioning close to a
critical level with respect to tissue oxygen supply, so even
moderate carbon monoxide exposure could decrease the oxygen
transport capacity of maternal and fetal hemoglobin and result in
interference in fetal tissue oxygenation during important
developmental stages.209
Second, in addition to the risks inherent in permitting normal
pregnancies to occur aboard submarines, gender-integrated submarines
would be faced with emergencies such as ruptured ectopic pregnancies,
which are life-threatening and untreatable by a medical officer (usually not
a doctor) in a sub’s closet-sized “sick bay.”210 The SAIC Report noted:
The medical problems sometimes associated with pregnancy,
such as ruptured ectopic pregnancy, spontaneous hemorrhagic
abortion, or septic abortion would be significantly magnified in
the submarine environment. The occurrence of a ruptured
ectopic pregnancy is a life threatening emergency that requires a
correct diagonosis and a prompt medevac to a medical treatment
facility with an obstetrical surgical capacity. In the U.S. there is
one [such] pregnancy for each [sixty] diagnosed pregnancies.
Eighty percent of ruptured ectopic pregnancies occur between
four to eight weeks after the last menstrual period.211
In his letter to Chairman Spence, Rear Adm. Scott noted, “Testing all
women for pregnancy will not remove the risk because the pregnancy test
may not be positive in very early pregnancy, the time at which ectopic
pregnancy poses the greatest problem.”212 It would be prudent to conduct
mandatory pregnancy tests prior to deployment, but in the past, female
officers have rejected mandatory pre-deployment pregnancy tests as an

209. SAIC REPORT, supra note 178, at 34-35 (footnotes omitted).
210. Personal observation and trip report of the author during Presidential Commission
visit to the USS Polk and USS Scranton (Sept. 13, 1992).
211. SAIC REPORT, supra note 178, at 32-33 (quoting several expert sources in the fields
of Navy medicine, obstetrics, and gynocological surgery).
212. See Rear Adm. Scott letter, supra note 206, at 3; see also SAIC REPORT, supra note
178, at 34.
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infringement on women’s rights, and intimidated men have capitulated to
their demands.213
If a submarine’s captain were faced with a female sailor in acute medical
distress, or a pregnant sailor who fears birth defects due to carbon
monoxide and other toxic elements in the atmosphere, what is the skipper to
do? An immediate, unexpected trip to the surface would compromise the
sub’s undersea mission. In addition, mid-ocean evacuations, accomplished
by means of a basket dangling from a helicopter, would be extremely
perilous for all concerned, especially when a sub is operating in deep ocean
or under polar ice.
Pregnancy is not a minor concern. According to the Center for Naval
Analysis, the unplanned loss rate for female sailors on surface ships
(twenty-three to twenty-five percent) is more than two-and-one-half times
the rate for men (eight to ten percent)—most often due to pregnancy and
other medical conditions.214 Proportional losses on submarines could
compromise stealth missions and have a devastating effect on morale and
readiness.215
x

The unplanned loss of any sailor from a small-crewed
submarine, which requires 100% manning for continuous
eighteen-hour shift cycles, imposes considerable stress on
remaining crewmembers. Properly trained replacement
personnel, who are usually not available even on surface

213. See NAVAL INSPECTOR GEN., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION ON THE INTEGRATION OF
WOMEN INTO CARRIER AIR WING ELEVEN (Feb. 10, 1997) [hereinafter AIR WING ELEVEN
REPORT] (on file with author). During the first deployment of female pilots in tactical
aviation in 1994, some female officers protested the air wing commander’s (CAG’s) order
for mandatory pregnancy testing. When the CAG rescinded the order, another storm of
protest ensued, causing lingering resentment among men and women alike. “No issue was as
divisive of men and women as the carrier commanding officer’s order that air wing
personnel undergo [mandatory] pregnancy testing. The issue was routinely cited by women
who were critical of the [CAG’s] . . . lack of understanding of women’s concerns.” Id. This
incident was so contentious that orders for pregnancy tests have become virtually anathema
in the Navy, except under limited circumstances.
214. Rowan Scarborough, Dropout Rate High for Women on Ships; Navy Finds
Readiness Woes, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1999, at A1.
215. SAIC REPORT, supra note 178, at 41-43. “The submarine’s independent operations,
often in remote areas, means that access to replacement personnel or assistance from others
only occurs in extreme emergencies. If such outside assistance is required, it can be obtained
only at the expense of mission readiness or mission performance . . . .” Id.; see also Rowan
Scarborough, Navy Finds Pregnancy Put at Risk by Sea Duty, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1998, at
A1; Scarborough, supra note 214.
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ships, would be even more difficult to find and place on
technologically advanced submarines.216
Replacements for unplanned personnel losses would have to
match in terms of gender as well as qualifications, since
replacement of a female with a male would lessen the hot
bunking burden on women and increase it for men, and vice
versa.217

Normal operations and damage control can be physically demanding on
submarines as well as on surface ships. The last Navy study of its kind
found that significant percentages of female sailors were unable to perform
the following tasks: Stretcher carry, level (38%); Stretcher carry, up and
down ladder (88%); Start P250 Pump (75%); and Remove SSTG Pump
(99%). None of the men failed to perform any of these tasks, which are
commonly performed during shipboard emergencies.218 This type of
equipment is still used on board Navy ships. Often another sailor is not
available to share the load, particularly given narrow shipboard space
constraints.
d. Interpersonal Relationships
There are additional reasons why it would be unwise to impose
unresolvable social and management problems on the submarine
community. The SAIC Report’s cautionary words to social engineers are
216. SAIC REPORT, supra note 178, at 41-42.
Because of the highly technical nature of submarining, the range of skills
required to operate and maintain submarines, the small size of the crew and the
independent, extended nature of submarine operations, operational submarines
are manned at 100 percent of allowance as a matter of policy. Submarines
depend upon 100 percent manning to provide the proper number of crew
members of the right skills to fight and maintain the ship, and to man all watch
stations for day-to-day operations with adequate watch rotation, usually three
sections.
Id.
217. Id. at 43.
218. Id. at 36 (quoting D.W. Robertson & T. Trent, Documentation of Muscularly
Demanding Jobs and Tasks and Validation of an Occupational Strength Test Battery (STB),
MDTLN REPORT NO. 86-1 (1985)). The Robertson & Trent Study was also cited with
diagrams and findings in the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at C-8, C-9.
A number of submarine wives, speaking with members of the Presidential Commission by
phone on October 8, 1992, said that they were most concerned about physical disparities
between male and female sailors, which could undermine safety procedures in emergency
situations. See Presidential Commission Panel Three Supplementary Trip Report (Oct. 23,
1992) (on file with author).
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comparable to the warnings given to NASA mechanical engineers about the
dangers of sparks and fire in a pure-oxygen environment.
First, recent experience indicates that inappropriate relationships—
ranging from harassment to sexual attraction—will occur and be known to
the entire crew. Displays of affection are sure to undermine morale and
discipline, since there is no effective way to separate the people involved,
short of evacuation. Unplanned surfacings to remove sailors due to
inappropriate personal behavior, as well as for medical/pregnancy
emergencies, would further compromise the mission.219
Second, unrelenting stress and an absence of personal comforts and
privacy place a premium on morale and cohesion of the crew. There is no
fresh air or communication with the outside world, except for fifty-word
family grams that are not private.220 Divorce rates in the submarine
community are already very high.221 Further stress on families, combined
with predictable unplanned losses and non-deployability problems, could
worsen personnel shortages, instead of improving them.
Lastly, by means of comparison, Norway, Sweden, and Australia assign
a few women to small submarines, but brief coastal deployments are
nowhere near as demanding as American submarine requirements. On
small, thirty-person Swedish subs, men and women change clothes, bunk,
and shower in the same spaces. In an interview with Navy Times, Swedish
sailors said that romantic relationships occurring in submarines are
conducted “professionally” and treated with wary acceptance.222 Such
arrangements are incompatible with sound personnel-management practices
and American cultural values.223
219. SAIC REPORT, supra note 178, at 48-49. This point has been demonstrated,
ironically, in the highly publicized case of former astronaut Lisa Marie Nowak. See Nasa
Fires Astronaut Nowak, supra note 149.
220. SAIC REPORT, supra note 178, at 18-20.
221. Elaine Donnelly, Trip Report to the Presidential Commission Regarding Sept. 13,
1992, Visit to Atlantic Submarine Command at Norfolk, Va. (Jan. 15, 1993); see also Elaine
M. Grossman, Crew Wives Want No Women on Subs, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 6, 2000, at 29A.
222. Bradley Peniston, Swedish Subs Serve as Model to U.S. Fleet, NAVY TIMES, July 5,
1999. Peniston talked to Swedish sailors stationed at Gdynia, Poland, who approved of
Sweden’s policy of putting female sailors on small submarines since 1989. Id. A male
officer acknowledged that there is no privacy, and people wind up changing clothes together.
Id. A female sailor who shares her stateroom with three male officers said, “I think we think
differently” from Americans. Id. “It’s the natural way of doing it.” Id. A chief petty officer
from the American guided missile cruiser USS Hue City said, “No way would that work.”
Id. A female lieutenant junior-grade, also from the Hue City, agreed, telling the reporter that
she was headed for nuclear training for aircraft carriers. Id.
223. See id.
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The Navy’s responses to DACOWITS and to the SAIC Report made
additional points in response to concerns about women’s careers. For
instance, Navy officials explained that it would not be rational to assign
women only to the larger, more spacious nuclear submarines, because
submariners must have operational experience in all classes of submarines
in order to advance their careers. Limiting women only to larger nuclear
submarines would disadvantage women, even while being perceived as
preferentrial treatment unfair to men.224 Furthermore, opportunities for
women in specialized fields, such as nuclear propulsion, are readily
available in other advanced classes of ships, such as AEGIS cruisers and
Nimitz-class aircraft carriers.225
The SAIC Report and the Navy’s Fall 1999 and Spring 2000 responses
did not matter to DACOWITS, which nonetheless recommended that
women be assigned incrementally to larger Ohio-class (Trident) ballistic
missile submarines (SSBNs), and eventually to the new Virginia-class
attack submarines, which are much smaller than Los Angeles-class attack
subs (SSNs). The Department of the Navy, however, has not changed its
official position:
In July 1995, the Secretary of the Navy concurred with the Chief
of Naval Operation’s recommendation not to open submarines to
women. He specified that the issue was to be assessed as the
Navy’s experience evolved in the Women at Sea program on
surface combatants. To date, the information which has become
available in the Women at Sea program does not provide a basis
for changing this policy. Therefore, in accordance with
SECNAVINST 1300.12B, Assignment of Women Members in
the Department of the Navy, submarines remain closed to
women.226
2. The Bartlett Amendment Mandating Oversight
Rep. Roscoe Bartlett (R-Md.), a member of the HASC Personnel
Subcommittee, recognized that advocates of women on submarines were
misguided.227 Rep. Bartlett also realized that a single incremental step to put
224. Navy Response, Spring 2000, supra note 186, at 8.
225. Navy Response, Fall 1999, supra note 183, at slide titled “Women in the Nuclear
Propulsion Program.”
226. Navy Response, Spring 2000, supra note 186, at 2-3.
227. See Rep. Roscoe Bartlett, News Release, Women on Subs Amendment Included in
Defense Bill, Oct. 12, 2000.
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female sailors on any class of submarine would inevitably lead to
irreversible changes on all classes of subs—all without congressional
oversight or approval.228 Such actions become inevitable when
policymakers assign highest priority to equal opportunity and career
considerations—at the expense of the needs of the military—and knowingly
create career path problems that cannot be solved without taking additional
steps in the wrong direction.229
Noting that “[a]ny policy change of this magnitude simply must undergo
review by Congress and public debate,” Rep. Bartlett wisely sponsored and
successfully passed an amendment to the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2001, which forbids the use of DoD funds to genderintegrate submarines unless Congress is formally notified thirty legislative
days (when both houses of Congress are in session, or approximately three
months) in advance.230
Such a mandate would not be necessary if the power of gender politics in
the Pentagon were not so great—both then and now. In 2006, the Chief of
Naval Operations, Adm. Mike Mullen, departed from long-standing Navy
policy in several speeches and interviews, speaking favorably about the
prospect of assigning women to submarines.231 A statement by Adm.
Mullen promoting “diversity in the ranks,” which he said should be
“mandatory,” apparently has encouraged unnecessary gender quotas at the
U.S. Naval Academy,232 which the Superintendent, Vice Adm. Rodney

As a practical matter, this is a no-brainer. The Constitution reserves the
exclusive authority to Congress to make regulations concerning the military.
Without this provision, the Administration could have imposed this radical and
exorbitantly expensive change over the objections of the Navy, with no public
debate or consideration by the Congress.
Id.; see also supra note 176.
228. See supra note 227.
229. See SAIC REPORT, supra note 178. Historically, the typical DACOWITS answer to
career limitations for women was to demand the removal of all “barriers,” regardless of the
consequences.
230. See Bartlett, supra note 227.
231. Andrew Scutro, Full Steam Ahead, NAVY TIMES, Feb. 27, 2006, at 14-16. Adm.
Mullen was quoted as saying that officials in the submarine community were “looking at”
the possibility. In another interview, then-Master Chief Petty Officer Terry Scott was quoted
as saying that he favored the inclusion of women on subs because his daughter said when
she was eight years old that she wanted to ride on submarines. Mark D. Faram, Coming
Soon? Women on Subs, Pay Parity, Top Enlisted Sailor Says Only Outdated “Culture”
Stands in Way, NAVY TIMES, Feb. 13, 2006, at 12.
232. See Scutro, supra note 231, at 15.
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Rempt, has promoted as a solution to sexual harassment.233 Adm. Mullen
and Vice Adm. Rempt seem to be unconcerned about the illogic of creating
an artificially large cohort of female officers who are not eligible for
assignment to combat communities that must, under DoD regulations and
Navy policy, remain all-male.
Marine infantry are sorely needed to train Iraqi men for combat in Iraq,
and the undermanned SEAL community is the Navy’s number one
recruiting priority.234 The submarine fleet is shrinking, but skilled officers
and crewmen are difficult to find. Women cannot fill those billets due to
habitability and health considerations. Self-sterilization is not a civilized
option. Furthermore, given the most pressing personnel needs of the Navy
and Marine Corps, it is not prudent for the Chief of Naval Operations and
the Superintendent of the Naval Academy to keep increasing gender quotas,
which will produce more female officers than the Navy needs. These
discriminatory quotas are an egregious example of double standards
involving women (DSIW), and they comprise a self-created demographic
dilemma in the making. DSIWs cause otherwise intelligent and honorable
men to do irrational things.
D. Double Standards in Naval Aviation
1. Death of an Aviator
The ramp of an aircraft carrier is unforgiving, and the penalty for errors
can be death. The story of the first two women trained to fly the F-14

233. Hearing on Sexual Assault and Violence Against Women in the Military and at the
Academies Before the H. Subcomm. on Nat’l Sec., Emerging Threats, & Int’l Relations, of
the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 109th Cong. (June 27, 2006) [hereinafter House, Hearing on
Sexual Assault and Violence Against Women in the Military and at the Academies]
(testimony of Vice Adm. Rempt) (citing TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 7), available
at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=
f:33682.wais; see also id. (statement of Elaine Donnelly). The Task Force Report suggested
that acceptance of women at the USNA might improve if their numbers were significantly
increased. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 22. The theory was based on civilian
sociology only, but the USNA nevertheless has increased its percentage of female
midshipmen from 15.8% in the Class of 2006 to 22.8% in the Class of 2010.
234. W. Thomas Smith, Jr., Burning Up SEALS: Misusing Special Warfare Assets, NAT’L
REV.
(online
ed.),
Aug.
31,
2006,
http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=
MTY1MDgxOTU2YTA3NWE3ODQyZDAwZTc1OGMxOThhNTU=. The USNA should
be concentrating on meeting the primary recruiting needs of the Navy and Marine Corps
today—i.e., men for the combat arms and submarines.
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Tomcat demonstrates the dangers of advancing female trainees with special
concessions that elevate risks in extremely hazardous occupations.
a. The Kara Hultgreen Story
Shortly after Defense Secretary Les Aspin issued regulations permitting
the training of female pilots in tactical aviation,235 Lt. Kara S. Hultgreen
and Lt. Carey Dunai Lohrenz became the first two women trained to fly the
F-14 Tomcat.236
On October 25, 1994, Lt. Hultgreen lost control of her aircraft on
approach to the carrier USS Abraham Lincoln.237 Her back seat radar
intercept officer barely ejected in time, but Lt. Hultgreen plummeted into
the ocean and died.238 The carrier platform videotape and subsequent
investigations confirmed that the primary cause of Hultgreen’s mishap was
pilot error.239 The crash was a tragedy but no disgrace, since most aviation
mishaps are caused by inadvertent mistakes. This fatal accident was
different, however, in that it involved double standards in aviation
training—DSIW of the most dangerous kind.
The glide-slope errors that caused Lt. Hultgreen to stall the engine and
depart from safe flight on approach to the carrier ramp were similar to
mistakes that she had made twice before. Lt. Hultgreen’s instructors gave
her “pink sheets” marking unsatisfactory performance for similar errors in
training. Lt. Hultgreen was well-liked and respected by her colleagues, and
235. See Policy on the Assignment of Women, supra note 44.
236. AIR WING ELEVEN REPORT, supra note 213, at 23; see also Nancy Klingener, A
Fighting Chance: Female Pilots Finally Will Be Flying Fleet F-14s, MIAMI HERALD, May
16, 1993, at B6; Scott D. Williams, Blacklions Fly into Naval Aviation History, COMPASS
(San Diego, Cal.), Sept. 9, 1994, at A1.
237. See Tony Perry, Navy’s 1st Woman Combat Pilot Killed During Training Mission,
L.A. TIMES Oct. 27, 1994, at A12; N.Y. Times News Service, Female Combat Pilot’s Death
Sparks Debate, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 30, 1994, at C3.
238. See, e.g., Perry, supra note 237; Michael E. Ruane, Knight Ridder Newspapers,
ATLANTA J. & CONST., Oct. 27, 1994, at A4; NBC Nightly News: Navy’s First Female Pilot
Is Lost at Sea (NBC television broadcast Oct. 26, 1994); see also MISHAP INVESTIGATION
REPORT (Apr. 4, 1995) [hereinafter MIR REPORT], available at http://www.panix.com/
~baldwin/hultgreen_mir.txt.
239. MIR REPORT, supra note 238, at 12. The MIR analyzed glide slope errors in
detailed, technical terms, and summarized: “The causal factors of this mishap and injury are
a result of overcontrol, external distraction, cognitive saturation, channelized attention, wear
debris, complacency and problem not foreseeable.” Id. at 16; see also infra note 263. This
document, normally kept in strict confidence, was initially revealed by Newsweek magazine
on March 27, 1995. See Becky Garrison, COs Irked by Handling of Hultgreen Case, NAVY
TIMES, June 5, 1995, at 6.

2010]

CONSTRUCTING THE CO-ED MILITARY

687

she probably would have developed into a skilled aviator if given sufficient
time.240 Her graduation into carrier aviation, however, was accelerated
before she was ready.241 The second female trainee, Lt. Carey Lohrenz,
washed out of carrier aviation in May 1995.242 Lt. Lohrenz frequently
blamed others for the low scores and numerous “pink sheets” that she had
received, which were far worse than those earned by Lt. Hultgreen, and
historically would have disqualified male aviation trainees.243 When
240. CENTER FOR MILITARY READINESS, CMR SPECIAL REPORT: DOUBLE STANDARDS IN
NAVAL AVIATION 3-6 (Apr. 25, 1995) [hereinafter CMR SPECIAL REPORT] (supported by
training records at B1-1–B13-1). This author met and talked with Lt. Hultgreen and other
aviators in her squadron, VF-213, during a visit to the San Diego Naval Air Station on
October 13, 1994, twelve days before her tragic death. It was obvious that Lt. Hultgreen
enjoyed being in the F-14 squadron, and her colleagues held her in high regard.
241. See infra notes 256-58.
242. AIR WING ELEVEN REPORT, supra note 213 (discussing the REPORT OF THE FIELD
NAVAL AVIATION EVALUATION BOARD (FNAEB) 94-103 (June 19, 1995) and individual
FNAEB documents referenced in the AIR WING ELEVEN REPORT); see also infra note 243. A
FNAEB is an administrative board that may be called to evaluate the performance, potential
judgment, and motivation for service of the aviator ordered to appear before the board. The
FNAEB evaluating the performance of Lt. Lohrenz removed her from carrier aviation but
recommended A-3 status, which would permit her to fly non-tactical aircraft. The squadron
commander went further in assigning her to B-1 (non-flying) status, and the decision was
upheld by a Naval Aviation Evaluation Board (NAEB), which removed her wings on June
17, 1995. In response to letters from Lohrenz’s parents to the Under Secretary of the Navy,
Richard Danzig, several investigations ensued. The Air Wing Eleven investigation
concluded that, at the time of the FNAEB, “Lt. Lohrenz’s grades were below minimum
standards.” AIR WING ELEVEN REPORT, supra note 213, at 103. Nevertheless, for
questionable reasons, Lohrenz was returned to non-carrier aircraft flight status by a second
Naval Aviation Evaluation Board in July 1996. See Ernest Blazar, Navy Gives Grounded
Female Pilot 2nd Chance, NAVY TIMES, June 30, 1997. After filing a lawsuit against the
Navy regarding the release of her records, Lohrenz agreed to leave the Navy in October
1998.
243. REPORT OF THE FNAEB [hereinafter FNAEB REPORT], FRS (Fleet Replacement
Squadron) Training Jacket Summary, Memorandum from Commanding Officer, Fighter
Squadron 213 to LCDR Warren S. Ryder, USN, at encl. 16 (May 31, 1995) (on file with
author); see also James W. Crawley, Navy Grounds Female F-14 Pilot for Evaluation of
Flying Skills, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., June 30, 1995, at B1.
In a statement filed with the FNAEB, the Commanding Officer of the Squadron, Cmdr. F.
J. Killian, wrote:
I feel that all the warning signs of impending danger exist, and that my tools,
the tripwires set forth by governing instructions, indicate a safety hazard. I
believe that to allow her to continue in the carrier environment could in fact put
lives at risk, and [I] am unwilling to do that.
FNAEB REPORT, supra, at encl. 6. Lt. Jeffrey Trent, Senior Landing Signal Officer (LSO),
said in a statement that Lohrenz’s performance was “undisciplined, unresponsive, and
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officers in her squadron removed Lt. Lohrenz from carrier aviation
following a Field Naval Aviation Evaluation Board (FNAEB), she
complained of sex discrimination.244
Several investigations were conducted, but they found no evidence of
bias against Lohrenz or other women in Air Wing Eleven.245 Adm. Brent
M. Bennit, Commander of the Naval Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet,
reviewed available documentation and conducted oral interviews with key
officers familiar with events leading up to Lohrenz’ FNAEB. Adm. Bennit
concluded that the decision to terminate Lt. Lohrenz’s flight status in the F14 was “an appropriate decision,” due to several documented factors,
including, in part: “[c]ontinued substandard carrier landing performance”;
“[e]rratic and, at times, dangerously unpredictable carrier landing
performance”; “[r]epeated instances of slow or unresponsive compliance
with landing signal officer advice or direction”; exhibiting “a consistent and
disconcerting tendency to minimize her personal responsibility for her
substandard carrier landing performance”; and exhibiting, “[a]t best, a
marked tendency to seriously exaggerate her accounts of events or, at
unpredictable.” Id. at encl. 9. The Commander of the Air Wing (CAG), Capt. Dennis
Gillespie, in his “Second Endorsement,” dated June 21, 1995, expressed agreement with the
FNAEB Report: “The buck stops here. Continued and unwarranted effort to achieve
mediocrity in the face of ‘the ramp’ would be an irresponsible act of cowardice on my part.”
Id. at 11-12. The Air Wing Eleven Report noted that “[Navy] investigators determined that
Lt. Lohrenz went to a FNAEB because those who observed her carrier landings thought she
was unresponsive, unpredictable, and unsafe.” AIR WING ELEVEN REPORT, supra note 213, at
102 ¶ 338.
244. Letter from Lt. Lohrenz to Commander, Naval Air Force (June 18, 1995) (asking for
reconsideration of the FNAEB decision to remove her from carrier aviation) (on file with
author); see also Ernest Blazar, Wing of Fate: What Went Wrong, NAVY TIMES, July 14,
1997, at 4.
245. See, e.g., NAVY HOTLINE COMPLETION REPORT 1-35 (Nov. 30, 1995, rev. Jan. 31,
1997) [hereinafter CARMAN REPORT], published in AIR WING ELEVEN REPORT, supra note
213, at app. Lt. Lohrenz demanded and did receive some revisions in the Carman Report,
but the conclusion that she had not been a victim of sex discrimination remained. It stated
that, “As early as October 1994, certain aspects of Lt. Lohrenz’ night carrier landing
performance were below minimum carrier qualification standards.” CARMAN REPORT, supra,
at 11. The Carman Report (rev.) noted,
When Lt. Lohrenz’ commanding officer referred her to a Field Naval Aviator
Evaluation Board on 30 May 1995, she ranked 113 of 113 among air wing
pilots . . . . Lt. Lohrenz received equivalent opportunity to train compared to
her contemporaries. Thus, claims that she was not given a reasonable
opportunity to succeed are not substantiated.
Id. at 16. It added, “Documentation was provided verifying command level monitoring of
aviators whose landing performance tended to be below required standards.” Id. at 17; see
also Blazar, supra note 244, at 6.
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worst, a lack of truthfulness in accepting responsibility for deficiencies.”
Adm. Bennit met with Lt. Lohrenz on April 26, 1996, but he denied her
request for reinstatement of flight status on June 12, 1996.246
Lt. Lohrenz remained dissatisfied, and her parents sent a letter of
complaint to Under Secretary of the Navy Richard Danzig, who promised
another investigation.247 In 1996, the Naval Inspector General conducted
yet another probe of possible sex discrimination against female aviators in
Air Wing Eleven.248 Over a period of months the Navy IG conducted scores
of sworn interviews with male and female pilots, wing commanders,
instructors, medical personnel, and Pacific Fleet commanders. With only a
few minor exceptions no evidence was found to support allegations of
discrimination against Lt. Lohrenz or any another female aviator in Air
Wing Eleven.249

246. Memorandum from Adm. Brent M. Bennit, Commander Naval Air Force, U.S.
Pacific Fleet, Second Endorsement on Lt. Carey D. Lohrenz, USNR, to Chief of Naval
Personnel, Subj: Request for Reinstatement of Flight Status, June 12, 1996, at 1-3 (Feb. 28,
1996) (on file with author) [hereinafter Bennit Memo].
247. Letters from Robert and Carol Dunai, the parents of Carey Lohrenz, to high level
Navy officials (July 20, 1995; Jan. 9, 1996) (on file with author); see also Blazar, supra note
244, at 8. In view of the record of unequivocal statements by experts evaluating Lohrenz’s
performance first-hand, the solicitous response of Under Secretary Danzig to the Lohrenz
FNAEB was unusual. His response, and objectives that the Naval Inspector General set for
the huge Air Wing Eleven investigation that followed, were examples of DSIWs, which had
become pervasive in the aftermath of the 1991 Tailhook scandal.
248. See AIR WING ELEVEN REPORT, supra note 213. The Naval Inspector General
investigation of Carrier Air Wing Eleven examined the initial work up and deployment of
women assigned to combat aviation positions aboard the USS Lincoln. The resulting report
of the Naval Inspector General was dated February 10, 1997, but it was not released, in
redacted form, until July 1997. The report examined the experiences of several female pilots
in Air Wing Eleven, but its primary focus was on Lt. Lohrenz, whose parents had sent letters
complaining of sex discrimination when she was removed from carrier aviation in May
1995. In 1996, scores of Navy personnel and officials were interviewed under oath, with
verbatim transcripts.
249. AIR WING ELEVEN REPORT, supra note 213, at 92.
[W]hatever the reason—stress, lack of motor skills, problems with scanning,
inability to comprehend what she was being told to do, unwillingness to
comply with the signals of the LSOs due to lack of trust or a belief that she
knew what was better for her—the bottom line is that a pilot must respond to
the signals of the LSO; Lohrenz did not. A pilot who cannot, or will not, follow
the directions of the LSO is inherently unsafe and must be removed from the
carrier flying environment.
Id. Additional allegations regarding Lohrenz and several other female aviators who claimed
or suspected discrimination were found to be minor or unsubstantiated. See id. at 149, 154,
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Unredacted transcripts of Navy IG interviews and documents, revealed,
however, that special concessions had been extended to ensure that the first
two women trained to fly the F-14 in combat would not be allowed to
fail.250 The squadron commanding officer commented that, after regulations
changed in 1993, there was a “race with the Air Force” to get women into
combat aviation.251 Lts. Hultgreen and Lohrenz technically were qualified
to fly—both were given keys to the aircraft. The definition and concept of
“qualified,” however, was effectively changed to ensure the women’s
graduation to the fleet. Instead of pursuing excellence and high standards
first, the Navy was giving priority to a political goal: making amends for
the Tailhook scandal.252 This was done despite performance problems that
historically had not been accepted in aviators aspiring to be pilots in carrier
aviation—the Navy’s most hazardous occupation.253 Questions persisted

165, 172, 185, 195, 198, 208, 211-30; see also Robert J. Caldwell, A Rough Flight for the
Navy’s Female Pilots, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 13, 1997, at G1.
250. See AIR WING ELEVEN REPORT, supra note 213, at 23-26 (publishing many excerpts
of sworn statements obtained by Naval Inspector General investigators, but without
attribution or identifying information). Unredacted transcripts of Naval Inspector General
interviews, obtained by this author during the discovery process of litigation, revealed
identifying information and more statements expressing serious concerns about Lt.
Lohrenz’s landing techniques, which had preceded her FNAEB and removal from carrier
aviation.
251. Id. at 41 ¶ 157. Cmdr. Thomas Sobiek, the commanding officer of the F-14 fleet
replacement (training) squadron (VF-124), initially denied that there were unusual pressures
to graduate the female trainees from the training squadron. He later conceded that Navy
public affairs officers were pressuring the training squadron to win “a race with the Air
Force” to get women into tactical aviation. See 60 Minutes: Double Standard? (CBS
television broadcast Apr. 19, 1998) (interview of Cmdr. Thomas Sobiek and Lt. Patrick
Burns by Mike Wallace) (transcript on file with author).
252. See 60 Minutes, supra note 251 (statement of Adm. Stanley Arthur).
253. Id. In many conversations with this author, Lt. Patrick J. (Jerry) Burns, a former
radar intercept officer (RIO) and F-14 instructor who had trained Lt. Lohrenz, stated that
carrier qualification historically had been defined by high standards and competency, not
minimal standards and mediocrity. This same belief was stated by other naval aviators. See,
e.g., AIR WING ELEVEN REPORT, supra note 213, at 91 (“Everyone [interviewed] was
consistent in their description of Lt. Lohrenz’ typical pass, which she said was high and fast
or overpowered . . . to many of the LSOs [landing signal officers], her technique presented
the profile of the classic ramp strike they all feared.”). Lt. Burns documented his statements
with records of carrier qualification washout rates of F-14 aviators from January 1986 to
July 1994, which were subsequently published in the CMR Special Report, see supra note
240, at B5-1–B5-14. See also Aff. of Lt. Patrick Jerome “Pipper” Burns, USN (Ret.), at 52,
Lohrenz v. Donnelly & CMR, 223 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 2002) (No. Civ. 96-777) (on file
with author) [hereinafter Burns Affidavit].
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about the readiness and competency of the two women—particularly Carey
Dunai Lohrenz—to fly the F-14 Tomcat in combat.254
Prior to the death of Lt. Hultgreen, Lt. Patrick Burns and others in the
training squadron expressed concerns about the competency of the two
female pilots to the training squadron (VF-124) commanding officer, Cmdr.
Thomas Sobiek, but were told that the women were going to graduate, no
matter what.255 Navy officials normally do not speculate on the cause of
aircraft mishaps. In this case, Navy spokesmen began almost immediately
to mislead the public about the circumstances of Lt. Hultgreen’s crash and
the controversial training that preceded it.256
In the days and weeks following the death of Lt. Hultgreen, Navy
officials continued to insist that she had been fully qualified to fly an F-14.
Aviators who knew of problems in the training of Lt. Hultgreen and, to a
greater degree, Lt. Lohrenz, expressed their dissatisfaction publicly but
anonymously in the San Diego area. Months later, evidence came to light
that there was good reason for their concerns.

I reject the notion, as stated by Plaintiff Lohrenz during her December 7, 1999,
deposition, that it was not a matter of general public concern whether some
female pilots were receiving preferential treatment in order to qualify for
carrier aviation. Both of these women [Hultgreen and Lohrenz] were
technically “qualified,” but the issue was competence to fly the F-14. I saw this
as a life and death issue, and it still is.
Id.; see also infra note 275.
254. See Pat Flynn, Pilot Qualified, Files Show, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Nov. 20, 1994,
at A1; Editorial, An Inevitable First, NAVY TIMES, Nov. 7, 1994. During this interim time,
following the death of Lt. Hultgreen and prior to publication of the CMR Special Report, see
supra note 240, rumors about double standards in the training of both women were
widespread in the San Diego naval aviation community. Some speculators who did not have
first-hand information may have confused the training records of Lt. Hultgreen with those of
her colleague, Lt. Lohrenz, which were far worse. Training records retained by Lt. Burns—
an F-14 instructor who feared that one of the women would die and that the Navy would try
to deny double standards that elevated risks for both women—did constitute first-hand
information. Copies of the records published in the CMR Special Report, which Rear Adm.
Lyle Bien had conceded were “largely accurate” in his January 1995 report, drew
distinctions between Lt. Hultgreen and the second female F-14 aviator, who was identified
only as “Pilot B.” See also Bien Report, infra note 271.
255. See 60 Minutes, supra note 251. Contradicting his previous denials to Naval
Inspector General investigators, Cmdr. Sobiek admitted on 60 Minutes that he did say
something to squadron instructors that could have been interpreted as pressure to graduate
the female aviators, no matter what. See AIR WING ELEVEN REPORT, supra note 213, at 27.
256. Eric Schmitt, Miramar Pilot’s Death Revives Issue of Women’s Military Roles, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Oct. 30, 1994, at A6; Flynn, supra note 254.
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During the Air Wing Eleven investigation, one of the Navy IG witnesses,
Lt. Cmdr. Rheinhart Wilke, testified that he had previously evaluated the
performance of Lt. Hultgreen during her second attempt to carrier qualify,
which took place on July 19–21, 1994. Lt. Cmdr. Wilke told investigators
that he had recommended a Field Naval Aviation Evaluation Board
(FNAEB) to review Lt. Hultgreen’s performance before granting her carrier
qualification.257 An Evaluation Board proceeding might have delayed her
graduation to the fleet, but she probably would have improved and
eventually succeeded as an F-14 pilot. Lt. Cmdr. Wilke’s recommendation
was overruled, and Lt. Hultgreen was assigned to a squadron on the carrier
Lincoln.258
Three months after the women’s carrier qualification, on October 25,
1994, Lt. Cmdr. Wilke was a senior landing signal officer on the Lincoln. It
was Wilke’s voice heard on the chilling videotape of Hultgreen’s crash,
pleading with her to “Raise your gear!” apply “Power, power!” and finally
“Eject!” Hultgreen was unable to regain control of the plane to make a
second approach, or to save her own life by ejecting in time. During
testimony given to the Naval Inspector General on July 3, 1996, which was
not mentioned in the publicly released report, Lt. Cmdr. Wilke said,
“Watching Kara Hultgreen die was the worst thing in my life.”259
On February 28, 1995, Navy officials in San Diego conducted a news
conference releasing the Judge Advocate General Manual (JAGMAN)
report on the fatal crash.260 The videotape was shown and broadcast

257. Interview of Lt. Cmdr. Rhinehart Wilke before Naval Inspector General, in Naval
Air Station San Diego., Cal. (July 3, 1996) (unredacted transcript on file with author).
During the Air Wing Eleven Investigation, few questions were asked about the death of Lt.
Kara Hultgreen or the training that preceded her fatal mishap on October 25, 1994.
Unredacted copies of interview transcripts were provided to this author in the course of
litigation discovery.
258. Id. The redacted copy of the Naval Inspector’s General’s Report, released to the
public in July 1997, did not include any reference to this significant statement by Lt. Cmdr.
Wilke. Exposure of his testimony would have called into question the judgment of Navy
officials and advocates who created the perception of a “race with the Air Force” to get
female pilots into combat aviation.
259. Id.
260. Naval Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet News Release No. 09-95, Navy Releases
Investigation Findings on F-14 Accident (Oct. 1994) (Feb. 29, 1995) (announcing release of
the public JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN. MANUAL (JAGMAN) REPORT (Feb. 28, 1995) [hereinafter
JAGMAN REPORT]); see also Pat Flynn, Hultgreen Cleared of Blame in F-14 Crash, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Feb. 28, 1995, at A1 [hereinafter Flynn, Hultgreen Cleared of Blame];
Pat Flynn, F-14’s Fate Sealed in Split Seconds, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 1, 1995, at
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repeatedly on network television. Although technical details contained in
that report indicated that the pilot had precipitated the engine stall and
caused the aircraft to depart from controlled flight,261 Navy Public Affairs
officials continued to suggest that engine failure, not pilot error, was the
primary cause of the crash.262 The Navy’s dissembling caused even more
controversy nationwide, particularly within the aviation community.263
During subsequent testimony given during a deposition, Lohrenz admitted
that she knew her colleagues would be agitated by the controversy, and that
she herself was incredulous about statements being made about the cause of
Lt. Hultgreen’s crash.264 San Diego Union-Tribune Insight Editor Robert J.
Caldwell later reported that simulator tests had been rigged to show that
engine failure was the primary cause of Lt. Hultgreen’s mishap.265
A1; Dana Priest, Female Pilot’s Crash Blamed on Engine Stall, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 1995,
at A7.
261. JAGMAN REPORT, supra note 260, at 27 (Finding 13) (“Her response was dual
engine wave off technique and this unwittingly exacerbated the single engine situation by
increasing left yaw and setting an AOA (angle of attack) in excess of NATOPS (flight
manual) recommended single engine wave off procedures.”).
262. See, e.g., Flynn, Hultgreen Cleared of Blame, supra note 260; Nightline (ABC
broadcast Feb. 28, 1995); Editorial, Robert J. Caldwell, Hultgreen Case Puts the Navy’s
Credibility at Risk Again, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 26, 1995, at G1; A Whitewash
Serves No Purpose, SOUNDINGS (Norfolk, Va.), Mar. 8, 1995; Becky Garrison, What Killed
Hultgreen?, NAVY TIMES, Mar. 13, 1995, at 3.
263. See MIR REPORT, supra note 238, at 12-13. The confidential Mishap Investigation
Report, revealed by persons unknown, was far more explicit than the JAGMAN Report, but
consistent with it. The MIR analyzed in detail five errors made by Kara Hultgreen, the
“Mishap Pilot,” or “MP,” which caused her to depart from safe flight and crash into the sea.
They were summarized as follows: (1) “MP’s attempt to salvage overshooting approach with
left rudder led to reduced engine compressor stall margin, contributing to left engine
compressor stall”; (2) “MP failed to execute proper single engine waveoff procedures”; (3)
“MP failed to inform MR (mishap radar intercept officer, in the back seat) of single engine
emergency”; (4) “MP failed to respond to LSO (landing signal officer) calls”; and (5) “MP
failed to make timely decision to eject.” Id. It should be noted that most aviation mishaps are
caused by pilot errors. These realities do not detract from the respect owed to Lt. Hultgreen,
a pioneering aviator. See also MITCHELL, supra note 15, at 300-02; Rowan Scarborough,
Pilot Error Acknowledged, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1995, at A1; Becky Garrison, Internal
Report Confirms Hultgreen’s Error, NAVY TIMES, Apr. 3, 1995.
264. Deposition of Carey D. Lohrenz at 373-76, Lohrenz vs. Donnelly & CMR, No. 96777 (D.D.C. Dec. 6, 1999) (transcript on file with author).
265. Robert J. Caldwell, Were the Simulator Tests Rigged?, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.,
Apr. 9, 1995, at G1; GREGORY VISTICA, FALL FROM GLORY: THE MEN WHO SUNK THE U.S.
NAVY 386-87 (1995). Vistica noted that the Navy went to great lengths to prove that
mechanical failure had caused the Hultgreen mishap—even raising the aircraft from the sea
to study the engines, which was not an ordinary practice:
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b. The Truth Comes to Light
Lt. Patrick (Jerry) Burns, F-14 instructor and naval flight officer, was
present at an all-officers meeting in the summer of 1994, during which his
commander made it clear that the women would graduate to the fleet, no
matter what.266 Lt. Burns had two major concerns: (1) that one of the
Test results, however, revealed that both engines were working fine, with the
exception of a malfunctioning valve, which in itself is not enough to ground an
aircraft. The Navy even manipulated and rigged a simulator test so the majority
of the naval aviators trying to replicate Hultgreen’s crash could do nothing but
crash. Without the rigged restrictions, most of the pilots would have
survived. . . . When stories about [the secret Mishap Investigation Report]
appeared first in Newsweek, then The Los Angeles Times, the Navy tried to
discredit them, claiming they were inaccurate. And when Robert Caldwell, a
former Army veteran and conservative columnist at The San Diego UnionTribune, began lifting the veil on the admirals’ obfuscation of the facts, the
Navy resorted to personal attacks on his character in an effort to undermine his
thorough reporting. The Navy’s public affairs officers then began calling
reporters to warn them off the story. Interest in the mishap investigation report
was so high because it clearly contradicted the Navy’s official position, that
Rear Admiral Kendell Pease, the chief of public affairs, had released a
memorandum for correspondents [regarding “errors of fact” about the
MIR]. . . . Commander Stephen Pietropaoli, a Navy spokesman, even bragged
to H. G. Reza of The Los Angeles Times that he had kept The Boston Globe and
The Washington Post from publishing stories.
Id.; see also Editorial, The Crash of Kara Hultgreen, DETROIT NEWS, Apr. 9, 1995.
The nation has been led to believe that mechanical failure caused the fatal crash
last October of Lt. Kara Hultgreen, the Navy’s first female combat pilot. Now
comes an internal investigation, leaked online, citing pilot error as the primary
factor in the crash . . . . Without question, Lt. Hultgreen was a brave and
committed pilot. Whether she was sufficiently trained and qualified for carrier
duty, however, is a matter of some dispute. Double standards are an unfortunate
consequence of the political decision to expand opportunities for women . . . .
[Release] of the public [JAGMAN] report was a masterpiece of
obfuscation . . . . Lt. Hultgreen wished only to be judged against her fellow
pilots. By applying a double standard, the Navy has heaped dishonor upon her
memory, and put other pilots at risk.
Id.
266. The training squadron commander, Cmdr. Thomas Sobiek, flatly denied that he had
made such a suggestion in his interview with the Naval Inspector General. See AIR WING
ELEVEN REPORT, supra note 213, at 29 (inquiring about this understanding: “A: That is a
flat-ass lie. And whoever told you that, if they were under oath, should be taken to task.”).
But during his interview with Mike Wallace, Cmdr. Sobiek admitted that he may have
conveyed that impression, and he added that some female pilots were advanced in combat
aviation ahead of many men who were kept waiting or forced to resign. See 60 Minutes,
supra note 251. Another aviator told Naval Inspector General investigators on July 5, 1996,
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women would die in an F-14 mishap; and (2) that, should a crash occur,
Navy authorities would try to deny that its own double standards in training
the women had led to the crash.267 Lt. Burns was, unfortunately, correct on
both counts. Lt. Burns had expressed his concerns to local commanders
several times, but they refused to acknowledge or correct the situation.268
When communications broke down completely, Lt. Burns contacted the
Center for Military Readiness and asked for assistance in conveying his
concerns about safety to the highest levels of the Navy.269 Lt. Burns was not
opposed to women participating in combat aviation, but he did not want to
see another aviator die due to compromises and double standards in
training. In a letter dated January 16, 1995, Elaine Donnelly of the Center
for Military Readiness asked Sen. Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.), thenChairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, to investigate whether
the statements and detailed information provided by her confidential source,
Lt. Burns, were true.270
Donnelly met to discuss the matter with the Vice Chief of Naval
Operations, Adm. Stanley Arthur, on January 6, February 8, and March 24,
1995. She also met with the Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Jeremy
(Mike) Boorda, on March 6, 1995. Rear Adm. Lyle Bien, who was sent to
San Diego to investigate the situation, reported to Adm. Arthur that
that he remembered Cmdr. Sobiek saying, “Read my lips. These women will make it to the
fleet, and they will make it on time, period, and we’ll do what it takes to get them there.” See
Testimony of William G. Bond, USN, in Naval Station San Diego, Cal. (July 5, 1996)
(transcript on file with author).
267. Burns Affidavit, supra note 253, at 25-27. Burns wrote that he had asked for the
assistance of the Center for Military Readiness because his local chain of command had been
unresponsive to his concerns, and because he
felt that it was imperative that Congress and senior officers within the
Department of Defense (DoD) be made aware of what was happening within
the Department of the Navy: that lives were being lost or put at risk, assets
destroyed, and millions of tax dollars wasted in order to execute what
amounted to little more than a questionable and ineffective public relations
campaign intended to “make amends for the Tailhook scandal.”
Id.
268. Id. at 26; see also Interview of Lt. Patrick Jerome Burns, USN, at the Office of the
Naval Inspector General, Washington Navy Yard, Wash., D.C. (Dec. 19, 1996) (transcript
on file with author); Memorandum from Vice Adm. J.R. Fitzgerald, Naval Inspector
General, to Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Subj: Investigation into the Unauthorized
Release of Flight Training Records (Jan. 10, 1997) (on file with author).
269. Telephone conversation between Lt. Patrick Burns and author (Nov. 27, 1994);
Letter from Lt. Patrick Burns to author (Dec. 15, 1994) (on file with author).
270. Letter from Elaine Donnelly, Center for Military Readiness, to Sen. Strom
Thurmond, U.S. Senate (Jan 16, 1995) [hereinafter Thurmond Letter] (on file with author).
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Donnelly’s information was “largely accurate.”271 An experienced aviator
reviewing Lt. Lohrenz’s records told Donnelly that they were the worst he
had ever seen.272
In the hopes that disclosure of the information would enable Navy
personnel and Americans to engage in a responsible discussion that would
lead to constructive reforms, the Center for Military Readiness published
the twenty-page CMR Special Report: Double Standards in Naval Aviation
on April 25, 1995.273 The meticulously researched report included 104
pages of related documents and training records showing numerous “pink
sheets” and low scores given to the women in training.274 These were the
same records that the January 1995 investigation had found to be “largely
accurate.”275

271. Report of Rear Adm. Lyle G. Bien to Commander, Naval Air Force, U.S. Pacific
Fleet, Subj: Preliminary Inquiry into the Circumstances Connected with the Allegation That
Standards Used To Qualify Naval Aviators for Assignment to Operational F-14 Tomcat
Squadrons from September 1993 Until the Present Varied with Gender of the Officer in
Training (Jan. 31, 1995) (on file with author) [hereinafter, Bien Report] (referring to CMR
letter Jan. 16, 1995 (“reference (b)”): “We found the facts contained in reference (b) to be
largely accurate.”); see also Robert J. Caldwell, Navy Admits “Concessions” for Female F14 Pilots, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 2, 1997, at G1; MITCHELL, supra note 15, at 298302.
272. Dep. of Capt. W.S. Orr, U.S. Navy (Ret.), at 115, Lohrenz v. Donnelly & CMR, 223
F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 2002) (No. Civ. 96-777) (transcript on file with author). Orr, an
experienced aviator, affirmed that, even though the training records that Donnelly had shown
him in 1995 did not include every flight, “What I saw was enough information for me to
believe that there was substandard performance that would never have been accepted in any
other environment that I have been exposed to.” Id.
273. See CMR SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 253. A condensed version of this report is
available at http://www.cmrlink.org/viewarticle.asp?f=87mr11cmrrpt09j95.pdf.
274. Id.; see also Rowan Scarborough, Navy Accused of Giving Women Special
Treatment, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1995, at A1; Robert Caldwell, Navy Files Cast Doubt on
“Gender Neutral,” SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., May 14, 1995, at G1; David Stump, A Double
Standard?, SOUNDINGS, Apr. 26, 1995, at A1.
275. On April 22, 1996, Lt. Lohrenz filed a libel suit against the Center for Military
Readiness and The Washington Times, claiming that the publication of this report caused her
to be washed out of carrier aviation. On August 16, 2002, the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia dismissed the case, ruling that Lohrenz was a limited-purpose public
figure and that Donnelly had good reason to question the Navy’s “party line” on double
standards in training. See Lohrenz v. Donnelly, 223 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 2002), aff’d, 350
F.3d 1272 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1042 (2004); see also MITCHELL, supra
note 15, at 288-302.
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2. The Dangers of DSIW in Carrier Aviation Training
At the time Lt. Lohrenz was removed from carrier aviation by a FNAEB
in May 1995, she ranked 113th of 113 pilots and washed out because her
flying techniques were “unsafe, undisciplined, and unpredictable.”276 Senior
landing signal officers testified that her flawed “high and fast” flying
patterns, combined with her tendency to blame others for her own mistakes
and to disregard instructions, made Lt. Lohrenz an “accident waiting to
happen.”277
Lt. Lohrenz’s rocky F-14 training records, the same ones published by
CMR, were among the documents considered by the evaluation board, but
she did not take the opportunity to challenge those records. The Air Wing
Eleven investigation revealed that Lt. Lohrenz had been on a “watch list”
for poor performance as early as January 3, 1995278—well before
Donnelly’s initial letter to Sen. Thurmond,279 which Lt. Lohrenz later
claimed had ruined her career.280
During an interview with reporter Mike Wallace of CBS 60 Minutes on
April 19, 1998, former Vice Chief of Naval Operations (Vice CNO) Adm.
Stanley Arthur said that the Navy had hoped that putting women on aircraft
carriers would help its “image problems.” He added, “This was a way that
we could at least demonstrate that the . . . [apparent] reluctance of the Navy
to deal properly with women coming out of Tailhook could be put aside;
that we were in fact, not the ogres that we were painted to be.”281 During a
sworn deposition taken on April 28, 2000, Adm. Arthur admitted under
276. See Bennitt Memo, supra note 246; see also CARMAN REPORT, supra note 245, at
16.
277. See Bennitt Memo, supra note 246; see also FNAEB REPORT, supra note 243, at 7.
Lt. Lohrenz’s carrier landing performance has been sub-standard. Her
performance in that regime has been declining since January 1995. This
performance has declined to the point that it is unsafe. Due to this documented
substandard, unpredictable and unsafe performance, she should be allowed to
continue performing in the carrier-based environment.
Id.
278. CARMAN REPORT, supra note 245, at 17.
279. See Thurmond Letter, supra note 270.
280. See Lohrenz, 223 F. Supp. 2d at 33. Contrary to Lohrenz’s complaint, the January
16, 1995, letter to Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sen. Strom Thurmond was a
private letter of inquiry and a request for his assistance in determining if the information
received from Donnelly’s known but unnamed source, Lt. Burns, was accurate. At the time
the letter was sent to Sen. Thurmond and referred to Navy officials for investigation,
Lohrenz already was on a “watch list” due to poor performance. See CARMAN REPORT, supra
note 245, at 17. The CMR Special Report was not published until April 25, 1995.
281. See 60 Minutes, supra note 251.
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cross-examination that “in this case we sent people to the fleet not
qualified.”282
This stunning statement confirmed a mountain of evidence that Navy
officials had vainly tried to keep from coming to light. What had begun as a
public relations campaign ended in the death of a pioneering female pilot.
Lt. Hultgreen was the victim of political correctness and DSIW taken to an
extreme.
On June 12, 1995, The San Diego Union-Tribune published a news
photograph of the ruined F-14 aircraft in which Lt. Hultgreen had died.283
The caption beneath the photo read, “The F-14 is an unforgiving aircraft. Its
safe operation is an issue that is bigger and more important than any
individual pilot.”284 That photo and caption summarized an issue that has
yet to be acknowledged by Navy leaders, much less resolved.
The CMR Special Report was published with the hope that Navy
officials would affirm the importance of high, uncompromised standards in
all forms of naval aviation training.285 By all accounts, female pilots are
282. Dep. of Adm. Arthur at 192-93, Lohrenz v. Donnelly & CMR, 223 F. Supp. 2d 25
(D.D.C. 2002) (No. Civ. 96-777) (transcript on file with author). During the same
deposition, Adm. Arthur admitted that he had not examined the training records of the two
women personally, but he understood that the women were doing well. That information, he
said, probably came from the Chief of Naval Information, Rear Adm. Kendell Pease, known
as CHINFO. Dep. of Adm. Arthur, supra, at 135-37. The Navy public affairs office, known
as CHINFO, was identified in the Air Wing Eleven report as the orchestrator of much of the
media attention given to issues surrounding the female aviators before and after the death of
Lt. Hultgreen. See AIR WING ELEVEN REPORT, supra note 213, at 39; Conversation between
Lt. Hultgreen and author at Naval Air Station San Diego, Cal. (Oct. 13, 1994). Rear Adm.
Pease also testified on April 28, 2000, that he had no firsthand knowledge of the training
records of Lts. Hultgreen and Lohrenz. Dep. of Adm. Pease at 41-42, Lohrenz, 223 F. Supp.
2d 25 (D.D.C. 2002) (No. Civ. 96-777) (transcript on file with author).
283. Photo by Sean Haffey of the San Diego Union-Tribune, accompanying article by
Robert J. Caldwell, For Naval Aviation, Gender Quotas Don’t Fly, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.,
June 12, 1995, at G1.
284. Id. Unlike the usual practice when male pilots crash in the ocean, which is to only
seek recovery of the human remains, this aircraft was retrieved from the ocean at a reported
cost of $100,000, even though there was video of the mishap and there were no nuclear
weapons on board. See Becky Garrison, The Grounding of Morale at Air Wing 11, NAVY
TIMES, Mar. 18, 1996, at 6; Navy Finds, Retrieves Body of Pilot Lt. Kara Hultgreen,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 16, 1994, at A20.
285. CMR SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 253, at 1-2.
Background and Purpose: The question at issue here is not whether women
should serve in combat squadrons, but whether women—and all naval aviation
trainees—should be held to the same high standards that have reduced accident
rates in recent years . . . . Double standards and concessions that heighten
inherent risks—for the sake of women or any other favored group—are simply
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performing courageously and well in the current war. Repercussions from
the Tailhook incident are long past. But high, uncompromised standards do
not spontaneously come into being by themselves—military leaders should
insist on excellence as the highest priority, especially in hazardous
occupations such as carrier aviation. This is why it is important to
understand the story of Kara Hultgreen. Will Navy officials remember the
hard lessons learned?
In a June 2006 speech, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Mike Mullen
promoted “diversity” as what he called a “strategic imperative” at all levels
of the Navy.286 After his remarks, Adm. Mullen was asked what role
qualifications play in increasing diversity. Mullen responded, “I think I
have seen a stunning number of examples where we thought more qualified
was really more qualified, where it wasn’t. So I don’t want to get stuck on
an absolute definition of more qualified.”287
Diversity and high standards should not be in conflict, but an
overemphasis on diversity as a “strategic imperative” could result in
compromises that detract from the pursuit of excellence and nondiscrimination as primary institutional goals.288 It will take wise,
unwavering leadership to avoid past mistakes and to maintain sound
priorities. If high-level officials really want to advance the status of women
in the military, they should consciously address the issue of compromises in
training and other forms of DSIW that are dangerous and demoralizing to
women and men alike.289

indefensible . . . . Above all, CMR hopes that disclosure of this information will
enable Navy personnel, family members, and the American people to engage in
a responsible discussion that leads to constructive reforms, before heightened
risks result in the needless loss of more young lives.
Id.
286. Adm. Mike Mullen, Remarks at the Patuxent River Naval Air Systems Command
“Total Force Diversity Day” Luncheon (June 26, 2006); Brian Seraile, NAWCAD (Naval
Air Systems Command) Public Affairs, CNO Delivers Message of Diversity, NAVY TIMES,
June 29, 2006; Andrew Scutro, CNO Stresses Need for Diversity, NAVY TIMES, June 29,
2006.
287. See Seraile, supra note 286.
288. See supra notes 286, 288.
289. See supra note 285.

700

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:617

III. GOOD ORDER AND DISCIPLINE
A. Aberdeen to Abu Ghraib
In March 2004, graphic photographs of decadent behavior at the Abu
Ghraib prison in Iraq were published and broadcast worldwide. Outraged
members of Congress demanded to know why and how the Army had
allowed such a thing to happen. But the scandal, repugnant as it was, should
not have been a complete surprise. Abu Ghraib was not the first or only
place where poor training, indiscipline, and inadequate supervision created
prime conditions for sexual misconduct within the military.
The admirable service of the majority of our female soldiers has been—
and should be—documented. The purpose of this discussion is to analyze
personnel policies that have tried to test the theory that men and women are
interchangeable beings in what could be described as a New Gender Order.
Scandals involving sexual misconduct in the military are not isolated
incidents. They are indicators of a social experiment gone wrong.
1. Co-Ed Basic Training
a. Gender-Normed Illusions
In the fall of 1994, civilian policy makers led by Sara Lister, Assistant
Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, effectively
forced Army officials to acccept co-ed basic training. This was a policy
trade-off to avoid implementation of her plans to assign women to some
direct ground combat positions.290 The plan for gender-integrated basic
training disregarded the results of a prior experiment with Army co-ed basic
training that had been tried and discontinued once before.291
Gender-integrated basic training is based on the unrealistic assumption
that men and women are interchangeable in all military roles. The concept
tries to circumvent or disguise physical differences with gender-normed
290. 1 FINAL REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON MILITARY TRAINING AND
GENDER-RELATED ISSUES 219-22, 228-30 (July 1999) [hereinafter CONGRESSIONAL
COMMISSION ON MILITARY TRAINING AND GENDER-RELATED ISSUES]; see also Eric Schmitt,
Generals Oppose Combat by Women: Secretary Withdraws Plan After Bitter Disagreement,
N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1994, at A1 (reporting on the withdrawal of Secretary Togo West’s
controversial June 1, 1994, memorandum ordering gender integration in close combat units,
such as multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) and Special Operations Forces (SOF)
helicopters).
291. A five-year experiment with gender-integrated basic training that began during the
Carter Administration was terminated in 1981 because women were suffering too many
injuries and men were not being challenged enough. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 5, at C-78 (Finding 2.4.1A).
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training standards that reward equal effort rather than equal results.
Advocates make the disingenuous claim that men and women are doing the
same things with identical rating systems, even though everyone knows that
they are not.
Gender norming is to social engineering what false façades are to poorly
designed buildings. To create the appearance of “equality,” scoring and
rating/qualification systems are adjusted in various ways to make it “fair”
for women in physical training exercises. Every service is different, but the
Navy Fitness Standards for males and females, age twenty to twenty-four,
demonstrate how gender-normed scores and rating systems work to create
the illusion of “equality.”292
x

In the 1.5-mile run, the Navy PRT Score minimum is fifty
points. To achieve a “Satisfactory/Medium” rating (and fifty
points), a man must run 1.5 miles in thirteen minutes and
fifteen seconds, or 13:15.293 To earn the same 50 points, a
woman must run 1.5 miles in fifteen minutes and fifteen
seconds, or 15:15.294 She is given a two-minute advantage,
but due to the gender-normed scoring system, her
performance is rated as “equal” to that of the man, earning
her the same fifty points.295

x

In the push-up category, male trainees must do forty-two
pushups for a minimum score;296 women must do
seventeen.297 Men must swim 500 yards in 12:15;298 women
get 14:00 to do the same thing.299 Under the Navy PRT rules,
all scores are averaged and measured against a rating system,
in categories ranging from “Outstanding” (High, Medium,
and Low) down to “Probationary.”300

292. Compare Navy Fitness Standards, Male, Age 20–24, Oct. 1, 2002, http://usmilitary.
about.com/od/navy/l/blfitmale20to24.htm [hereinafter Navy, Male Standards], with Navy
Fitness Standards, Female, Age 20–24, Oct. 1, 2002, http://usmilitary.about.com/library/
milinfo/navfitness/blfemale20-24.htm [hereinafter Navy, Female Standards].
293. Navy, Male Standards, supra note 292.
294. Navy, Female Standards, supra note 292.
295. See Navy, Male Standards, supra note 292; Navy, Female Standards, supra note
292.
296. Navy, Male Standards, supra note 292.
297. Navy, Female Standards, supra note 292.
298. Navy, Male Standards, supra note 292.
299. Navy, Female Standards, supra note 292.
300. Navy, Male Standards, supra note 292; Navy, Female Standards, supra note 292.
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x

Turning to the highest scores and ratings, in order to get an
“Outstanding/High” rating a man must do eighty-seven
pushups, do the 1.5-mile rule in 8:30, and do the 500-yard
swim in 6:30.301 Achievements required for women to earn
the same top rating are forty-eight, 9:47, and 7:15,
respectively.302

x

The “curl-up” category in the PRT test is the only one with
requirements identical for both sexes.303 However, the
standard really ought to be higher for women because their
bodies have more strength in the midsection. The physiology
is related to the female potential for pregnancy. Of greater
importance in the military context, however, is upper body
strength and aerobic capacity for endurance—qualities in
which men have an undisputed advantage.304

Gender-normed rating systems are misleading because they award equal
“points” for unequal accomplishment. This explains why some female
soldiers attempt to convince credulous reporters that they have to meet the
same standards, i.e., “points” as their male colleagues. Nevertheless,
sensible women and men in the military understand the illusion.
A 1997 study done for the Army by a Senior Review Panellargely
composed of officials responsible for or supportive of gender-integrated
basic trainingdetected doubts about gender-normed standards.305 Among
military men surveyed, sixty percent were either “not sure” or “disagreed”
that “[t]he soldiers in this company have enough skills that I would trust
them with my life in combat.”306 The combined figure for women was
seventy-four percent.307
Another survey done by the Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS) found that only thirty-six perecent of male and female
301. Navy, Male Standards, supra note 292.
302. Navy, Female Standards, supra note 292.
303. Compare Navy, Male Standards, supra note 292, with Navy, Female Standards,
supra note 292.
304. See, e.g., PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at C-70–C-71 (Findings
2.1.1, 2.1.2, 2.1.3, 2.1.4B, 2.1.5).
305. Steven Komarow, Soldiers Lack Confidence in Their Officers, USA TODAY, Sept.
12, 1997, at A1; Steven Komarow, Boot Camp Training Goes Back to Basics, USA TODAY,
Sept. 12, 1997, at A4.
306. See generally SEC’Y OF THE ARMY, 2 SENIOR REVIEW PANEL REPORT ON SEXUAL
HARASSMENT, at A19 (July 1997) (discussing survey question 24).
307. Id.
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respondents agreed that female personnel would pull their fair share of the
load in combat or hazardous situations.308 These findings were not a
reflection of sexism but instead showed an honest concern about mission
accomplishment and survival.
In Great Britain in 1997, Army Training Regiment commanders at
Purbright Barracks, Surrey, noted that co-ed basic training was causing
many young women to drop out early, due to injuries to their lower limbs.
Restoration of all female platoons for a one-year trial in 1996 reduced
women’s injury rates by fifty percent, and first-time pass rates increased
from fifty percent to seventy percent. Incidents of sexual misconduct
between instructors and recruits also decreased significantly.309
The trust that soldiers have in buddies who are capable of saving their
lives is part of the cohesion that binds soldiers together in small military
units. The definition of “unit cohesion,” as presented to the Presidential
Commission, uses the word “survival” three times in one paragraph.310
308. CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (CSIS), AMERICAN MILITARY
CULTURE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 27 (Feb. 2000).
309. Michael Evans, Army Hits the Target with Female Units, LONDON SUNDAY TIMES,
Feb. 8, 1999; see also Correspondence between Lt. Col. Simon Vandeleur, Army Training
Regiment, Alexander Barracks, Purbright, Woking, Surrey, U.K., and author (Feb. 10-19,
1999) (on file with author).
Despite this success, another experiment with “gender-free” (co-ed) training began in
1998. Minister of Defence Geoffrey Hoon, who took office in October 1999, initiated a twoyear “Army Study into Combat Effectiveness and Gender,” raising expectations that women
soon would be assigned to infantry units. But women participating in “gender-free” training
along with the men suffered twice as many stress fractures and were eight times more likely
to be discharged with back pain, tendon injuries, and bone fractures. See David Derbyshire,
Tougher Army Training Doubles Female Injuries, LONDON TELEGRAPH (online ed.), Jan. 2,
2002, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=news/2002/01/03/
narmy03xml; Kate O’Beirne, The Empire Strikes Back, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, June 26, 2001,
available at http://www.nationalreview.clom/kob/kob062601.shtml.
A system of “gender-fair” training allowing for physical differences was restored, and the
Ministry of Defence decided that female soldiers would not be assigned to direct ground
combat units. See Michael Evans, LONDON TIMES ONLINE, Women Pay Painful Price for
Equal Military Training, Mar. 22, 2005, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/
uk/article434024.ece; Michael Smith, British Won’t Put Women on Front Lines, DAILY
TIMES (Pakistan) (online ed.), May 26, 2002, available at http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.
asp?page=story_26-5-2002_pg4_2.
310. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at C-80 (Finding 2.5.1).
Cohesion is the relationship that develops in a unit or group where (1) members
share common values and experiences; (2) individuals in the group conform to
group norms and behavior in order to ensure group survival and goals; (3)
members lose their personal identify in favor of a group identity; (4) members
focus on group activities and goals; (5) unit members become totally dependent
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Questions about the physical abilities of female soldiers in extreme,
close-combat circumstances create an element of hesitation and doubt that
women cannot overcome. Social engineers demand “education” to teach
illusions about the physical capabilities of women. Soldiers are more
interested in reality. Soldiers willing to put their lives at risk cannot forget
that there are no gender-normed scores on the battlefield.
b. Sex Scandals and Soldierization
Co-ed basic training assigns higher priority to faux “equality” than to the
fundamental purpose of the exercise. In a process known as
“soldierization,” ordinary civilians are transformed and shaped into
disciplined soldiers. Soldierization requires concentration and sound
leadership—not illusions or distractions that can be avoided if men and
women are initially trained separately.
In November 1996, two years after the Army began mixing women with
men in basic training, sex scandals at Aberdeen Proving Ground in
Maryland made headlines nationwide.311 Male drill sergeants were abusing
female trainees there and at the Army’s basic training camps.312 Rape or
“consexploitation”—consensual but exploitive sex—occurred between
instructors and trainees at several Army training bases. Whether voluntary
or coerced, such misconduct was and is contrary to military law and is
inherently disruptive to good order and discipline.313
In the ensuing uproar about Aberdeen, then-Secretary of Defense
William Cohen appointed former Sen. Nancy Kassebaum-Baker (R-Kan.)
to head an independent advisory committee to study the issue in 1997. In its
concise, unequivocal report, the Kassebaum-Baker Committee unanimously

on each other for the completion of their mission or survival; and (6) group
members must meet all standards of performance and behavior in order not to
threaten group survival.
Id.
311. See, e.g., Elizabeth Gleick, Scandal in the Military: Reports of Rape at Army
Training Base Suggest That the Services’ Tolerance for Sexual Harassment Is More than
Zero, TIME, Nov. 25, 1996, at 28.
312. See id.
313. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-163,
§ 552(a)(1), (f), 119 Stat. 3136, 3256–63 (2006) (amending 10 U.S.C. § 920 (effective
October 1, 2007) (codifying the Uniform Code of Military Justice, Article 120) to include
“rape, sexual assault, and other sexual misconduct”). As of the printing of this article, the
Manual for Courts-Martial has not been changed to reflect the new law. See MANUAL FOR
COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, pt. IV, Art. 120 (2005) [hereinafter MCM], available at
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/law/mcm.pdf.

2010]

CONSTRUCTING THE CO-ED MILITARY

705

declared, “[Co-ed basic training] is resulting in less discipline, less unit
cohesion, and more distraction from training programs.”314
In 1998, the House followed the Kassebaum-Baker Committee’s
recommendations and passed legislation to end co-ed basic training.315 The
Senate stalled and set up another commission to study the issue. The
ideologically divided Congressional Commission on Military Training and
Gender-Related Issues did a thorough study, resulting in a 1999 report that
filled four volumes. In a significant admission, the commission concluded:
“Whether [gender-integrated basic training] improves the readiness or the
performance of the operational force is subjective.”316
The same sort of damning faint praise appeared in a 2002 briefing
presented to the Secretary of the Army, which endorsed gender-integrated
basic training but conceded that the program was “not efficient” and was
“effective” only in sociological terms.317 Various “inefficiencies”
documented in that and previous official reports included the following:
x

Less discipline, less unit cohesion, and more distraction from
training programs;

x

Voluntary and involuntary misconduct, due to an
emotionally volatile environment for which immature
recruits are not prepared;

314. REPORT OF THE FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON GENDER-INTEGRATED TRAINING
RELATED ISSUES TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 15 (Dec. 16, 1997) [hereinafter
KASSEBAUM-BAKER COMMISSION REPORT]; see Rowan Scarborough, Segregate the Sexes,
Panel Urges Military, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1997, at A1; Charles Moskos, The Folly of
Comparing Race and Gender in the Army, WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 1998, at C1; John Hillen,
Prudent Triumph of Common Sense, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1997, at A18; Bill Gertz &
Rowan Scarborough, Inside the Ring, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2003, at A7.
315. See Military Recruit Training Policy Restoration Act of 1997, H.R. 1559, 105th
Cong. (1st Sess. 1997) (proposing to mandate separate basic training regimens for men and
women within each service branch).
316. CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON MILITARY TRAINING AND GENDER-RELATED
ISSUES, supra note 290, at 122.
317. At the request of Rep. Duncan Hunter (R-Cal.) and Rep. Roscoe Bartlett (R-Md.),
the Center for Military Readiness compiled a comprehensive report listing dozens of reasons
why the Army should end co-ed basic training. See CENTER FOR MILITARY READINESS,
SUMMARY OF RELEVANT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: ARMY GENDER-INTEGRATED
BASIC TRAINING (GIBT), 1993–2002 (May 2003), available at http://www.cmrlink.org/
cmrnotes/gibtsp01.pdf, with Appendices A–D available at http://www.cmrlink.org/
cmrnotes/gibttapdx.pdf. Rep. Bartlett subsequently placed the eighteen-page document into
the Congressional Record. See 149 CONG. REC. E1223–26 (daily ed. June 11, 2003)
(statement of Rep. Bartlett); see also Rowan Scarborough, Army Endorses Mixed-Sex
Training, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2003, at A1.

AND

706

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:617

x

Higher physical injury and sick-call rates that detract from
primary training objectives;

x

Diversion from essential training time due to interpersonal
distractions and the need for an extra week of costly
“sensitivity training” (mandated after Aberdeen);

x

A perceived decline in the overall quality and discipline of
gender-integrated basic training; lack of confidence in the
abilities of fellow soldiers; and the need to provide remedial
instruction to compensate for military skills not learned in
basic training;

x

Re-defined or lowered standards, gender-normed scores, and
elimination of physically demanding exercises so that
women will succeed;

x

Additional stress on instructors who must deal with different
physical abilities and psychological needs of male and
female recruits;

x

Contrivances to reduce the risk of scandal, such as extra
changing rooms, security equipment, and personnel hours to
monitor barracks activities, and “no talk, no touch” rules,
which interfere with informal contacts betweeen recruits and
instructors;

x

No evidence of objective, military-oriented benefits from
gender-integrated basic training (social effects primarily
benefited women in subjective ways); and

x

Little or no evidence that restoration of separate-gender
training would have negative consequences for women or
men.318

Army leaders were close to announcing a decision to end genderintegrated basic training in the fall of 2001. The September 11 attacks,
however, diverted their attention to urgent requirements of the war.
Secretary of the Army Thomas L. White, a former business executive, also
was distracted for months by corporate scandals involving Enron, his
former employer. As a result, the Army stuck with the status quo, instead of
318. See generally SENIOR REVIEW PANEL REPORT ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT, supra note
10; KASSEBAUM-BAKER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 314; CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION
ON MILITARY TRAINING AND GENDER-RELATED ISSUES, supra note 290.
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restoring separate-gender basic training. That format, which is known to
produce better results for women as well as men, is still being used by the
Marine Corps.319
Military discipline does not just happen—it must be taught. Basic
training is the building block on which the “soldierization” process rests. To
improve discipline that deters misconduct in the ranks, men and women
should be trained separately until they learn basic principles and are mature
enough to live by them.
2. The “Ungendered” Military
a. Abu Ghraib
Two years after the war began in Iraq, the Abu Ghraib sex scandal broke.
Photos of naked Iraqis at the mercy of undisciplined male and female
soldiers enraged the media and members of Congress, who demanded
action to end sexual misconduct in the military. By October of 2005, twelve
major investigations had been conducted, one of which was headed by
former Nixon-Ford Administration Secretary of Defense James
Schlesinger.320
Secretary Schlesinger’s Independent Panel report concluded that abuses
at Abu Ghraib prison were not related to prisoner interrogations. Panel
Chairman Schlesigner, however, described the atmosphere there as an
“Animal House on the night shift.”321 In testimony before a military court,
Pfc. Lynndie England, the soldier photographed holding a leash attached to
the neck of an Iraqi man, confirmed that attempts to embarrass the prisoners
319. See KASSEBAUM-BAKER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 314, at 16. The
Commission found that the Marines’ single-sex approach was producing “impressive levels
of confidence, team building, and esprit de corps in all female platoons at the Parris Island
base.”
320. See generally REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL TO REVIEW DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE DETENTION OPERATIONS (Aug. 24, 2004) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT
PANEL]; James Schlesinger, The Truth About Our Soldiers, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 2004, at
A16.
321. CNN, Report: Abu Ghraib was “‘Animal House’ at Night” (Aug. 25, 2004)
(quoting Independent Panel Chairman Arthur Schlesinger, who noted, speaking at a news
conference, “There was sadism on the night shift at Abu Ghraib, sadism that was certainly
not authorized.”); see also REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL, supra note 320, at 13 (“The
aberrant behavior on the night shift in Cell Block 1 at Abu Ghraib would have been avoided
with proper training, leadership and oversight.”); Allen G. Breed, Witness: Iraq Abuse
Photos “Just for Fun,” ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 4, 2004, available at
http://www.pakistanidefenceforum.com/lofiversion/index.php/t34466.html; Third Soldier
Guilty in Abu Ghraib Case, ARMY TIMES, Nov. 15, 2004, at 5 (regarding plea bargain of
Spc. Megan Ambuhl).
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were made not to soften them up for interrogation purposes, but for the
amusement of the guards and their girlfriends.322
A Wall Street Journal editorial commenting on this finding quoted a
military source who had seen all of the photos—not just the ones released
to the press—and noted that they were date and time stamped.323
The sequence begins with naked photos of Ms. England and her
boyfriend, convicted abuse ringleader Charles Graner. It
progresses to photos of the two engaged in lewd acts, and then to
photos involving other soldiers in lewd acts. Finally, the
detainees enter the pictures. In other words, the Abu Ghraib crew
degraded themselves before they degraded any Iraqis.324
In an intellectually honest op-ed, self-identified feminist Barbara
Ehrenreich confessed she was unsettled and heartbroken by the pictures
coming out of Abu Ghraib:
I had no illusions about the U.S. Mission in Iraq—whatever
exactly it isbut it turns out that I did have some illusions about
women.
Of the seven U.S. soldiers now charged with sickening forms
of abuse at Abu Ghraib, three are women: Spc. Megan Ambuhl,
Pfc. Lynndie England and Spc. Sabrina Harman.
....
Here, in these photos from Abu Ghraib, you have everything
that the Islamic fundamentalists believe characterizes Western
culture, all nicely arranged in one hideous image—imperial
arrogance, sexual depravity . . . and gender equality.
....
. . . Secretly, I had hoped that the presence of women would
over time change the military, making it more respectful of other
people and cultures, more capable of genuine peacekeeping.
That’s what I thought, but I don’t think that anymore.
A certain kind of feminism, or perhaps I should say a certain
kind of feminist naivete, died in Abu Ghraib. . . .
322. Thomas E. Ricks, Incidents Grew in Severity, Report Says, WASH. POST, Aug. 26,
2004, at A17; Schlesinger, supra note 320.
323. Review & Outlook, “Torture” on Trial, WALL ST. J., May 4, 2005, at A18.
324. Id.
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....
You can’t even argue, in the case of Abu Ghraib, that the
problem was there just weren’t enough women in the military
hierarchy to stop the abuses. The prison was directed by a
woman, Brig. Gen. Janis Karpinski. The top U.S. intelligence
officer in Iraq, who was also responsible for reviewing the status
of detainees before their release, was Maj. Gen. Barbara Fast. . . .
....
The struggles for peace and social justice and against
imperialist and racist arrogance, cannot, I am truly sorry to say,
be folded into the struggle for gender equality.325
Ehrenreich’s candor in reevaluating her previous beliefs is admirable but
rare in feminist circles. The elitist philosophy that women are inherently
superior and incapable of doing anything wrong is widespread, prejudicial,
and just as misguided as the idea that all men are perfect. Human beings are
flawed. Military policies must recognize and consciously work to counter
failings that are present among women as well as men.
Stripped to its essence, Abu Ghraib began with sexual misconduct
between one man and two women who were competing for his attention.
Lynndie England had Charles Graner’s baby, but he married Megan
Ambuhl, who pleaded guilty to reduced charges for her actions at Abu
Ghraib.326
The psychological dynamics of this triangle, as described in The New
York Times, are not difficult to understand.327 According to reports, England
posed with the leash to please Graner. He gave her photos of detainees
masturbating as a birthday gift for her. Sexual misconduct escalated into
gross indecency and cruelty against prisoners. Unlike Barbara Ehrenreich,
social engineers have not been intellectually honest enough to figure out
where their assumptions went wrong. The theory that sexuality is of no
consequence helped to create a combustible atmosphere that ignited with
explosive military and political consequences.

325. Barbara Ehrenreich, Feminism’s Assumptions Upended, L.A. TIMES, May 16, 2004,
at M1.
326. Kate Zernike, Behind Failed Abu Ghraib Plea, a Tangle of Bonds and Betrayals,
N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2005, at A1.
327. Id.
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b. Camp Bucca
The female soldiers of Abu Ghraib, including the one- and two-star
generals responsible for the military police and intelligence operations
there, were by no means typical of our women in uniform. There is no
“typical” female soldier; they come in all kinds. The discussion here is
about personnel policies that either support or detract from discipline in the
military.
Images of partying civilian “girls gone wild,” flashed in racy videos sold
on the Internet, coarsen and degrade our culture. When similar behavior
develops in a military setting, disciplined enemies can take advantage of the
distraction. Witness an October 2004 going-away party for the departing
160th MP Battalion at Camp Bucca, Iraq, as reported by the New York
Daily News:
In front of a cheering male audience, two young women
wearing only bras and panties throw themselves into a mudfilled plastic kiddie pool and roll around in a wild wrestling
match. At one point a man in the audience raises a water bottle
and douses the entwined pair.
At another, a “referee” moves in to break up the scantily clad
grapplers.
A young blond lifts her T-shirt to expose her breasts. A
brunette turns her back to the camera and exposes her thong
undies.
These scenes, taken from 30 photos leaked to the New York
Daily News, could have been snapped at an out-of-control frat
party.
But this happened a world away from any American college.
The photos were taken in Camp Bucca, the military prison at
Umm Qasr in the hot sands of southern Iraq near the Kuwaiti
border.
The women are not co-eds but military policewomen who had
left their uniforms in a pile not far off.
The men are soldiers, too. Most of them wore T-shirts
emblazoned with Army logos, but at least one was still wearing
his uniform.
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Some were sergeants, including the referee, and some
allegedly were drunk.
The photos were taken last October 30, in the same period
when enemy detainees were being transferred to Camp Bucca
from Abu Ghraib, the prison made notorious by photos of
Americans torturing naked Iraqis.328
The article also reported allegations that sergeants were lending rooms
for sexual encounters.329
Pvt. Deanna Allen, a nineteen-year-old prison guard with the 105th MP
Battalion, was the only participant whose name appeared in connection
with punishment for the infamous October 30, 2004, mud-wrestling
match.330 After a photo of Allen exposing her breasts appeared in the New
York Daily News in February 2005, she was forced out of the military with
a general discharge. She returned to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, for
medical treatment, where she complained about the loss of her veterans
benefits and said she would appeal.331
Up until that time, Camp Bucca was thought to be a model camp because
prisoners were not being abused. The salacious mud wrestling photos and
allegations quickly vanished from public awareness,332 but the situation at
Camp Bucca was more unsettled than met the eye.
On January 31 and April 1, 2005, scores of Iraqi prisoners staged two
violent uprisings and, on March 25, 2005, came dangerously close to
pulling off a massive prison break.333 According to The Washington Post,
the prisoners began constructing a 357-foot “Great Escape” tunnel in
January 2005.334 An inmate released on May 27, 2005, said, “It was a
military operation. It was very organized, and it was very disciplined. If
only 200 people would have escaped, it would have been a blow to the
Americans.”335
328. Brian Kates, Out of Control at Camp Crazy!, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Feb. 6, 2005, at
29 (italics added).
329. See id.
330. See id.
331. Brian Kates, She’s Mud as Hell, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Mar. 22, 2005, at 27.
332. Compare Bradley Graham, Prisoner Uprising in Iraq Exposes New Risk for U.S.,
WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 2005, at A1 (mentioning the mud-wrestling incident), with Steve
Fainaru & Anthony Shadid, In Iraq Jail, Resistance Goes Underground, WASH. POST, Aug.
24, 2005, at A01 (not mentioning the mud-wrestling incident only six months later).
333. Graham, supra note 332.
334. Id.
335. Fainaru & Shadid, supra note 332.
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Hours before the planned prison break, on March 24, 2005, an informant
tipped off the Americans.336 They discovered and destroyed the remarkably
engineered tunnel, which had narrow walls as smooth and strong as
concrete, sculpted with water and possibly milk.337 About a week later, the
prisoners began a full-scale riot that raged for four days. “The violence was
just absolutely incredible,” said one soldier.338 Cinderblock rocks, taken
from a mosque that the military had kept off limits to the guards, were
thrown at the guards with surprising precision.339 The sheer volume of the
well-aimed barrage caused the soldier to have an epiphany: “I realized . . .
these guys have been fighting riots and wars a lot longer than we have.
They have been fighting this way for hundreds of years.”340
Is the word “duh” in the dictionary yet? How else would one describe
this belated awareness of cultural differences between American guards and
cunning prisoners in a war zone? The Iraqis knew exactly how to take
advantage of Western “sensitivity” to their religion and mosque in the
aftermath of Abu Ghraib. In the same way, future adversaries will find
ways to take advantage of weaknesses in American military culture,
including weaknesses caused by social experimentation with human
sexuality.
The soldiers of the 105th MP battalion, some of whom were present at
the mud wrestling party with the 160th MP unit in October, were not solely
responsible for the unruly behavior of the MP mud wrestlers. Nor were
battalion-level commanders primarily responsible for the politically correct
but naïve restrictions on the prison guards or the quality of the training
provided to male and female soldiers before they deployed to Iraq. The
sexually charged mudfest in October 2004—which occurred even after Abu
Ghraib—betrayed a weakness in co-ed military culture that enemy
prisoners were quick to exploit. The responsibility for chaos at Camp Bucca
should be laid at the feet of Department of Defense officials and Army
policymakers who underestimated our adversaries and assumed that it was
all right to impose known “inefficiences,” such as co-ed basic training, on
the gender-integrated force.
Uniformed and civilian Pentagon officials should be held accountable for
serious miscalculations in a social engineering project gone awry. It is not
enough to punish a nineteen-year-old “girl gone wild” at Camp Bucca.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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c. Social Fiction: The New Gender Order
During a 1996 debate about the wisdom of housing men and women in
co-ed tents in Bosnia, then-Rep. Patricia Schroeder (D-Colo.) suggested
that American colleges and the congressional page system proved that a
“desexegrated” environment is workable.341 Also, in 1996, Duke Law
Professor Madeline Morris suggested that, in an “ungendered” military,
“masculinist attitudes” and sexual complications could be reduced by a
concerted effort to instill what she called the “incest taboo.”342
The full inclusion of women would require adjustment of the
mechanisms for continued minimization of sexual relationships
within units. Just as military units have traditionally been “a
band of brothers,” gender integrated units would have to be
carefully shaped and defined as a band of brothers and sisters
between whom sexual relationships would be unacceptable. The
incest taboo approach would amount to a broadened
fraternization policy, prohibiting not only inappropriate
relationships between ranks but also sexual relationships
regardless of rank within military units.343
Some soldiers do relate to each other as brothers and sisters in the
military. Deep bonds of friendship can develop in almost any profession.
But in close-combat environments where soldiers depend on each other for
survival, Prof. Morris’ prescriptions for a socially engineered military
“incest taboo” and other types of “social fiction” were no more realistic
than science fiction.344
When social problems develop in co-ed training or on active duty,
professionals in the “victim advocate” or “diversity” industry request more
funds to fix problems that their own philosophy and previous programs
341. Good Morning America (ABC television broadcast, Nov. 18, 1996) (Rep. Patricia
Schroeder appearing opposite then-Rep. Robert Livingston (R-La.)).
342. Madeline Morris, By Force of Arms: Rape, War, and Military Culture, 45 DUKE L.J.
651, 747-60 (1996).
343. Id. at 757.
344. E.g., in the 1996 feature film Star Trek: First Contact, an android character named
Lt. Cmdr. Data was equipped with an “emotion chip” to help him experience human
emotions and sexuality. The enemy Borg Queen tied up Lt. Cmdr. Data and attempted to
extract information from him by activating the emotion chip, making him vulnerable to her
seduction. The science-fiction screenplay was entertaining, but military social policy cannot
be based on the social fiction that human emotions can be “deactivated” at will. See Star
Trek: First Contact, Synopsis, http://www.startrek.com/startrek/view/series/MOV/008/
synopsis.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2007).
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helped to create.345 Mandatory, continuous sensitivity training is supposed
to instill politically correct attitudes. In the New Gender Order, military
people are supposed to be immune to the full range of emotions associated
with hostilities, tensions, and attractions. This is social engineering—elitist
experimentation with the lives of other people. But when spark-induced
“explosions” occur, as they so often have from Aberdeen to Abu Ghraib,
social engineers rarely get the blame.
There is no compelling need—particularly in a time of war—to ask our
military to engage in a vast social experiment designed to test the limits of
human sexuality.
d. Morality and Morale
Sexual misconduct is not peculiar to the Army alone. Officials in all the
armed services keep trying to implement policies based on the notion that
sexual relationships can be managed perfectly and prevented from veering
to extremes on either end of the emotional spectrum. Social engineers seem
to think that, with a few sensitivity training sessions here and a few courtsmartial there, the most basal human feelings can be contained and managed
in a volatile, “pure oxygen” environment, without predictable sparks. And
if problems do arise, “masculinist” men—not women—are always to
blame.
Most men and women in the military conduct themselves like
professionals; the nation is proud of all who volunteer to serve.
Nevertheless, there have been a number of recent news stories highlighting
problems in the co-ed military, as illustrated by the partial list of headlines
below:
Not So Ship Shape: Admirals Are Concerned About the
Unprofessional Attitudes, Behaviors of Sailors.346
Warship or Ljveboat? One Destroyer. 19 Months. 13 Cases of
Fraternization and/or Adultery. And the Courts-Martial Aren’t
Over Yet.347

345. Sean D. Naylor, Values Instruction To Be Added to Basic Training, ARMY TIMES,
Sept. 22, 1997, at 4. This article reported Army plans to extend basic training from eight
weeks to nine, a move that would cost the Army’s force structure three battalions of soldiers.
346. William H. McMichael, Not So Ship Shape: Admirals Are Concerned About the
Unprofessional Attitudes, Behaviors of Sailors, NAVY TIMES, Nov. 22, 2004, at 8-9.
347. William H. McMichael, Warship or Loveboat? One Destroyer. 19 Months. 13 Cases
of Fraternization and/or Adultery. And the Courts-Martial Aren’t Over Yet, NAVY TIMES,
Nov. 21, 2005, at 14 (regarding the destroyer U.S.S. Chung Hoon).
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Pimping Alleged at Patrick, NCO Arranged for Subordinate to
Have Sex.348
Cutter CO Relieved After “Inappropriate Relationship.”349
Adultery, Fraternization, Drugs, Graft & Guns: The Disturbing
Tale of a Brand-New Destroyer.350
Captain Given 60 Days in Patrick [AFB] Sex Case: Verdict
Allows Honorable Discharge.351
Some KY Guard Women May Have Posed Nude.352
Stories about sexual misconduct appear frequently in military
newspapers. However, with the exception of occasional wire-service
dispatches and sensational photo-illustrated stories such as Abu Ghraib,
headlines like these rarely show up in The New York Times or The
Washington Post. The exception is military sex scandals that center on
allegations of harassment or abuse of women at the service academies.
If a tree falls in the woods but no one hears, did it really fall? And if
demoralizing problems happen in the military, but they are not reported in
The New York Times and The Washington Post, do they really happen?
They do, and they are ignored at great peril.
B. The Military Service Academies
In recent years, most of the attention regarding military sex scandals has
focused on the military service academies. Women who accuse male
colleagues of sexual assault or rape are automatically labeled “victims,”
even before it is known that a crime has been committed. News and
commentaries fitting this template have led to dozens of congressional

348. Rod Hafemeister, Pimping Alleged at Patrick: NCO Arranged for Subordinate To
Have Sex, AIR FORCE TIMES, June 19, 2006, at 8, available at http://www.airforceots.com/
portal/modules.php?name=News&file=article?sid=115.
349. Cutter CO Relieved After “Inappropriate Relationship,” NAVY TIMES, June 28,
2004.
350. William H. McMichael, Adultery, Fraternization, Drugs, Graft & Guns: The
Disturbing Tale of a Brand-New Destroyer, NAVY TIMES, Jan. 20, 2006, at 14 (regarding the
U.S.S. Momsen).
351. Captain Given 60 Days in Patrick [AFB] Sex Case: Verdict Allows Honorable
Discharge, AIR FORCE TIMES, Sept. 25, 2006, at 10.
352. Andrew Wolfson, Some Ky. Guard Women May Have Posed Nude, COURIER-J.
(Louisville, Ky.), Sept. 28, 2006, at 1A.
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hearings, investigations, Pentagon task forces, advisory committees, and
relentless criticism of “masculinist” men in the military.
1. Mixed Signals on the Severn River
This author began using the phrase “double standards involving women,”
or DSIW, shortly after a Task Force Report on Sexual Harassment at the
Military Service Academies was presented to the U.S. Naval Academy
(USNA) Board of Visitors in August 2005.353 Many of the panel’s fortyfour recommendations, largely crafted by civilian “victim advocate”
professionals, were contrary to sound military principles and potentially
harmful to morale at the academy.354
Sen. Barbara Mikulski (D-Md.), a member of the Board of Visitors, did
not seem to notice flaws in the Task Force Report. Instead, she berated
Superintendent Vice Adm. Rodney Rempt for not doing enough to protect
women from allegedly abusive midshipmen.355 Adm. Rempt announced
several responses to the Task Force Report, including a “zero tolerance”
policy against sexual harassment.356
a. Blue Language and Lt. Black
Into the gender-war crossfire wandered Lt. Bryan Black, a USNA
instructor, who had used graphic profanity in the presence of a female
midshipman.357 He apologized and she accepted, but another female officer
decided that Black’s apology for that incident—and another incident—were
not sincere enough.358 The Black case rose to the desk of Superintendent
Rempt, who overruled a Marine investigator’s recommendation for a letter
of reprimand, which probably would have ended Black’s military career.
Lest anyone think he was soft on sailors who use profane language, Rempt
353. DEFENSE TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10. An analysis of the report is available
at http://www.cmrlink.org/viewarticle.asp?f=cmr-pa%20092105a.pdf.
354. Center for Military Readiness, CMR Notes, DoD Task Force Proposals Target Men
of West Point & Annapolis (Nov. 2005), available at http://www.cmrlink.org/search.asp.
355. Bradley Olson, Mikulski Presses Naval Academy Officials on Harassment, BALT.
SUN, Sept. 21, 2005, at 7A; Christopher Munsey, Culture Change Needed at West Point,
Panel Says, ARMY TIMES, Sept. 5, 2005, at 13.
356. Bradley Olson, Admiral Hammers on Gender Inequity, BALT. SUN, Feb. 27, 2006, at
1.
357. Andrew Scutro, Foul Comments; Academy Instructor’s Remarks Land Him in
Court-Martial, NAVY TIMES, Jan. 30, 2006, at 8; Earl Kelly, Academy Professor Unfairly
Targeted for Sex Comments?, CAPITAL (Annapolis) (online ed.), Jan. 14, 2006,
http://www.hometownannapolis.com/cgi-bin/read/2006/01_14-40/NAV.
358. Kelly, supra note 357.
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ordered a Special Court Martial and filed charges of “conduct unbecoming
an officer” against the hapless Lt. Black.359
But Adm. Rempt’s zero tolerance policy had an asterisk beside it. In the
same week that Lt. Black’s story made national news, the Superintendent
invited all midshipmen to attend campus performances of a civilian play
called Sex Signals.360 Actors performing the racy, interactive play, which
was subsidized by the Academy, used the same vulgarities that Lt. Black
had used.361 Four-letter words and slang for intimate body parts were
perfectly acceptable, it seemed, provided that they were recited by civilian
actors in an “educational” production that was supposed to teach
midshipmen about date rape.362
Crude language is rude and unprofessional; it should be discouraged or
punished in appropriate ways. But are women truly helpless when they hear
mild cuss words that don’t make sailors blush? In a December 2005 survey
of sexual harassment at the military academies, one hundred percent of

359. Id. According to Lt. Black’s attorney, Charles Gittins, the Superintendent wanted to
conduct Black’s Article 15 (non-judicial punishment) hearing publicly, in order to make an
example of him. Id.; see also The Situation: “Swearing Like a Sailor” Gets Navy Man in
Trouble (MSNBC television broadcast Jan. 19, 2006) (transcript available at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10928032); Rowan Scarborough, Naval Academy Teacher
Cautioned over Language, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2006, at A07. Article 15 (nonjudicial
punishment) hearings are usually conducted in private. See Scutro, supra note 357. Realizing
that such a spectacle would be neither objective nor fair, Black opted for a court-martial,
which offered better protection for his rights. See id. The Superintendent decided to proceed
with the court-martial, but the outcome was delayed for almost a year. See Scarborough,
supra. After months of controversy and criticism for what was perceived as an over-zealous
prosecution, Adm. Rempt transferred the case to another Navy authority, who dismissed the
case and ordered the same type of letter of reprimand that Lt. Black was prepared to accept
in the first place. Id.
360. E-mail from Vice Adm. Rodney P. Rempt to nonmids@unsa.edu, Subject: Faculty
and Staff Invitation, (Jan. 4, 2006) (inviting USNA faculty, staff, and their families to join
members of the Class of 2007 for performances of the interactive play Sex Signals at Mahan
Hall on the USNA campus on January 9, 10, and 11, 2006, at 7:30 p.m.). The e-mail
acknowledged that the production is geared to college students with discussions of dating,
sex, and date rape. Id. The e-mail recommended that due to “graphic language,” children
under the age of thirteen should not attend. Id.; see also infra note 362.
361. Id.; see also Center for Military Readiness, Naval Academy Prosecution Taken to
PC Extreme (Jan. 13, 2006), http://www.cmrlink.org/social.asp?docID=261.
362. Letter from Attorney Charles Gittins to Vice Adm. Rodney Rempt (Jan. 11, 2006)
(on file with author). Gittins, a USNA alumnus who witnessed the play, criticized its
raunchy language, which he considered inappropriate for the Academy’s Mahan Hall, and
noted that the players had presented misinformation about “date rape” that conflicted with
military law.
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Naval Academy women who did not file official complaints said they
thought they could handle such problems themselves.363
When it comes to the oxymoronic etiquette of profanity, there are no
easy answers. Some women like to compete with men who use profanity as
performance art. Witness the book Love My Rifle More Than You, written
by former Army sergeant Kayla Williams about her experiences in Iraq.364
The provocative book takes the prize for equal-opportunity raunchiness in a
gender-mixed environment.365
Some women expect men to be protectors, while others fume if a man
extends simple courtesies to women under his command. In the minefield
of sexual politics, what’s a military guy to do? Miss Manners wouldn’t
have a clue.
b. Inconsistency and Favoritism
The Superintendent could help Naval Academy women most by working
to avoid the perception and reality of double standards involving women.
The following incidents are prime examples of DSIW:
x

In June 2006, Annapolis Capital reporter Earl Kelly quoted
two unnamed, former midshipmen who said they knew a
female company commander who did not take the physical
readiness test, but lied and said that she did.366 Investigators
recommended her dismissal, but Commandant of
Midshipmen Capt. Bruce Grooms “overrode the decision
because ‘she is a woman in power’ and the Naval Academy
is under pressure to recruit and retain female
midshipmen.”367 So much for the USNA Honor Concept,

363. DEFENSE MANPOWER DATA CENTER, SERVICE ACADEMY 2005 SEXUAL HARASSMENT
ASSAULT SURVEY vi (Dec. 23, 2005) [hereinafter SASA 2005], available at
http://www.sapr.mil/contents/references/DMDC%20Academy%202005%20Survey.pdf.
This survey was conducted in response to section 527 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for FY 2004 and was the second in a series of annual surveys that will continue through
2008.
An
analysis
of
this
and
previous
surveys
is
available
at
http://www.cmrlink.org/social.asp?docID=260 (last visited Apr. 12, 2007).
364. KAYLA WILLIAMS & MICHAEL E. STAUB, LOVE MY RIFLE MORE THAN YOU: YOUNG
AND FEMALE IN THE U.S. ARMY (2005).
365. Id.; see also Kathleen Parker, Guys & Dolls: The Facts of Life About Co-Ed
Combat, WEEKLY STANDARD, Oct. 31, 2005, at 38.
366. Earl Kelly, Mids Say Discipline Is Not Consistent, CAPITAL (Annapolis), June 6,
2006, at A1.
367. Id.
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which directs midshipmen to “Tell the truth and ensure that
the full truth is known . . . do not lie.”368
x

In Fall 2004, a male midshipman used mild profanity with
an angry female colleague who responded in kind.369 The
man was dismissed and ordered to repay the cost of his
education, but the woman graduated normally in 2005.370
USNA spokesmen claimed to be unaware of any case fitting
the description, dissembling with stock replies claiming “fair
and equitable treatment for all.”371

x

A male midshipman who asked a reporter not to use his
name said that he was dismissed from the Academy for
having consensual sex with a female midshipman.372 The
brief summer “fling” occurred during a ten-day training
exercise away from the yard in July.373 He added that his
partner and three more female midshipmen who engaged in
similar activities were counseled, but not punished.374 A
USNA spokesman cited privacy concerns in refusing to
discuss the case with the reporter.375 Nor did the spokesman
provide information on the number of midshipmen—either
cumulatively or by gender—who had been discharged in the
previous two years for sexual harassment, assault, or
misconduct.376

Harsh discipline of male midshipmen for certain offenses, which are
excused when committed by female midshipmen, constitutes double
standards that are divisive and demoralizing in the fullest sense of the word.
Most women in the military are not responsible for DSIW in disciplinary
matters, but the resulting backlash and hard feelings are harmful to women
368. U.S. Naval Academy, Honor Concept, http://www.usna.edu/OfficerDevelopment/
honor/honorconcept.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2007).
369. E-mail correspondence and telephone conversation between confidential sources
and author (May 2006) (on file with author).
370. Id.
371. Id.; E-mails from USNA spokesmen to author (Mar. 3, 2006–May 19, 2006) (on file
with author).
372. Earl Kelly, Academy Double Standard on Sex Dismissals?, CAPITAL (Annapolis),
Mar. 6, 2006, at A1.
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id.
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and men alike. Double standards of any kind weaken the structural integrity
of the military as an institution.
2. Rape and Victimology
The most controversial examples of double standards and misconduct at
the Military Service Academies have involved charges of assault and rape.
In January 2003, ABC News set off a wave of publicity and criticism about
allegations of rape at the Air Force Academy.377 Several full-scale
investigations and congressional hearings were conducted to determine how
those cases had been handled. Some of the details footnoted in a report by
an Air Force Working Group read like pornographic movie scripts, but
records showed that most of the cases had been handled properly, under
military law.378
Media critics and professional victim advocates remained dissatisfied
because, in their view, all accusations of assault are credible and any
punishment short of court-martial and jail means that the case was
mishandled and unfair to the “victim.”379 Several more investigations of
sexual misconduct at the academies were conducted, creating opportunities
for professional victim advocates seeking Department of Defense funds and
prestige.
a. DoD Office of Victim Advocate (OVA)
Sensational scandals at the Air Force and Naval Academies were
intensified by release of the Service Academy 2005 Sexual Harassment and
Assault Survey (SASA)—the first of a series of annual polls of military
academy cadets and midshipmen, which was done on an anonymous
basis.380 Most news reports about the 2005 survey failed to notice that its
findings regarding incidents of sexual harassment did not differentiate
between minor incidents and serious offenses. Nor did the survey
differentiate between allegations and substantiated cases. News reports
377. Lynn Sherr, Rape Without Repercussion? Women Say Assaults Are Not Prosecuted
at Air Force Academy (ABC News television broadcast Feb. 28, 2003).
378. OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. AIR FORCE, THE REPORT OF THE WORKING
GROUP CONCERNING THE DETERRENCE OF AND RESPONSE TO INCIDENTS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT
AT
THE
U.S. AIR FORCE ACADEMY 156-64 (June 2003), available at
http://www.usafatoday.com/docs/usafa_report.pdf.
379. Christine Hansen, The Miles Foundation, Inc., A Considerable Sacrifice: The Costs
of Sexual Violence in the U.S. Armed Forces (Sept. 16, 2005) (presented at the Military
Culture and Gender Conference, University of Buffalo, N.Y.), available at
http://www.law.buffalo.edu/BALDYCENTER/pdfs/MilCult05Hansen.pdf.
380. SASA 2005, supra note 363.
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nationwide accused West Point of having the worst record of the three,381
creating the impression that the U.S. Military Academy is a sexual
battleground for female cadets. A closer look at survey numbers revealed
that anonymous reports of assault at the military service academies are
relatively few and probably comparable to or lower than incidents in the
civilian world.
For example, six percent (thirty-seven of 618) women at the Military
Academy, five percent (thirty-five of 693) women at the Naval Academy,
and four percent (thirty of 738) women at the Air Force Academy reported
some sort of sexual assault, defined most often as “unwanted touching of a
sexual nature.”382 Even one case is too many, but perspective is in order.
All the bad publicity aimed at West Point, tagged with the largest number
(six percent), resulted from anonymous reports from only seven more
women than those who reported assaults at the Air Force Academy.
Exaggerated reports of this kind are not helpful to the military, or to female
cadets and midshipmen. They do create perceptions, however, as well as a
potential growth industry for professional “victim advocates.”
In 2004, Rep. Louise Slaughter (D-N.Y.) sponsored a ninety-five-page
bill that would have authorized more than $218.6 million for an Office of
Victim Advocate (OVA) in the Pentagon.383 This costly piece of feminist
“pork,” or even a fraction of the proposed funding, would empower civilian
feminists who seem to believe that men are innocent only until they are
accused.384 In 2006, The Wellesley College Centers for Women produced a
$50,000 report commissioned by DoD on “prospects” for a Pentagon
OVA—but DoD did not endorse the proposal.385 Establishment of such an
office would have been a huge mistake. Victim advocates almost always
consider accusers to be “victims” even before it is known that a crime has
been committed. They also react in horror any time expert investigators
381. Id. at 13-15 (“Survey Metholodgy”); see also Lolita C. Baldor, Military School Sex
Harassment Continues, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 28, 2005; Josh White, Air Force Academy
Shows Improvement, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 2005, at A02; Rowan Scarborough, Military
Academies See Less Harassment, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2006, at A1.
382. SASA 2005, supra note 363, at iv-vii (“Executive Summary”); Center for Military
Readiness, Sex Survey Scolding Unfair to Service Academies (Jan. 11, 2006),
www.cmrlink.org/SOCIAL.ASP?DOCID=260 (last visited Apr. 4, 2007).
383. Dep’t of Defense Office of the Victim Advocate Act of 2004, H.R. 4587, 108th
Cong. (2004).
384. See Center for Military Readiness, Pentagon Doesn’t Need an Office of Male
Bashing (Dec. 1, 2005), http://www.cmrlink.org/social.asp?docID=257.
385. Bryan Bender, Wellesley College Advised Pentagon on Victim Office, BOSTON
GLOBE, Dec. 10, 2005, at A1.
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suggest that false allegations of sexual assault are common and
distinguishable from truthful ones.386
The DoD Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office (SAPRO) has
established some useful guidelines to strike a balance between the privacy
of accusers and the rights of the accused.387 There is no need for a Pentagon
Office of the Victim Advocate, which would operate as an “Office of Male
Bashing” that all DoD officials would fear to challenge. Such an office in
the Pentagon would nuclearize the war between the sexes by meddling in
distant “he said, she said” disputes that are local and highly emotional.388
Sexual harassment problems should be handled at the local level, with full
respect for the rights of the accused.
b. Alcohol and the Owens Case
Even though alcohol is supposed to be off limits to cadets and
midshipmen, it is almost always present in military service academy sex
scandals. So it was in the 2006 case of former USNA quarterback Lamar
Owens, who was accused of raping a female midshipman in Bancroft
386. See Center for Military Readiness, Sex, Lies, and Rape (Sept. 4, 2006), http://www.
cmrlink.org/social.asp?DocID=276.
387. Dep’t of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs),
DoD Issues Confidentiality Policy for Sexual Assault Victims (Mar. 18, 2005),
http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=8320;
Memorandum
from
Deputy Secretary of Defense to Secretaries of the Military Departments, Confidentiality
Policy for Victims of Sexual Assault (Mar. 16, 2005), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050318dsd.pdf; see also Dep’t of Defense
Directive No. 6495.1, Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program (Oct. 6,
2005), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/649501p.pdf; K.C.
McClain, We’re Making Progress, USA TODAY, Mar. 27, 2005, at 14A.
388. The Defense Department opposed OVA legislation that was reintroduced in 2006.
See Military Domestic and Sexual Violence Response Act of 2006, H.R. 5212, § 111, 109th
Cong. (2006). On June 12, 2006, the DoD Office of Domestic Violence issued this
statement:
An office of the OVA is unnecessary. DoD is committed to maintaining a
strong focus on preventing these crimes, effectively responding to them and
holding offenders accountable for their actions. In the military, the
responsibility for maintaining this focus lies with commanders, not with victim
advocates. While victim advocates are important, victims often times need
additional resources within the military community. Victims need strong
support from commanders and other responders to ensure that medical, legal
and investigative systems remove barriers to reporting, reduce bureaucratic
hurdles for victims and survivors, and ensure access to treatment services.
See Telephone call and facsimile from Pentagon official to author (June 12, 2006) (on file
with author).
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Hall.389 The Academy granted legal immunity to the accuser, an admitted
binge drinker, but the unnecessary privilege backfired.390 Legal immunity
did not help to lift the fog of alcohol that blurred both parties’ memories of
what happened that night.391
Reasonable doubt remained, so Owens was acquitted of rape.392 He was
convicted of conduct unbecoming an officer, but the jury recommended no
punishment.393 Superintendent Rempt referred the case to the Secretary of
the Navy, recommending that Owens be expelled for “unsatisfactory
conduct,” but not be required to repay the cost of his education. Navy
Secretary Donald Winter approved the expulsion, but also ordered that
Owens repay $90,000 of the $136,000 cost of his educationthe smaller
amount in recognition of Owens’ contributions to the academy as an
athlete. As of this writing, Owens’ defense team is appealing that order. In
contrast, Owens’ accuser, a known binge drinker who had been given
immunity for her testimony, was allowed to graduate normally. The
Academy’s intervention in what should have been an unbiased trial left the
Superintendent with a troubled female officer, a muddled message about
alcohol, and a glaring example of DSIW that demoralized the Academy for
months.394
389. See Bradley Olson, Mid Tells Jury of Rape in Her Dorm: Defense Attacks
Credibility, Says Navy QB Had Consensual Sex, BALT. SUN, July 12, 2006, at 1A; Earl
Kelly, Judge Blasts Prosecution in Owens’ Trial, CAPITAL (Annapolis), July 14, 2006, at A1;
Steve Vogel, Superintendent Faulted over Rape Case E-Mails, WASH. POST, July 7, 2006, at
B04; Bradley Olson, Message Is Focus in Rape Case: Woman Might Have Invited
Quarterback to Her Dorm Room at Naval Academy, BALT. SUN, July 13, 2006, at 1B; Arlo
Wagner, Alcohol an Issue in Accuser’s Recall, WASH. TIMES, July 18, 2006, at B3.
390. See Stuart Taylor, Jr., “Rape” and the Navy’s P.C. Policy, NAT’L J., Apr. 9, 2007
(reporting that Vice Adm. Rempt, the USNA Superintendent and “convening authority” in
the Owens case, told alumnus Peter Optekar at a social event that he had to submit Owens to
a court martial: “Pete, I had no other choice. If I did not take him to a GCM, we would have
had every feminist organization and the ACLU after us.”).
391. See Arlo Wagner, Alcohol an Issue in Accuser’s Recall, WASH. TIMES, July 18,
2006, at B3.
392. Nathan Barney, Owens Cleared of Rape Charge, WASH. TIMES, July 22, 2006, at
B1.
393. Id.; Derrill Holly, Military Jury: No Punishment for Navy Quarterback, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, July 21, 2006.
394. Nia-Malika Henderson, Annapolis Alderwoman Seeks Support for Owens, BALT.
SUN, Feb. 7, 2007, at 3B; Chris Amos, Worthy of Commission?, NAVY TIMES, Mar. 12,
2007, at 8; Bradley Olson, Owens, Alumni Plead for Support: Navy Ex-Quarterback Uses
Web To Ask for Character References, BALT. SUN, Feb. 17, 2007, at 1A; Earl Kelly,
Academy Criticized for Unequal Punishment: Some Say Owens Trial Proves Double
Standard for Female Midshipmen, CAPITAL (Annapolis), Aug. 20, 2006, at A1; Bradley
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c. Guilt by Accusation
In 2004, DoD Inspector Gen. Joseph E. Schmitz conducted an extensive
survey to measure opinions on sexual harassment and assault at the military
service academies. Among other things, the Schmitz DoD IG Report,
released in March 2005, found that fraudulent complaints are perceived as a
problem by an average of seventy-three percent of women at the Air Force
Academy, West Point, and Annapolis. The comparable average percentage
for men at all three academies was seventy-two percent.395
Figures of that size indicate a problem worthy of further investigation
and honest plans to reduce the problem, not cover it up. But in the Sexual
Harassment and Assault (SASA) Survey of December 2005, described as a
“baseline” in a series of authorized studies, there were no questions about
fraudulent complaints.396 Nor did the SASA 2005 ask any questions about
concerns that standards have been lowered, even though statements about
such concerns were identified by the GAO in 1991 and 1994 as the second
most prominent form of sexual harassment at the academies.397
In 2006, many news stories created the misimpression that sexual
harassment and assaults were increasing at the military service academies.
Reporters frequently repeated questionable figures obtained from victim
advocates, who seem to believe every allegation to be true and consider a
case to be mishandled if the accused person is not court martialed and sent
to jail. The truth was that numbers of women alleging harassment were
remarkably small, and on a downward trend.398
Military officials should not endorse the notion that men are always
wrong and women are always right—a suggestion as ludicrous as the idea
that all women think alike. Men who assault women should be punished.
Women who drink to excess or make false accusations should be punished,
Olson, Mid Vows To Fight Expulsion: Owens’ Lawyer Also Objects to Order To Repay Navy
$90,000 Navy for Education, BALT. SUN, Apr. 14, 2007, at 5B.
395. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEP’T OF DEFENSE, REPORT OF THE
SERVICE ACADEMY SEXUAL ASSAULT AND LEADERSHIP SURVEY xi n.15 (Mar. 4, 2005),
available at http://www.dodig.mil/Inspections/IPO/reports/Final%20Survey%20Report.pdf;
see also Daniel de Vise, Defense Dept. Surveys Academy Sex Assaults, WASH. POST, Mar.
19, 2005, at A01; Robert F. Dorr, Lies and Victims’ Inaction Have Skewed Service
Academies’ Sex Assault Reports, NAVY TIMES, Apr. 25, 2005, at 46.
396. See supra note 363.
397. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DOD SERVICE ACADEMIES: MORE ACTIONS NEEDED TO
ELIMINATE SEXUAL HARASSMENT 3 (Jan. 1994), available at http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat4/
150664.pdf (“The most common forms of harassment were derogatory personal comments
and comments that standards had been lowered for women.”).
398. Center for Military Readiness, supra note 382.
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too. Mishandled accusations of rape are not about sex; they are about
power—the power of women over men.
C. The 1993 Law Regarding Homosexual Conduct
A common thread in the debates about social policy in the military centers
on the institution’s unique character, culture, and mission. The armed forces
exist to defend the republic—a purpose that sets the military apart from all
other institutions in the civilian world.
Advocates of allowing homosexuals to serve in the military almost always
discuss the issue in terms of civil rights. But participation in the military is
sometimes a duty; it is never a right. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
does not apply to the military.399
The issue was discussed in a comprehensive law review article by
Professor William A. Woodruff of the Norman Adrian Wiggins School of
Law at Campbell University:
The American Armed Forces are unique. In a government based
upon the consent of the governed, the military is autocratic. In a
society that treasures individual freedom, the soldier must
conform and sacrifice individual freedom for mission
accomplishment. In a country where the right to speak one’s
mind is paramount, the soldier is called upon to defend that right
while not enjoying its full extent. To some, it is paradoxical that
the defenders of freedom must forfeit their own freedom.
Consider the mission of the military, however, and the paradox
vanishes. The mission of the United States Armed Forces is to
fight and win our nation’s wars. It takes an army to do that, not a
debating society. . . .
. . . Wars are won not by individuals, but by units functioning
under extremely difficult circumstances. . . .

399. See PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at C-40 (Finding 1.32).
Title VII has not been legally applied to the military in recognition of the fact
that its provision could impose constraints on the United States by which
potential military opponents, not operating under the same constraints, might
derive an advantage. Warfare is a supranational survival contest in which
opposing sides vie for any advantage; unilateral policies adopted to promote
principles other than military necessity may place the adopting party at
increased risk of defeat.
Id.

726

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:617

In the final analysis, all military rules, regulations, policies,
traditions, and customs are related to, and in some manner
support, the ultimate goal of combat effectiveness.400
As famously articulated by the Supreme Court in Goldman v. Weinberger,
[W]e have repeatedly held that the military is, by necessity, a
specialized society separate from civilian society. The military
must insist upon a respect for duty and a discipline without
counterpart in civilian life, in order to prepare for and perform its
vital role.
. . . The essence of military service is the subordination of the
desires and interests of the individual to the needs of the
service.401
The military guards individual rights, but it must be guided by different
rules. This principle should inform all discussions about social policies,
including the question of homosexuals in the military.
1. Congressional Oversight
a. Clinton Vows To Repeal Department of Defense Regulations
The contemporary public debate about homosexuals in the military began
in 1992, when former Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton challenged President
George H.W. Bush for re-election. President Bush did not raise the issue
much during the campaign, but homosexual activist groups contributed
heavily to the campaign of Bill Clinton and Al Gore and expected Clinton
to deliver on his promise to “lift the ban” on homosexuals in the military.402
Shortly after the election, on Veterans Day, President-elect Clinton
vowed to deliver on his campaign promise and announced his intention to
change policies that excluded homosexuals from the military.403 At the time,
400. William A. Woodruff, Homosexuality and Military Service, 64 UMKC L. REV. 121,
123-24 (Fall 1995). Prior to retiring from active duty in the Judge Advocate General’s
Corps, Professor Woodruff served as Chief of the Litigation Division in the Office of the
Judge Advocate General, where he was responsible for defending the Army’s interests in
civil litigation, including litigation challenges to the homosexual exclusion policy. Id.
401. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 506-07 (1986) (citations, internal quotation
marks, and alteration omitted).
402. See J. Jennings Moss, Clinton To Allow Gays in Military, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 12,
1992, at A1; J. Jennings Moss, Gays See Clinton Backing Agenda, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 20,
1993, at A8.
403. See Bill Gertz, Nunn Defies Clinton on Gays in Military, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 16,
1992, at A1; Bill Gertz, Clinton To Move Fast for Gays in the Military, WASH. TIMES, Jan.
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the ban was not inscribed in law, but in Department of Defense directives
that were adopted in 1981.404 On January 29, 1993, the newly inaugurated
president ordered the Department of Defense to cease asking “the question”
about homosexuality, which used to appear on military induction papers.405
This change was described as an “interim policy,” pending further review
by Congress and the Defense Department.406
A storm of spontaneous opposition ensued. Many congressional offices
needed extra staff to answer thousands of phone calls and letters protesting
the president’s move, and it quickly became apparent that even a Congress
controlled by the president’s own party would not permit the Administration
to repeal the ban on homosexuals in the military arbitrarily.407 Then22, 1993, at A4; Chandler Burr, Friendly Fire: How Politics Shaped Policy on Gays in the
Military, CAL. LAW., June 1994, at 54-55. In his article, Burr reported that about an hour
after his swearing-in, President Clinton saw Rep. Gerry Studds (D-Mass.), one of two openly
gay members of the House, in the Capitol rotunda. “[S]haking his hand, [President Clinton]
said with deep conviction, ‘I’m going to do this, Gerry.’ ‘This’ was Clinton’s campaign
promise to lift the ban on gay and lesbian soldiers in the military.” Id. A few weeks later,
Clinton intimate Paul Begala was present at the inception of the Campaign for Military
Service, an ad hoc coalition of the American Civil Liberties Union, People for the American
Way, the National Organization for Women, and other groups that joined together to do the
lobbying, public relations, and vote counting.
404. See Dep’t of Defense Directive No. 1332.14, Enlisted Administrative Separations
(Jan. 15, 1981); Dep’t of Defense Directive No. 1332.30, Separation of Regular
Commissioned Officers, at encl. 2 (Jan. 15, 1981); Woodruff, supra note 400, at 131-32
nn.56 & 60, reprinted in 32 C.F.R. pt. 41, app. A, ¶ (H). Both directives were republished in
1982. See also Memorandum from Deputy Secretary of Defense to Military Departments
(Jan. 16, 1981) (“I am promulgating today a change to DoD Directive 1332.14 (Enlisted
Administrative Separations), including a completely new Enclosure 8 on Homosexuality.
The revision contains no change in policy. It reaffirms that homosexuality is incompatible
with military service.”). Although these changes were put into place under the Carter
administration, the directive on Enlisted Administrative Separation was again revised in
1982. See Dep’t of Defense Directive No. 1332.14, Enlisted Administrative Separations
(Jan. 28, 1982), available at http://dont.stanford.edu/regulations/regulation41.pdf. The 1982
revision did not affect the policy on homosexuality. Nevertheless, the 1982 date has caused
some to erroneously attribute this language to the Reagan administration.
405. Memorandum from President Clinton to the Secretary of Defense, Ending
Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation in the Armed Forces (Jan. 29, 1993),
available at http://dont.stanford.edu/regulations/pres1-29-93.pdf.
406. See id.
407. See Michael Hedges, Support for Gay Ban Seen As Spontaneous, WASH. TIMES, Feb.
2, 1993, at A1; Rowan Scarborough & Ronald A. Taylor, Clinton Seeks a Deal To Avoid
Battle on Ban, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1993, at A1. Veterans, conservative, and pro-family
groups were relatively unprepared for the controversy because it had not been widely
debated during the 1992 presidential race. Following extensive hearings, members of
Congress and staff eventually formulated a legislative strategy.
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Secretary of Defense Les Aspin formed an internal Military Working Group
and charged the panel to come up with a suitable plan for accommodating
homosexuals in the military by July 15, 1993.408 The Joint Chiefs and
military experts argued for continuation of the status quo, but task force
members were under pressure from the White House and activist groups to
devise a plan to accommodate gays in the military.
Feeling political backlash, in March 1993, President Clinton said at a
news conference that he might consider a plan that would allow
homosexuals in the military but restrict them from certain assignments.
Self-identified homosexual Bob Hattoy, Associate Director of Presidential
Personnel and an advisor to Clinton on the issue, flatly rejected that
option.409 The internal and public debate intensified when a coalition called
the Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Military Freedom Project drew up a list of
“recommendations” that left no doubt that activists would not be satisfied
with the option of homosexuals serving in the military discreetly. The wish
list included, inter alia: (1) an Executive Order to ban discrimination based
on homosexual or bisexual orientation or conduct in the armed forces; (2)
an end to all discharge procedures for homosexual orientation or conduct;
(3) training programs on the acceptance of homosexual or bisexual
personnel into the military, on the same basis as racial and gender issues;
and (4) an official Defense Department committee, similar to the Defense
Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS), to advise
the Secretary on matters relating to homosexuals and bisexuals in the armed

408. Memorandum from the Military Working Group to the Secretary of Defense,
Recommended DoD Homosexual Policy Outline (June 8, 1993); see also Peter Copeland,
Gay-Sex Video Set for Battle, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1993, at A1; Rowan Scarborough,
Study Urges Ban on Overt Gays: Pentagon Report To Seek Compromise, WASH. TIMES, May
21, 1993, at A1; Eric Schmitt, Pentagon Speeds Plan To Lift Gay Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15,
1993, at A20; Rowan Scarborough, Gay-Ban Supporters Seek Equal Time with Pentagon,
WASH. TIMES, May 25, 1993, at A3; Rowan Scarborough, Aspin Policy Follows “Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell,” WASH. TIMES, June 22, 1993, at A1. The Military Working Group did not meet
with opponents of President Clinton’s plan until June 8, 1993—the date they submitted their
policy outline to Secretary Aspin.
409. Richard H.P. Sia, Top Military Officers Favor Gays Staying in Closet, BALT. SUN,
FEB. 23, 1993, available at http://www.cs.cmu.edu/afs/cs.cmu.edu/user/scotts/bulgarians/
joint-chiefs-ban.html; Joyce Price, Clinton Aide Rips Deal on Gay Ban, WASH. TIMES, Mar.
25, 1993, at A1; Paul Bedard, Clinton Softens Gay Plan, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1993, at
A1; Rowan Scarborough, Senator Questions [Bernard] Nussbaum’s Role in Gay-Ban Case,
WASH. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1994, at A4.
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forces.410 Some items on the wish list were partially granted by the Clinton
Administration in 1994.411
Homosexual activist groups staged a large (though not as large as
planned) rally in Washington, D.C., on April 25, 1993. Organizers
promoted the march as what would be “the largest civil rights
demonstration in [U.S.] history” and were disappointed when President
Clinton did not promise to be there in person.412 The event included
bizzarre elements that were aired on C-SPAN, including some
provocatively dressed marchers and a group holding up posters depicting
President Clinton with a “Pinnochio” nose.413 President Clinton did not
show up at the rally, but he met in the Oval Office with a large group of
organizers, who consulted frequently with officials from the Deparments of
Defense and Justice on legislative and legal strategies to advance the cause
of homosexuals in the military.414

410. See Rowan Scarborough, Gay Rights Groups Ready Wish List for Military in Case
Ban Is Lifted, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1993, at A1. The Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Military
Freedom Project was a coalition of nine human rights and gay activist organizations,
including: Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual Veterans of America; American Civil Liberties Union;
American Psychological Association; the Human Rights Campaign Fund; National Gay and
Lesbian Task Force; Military Law Task Force; National Lawyer’s Guild; Lambda Legal
Defense and Educational Fund; and Queer Nation. See id.
411. On September 8, 1994, the Department of Defense co-sponsored a day-long
“Diversity Day Training Event” in Arlington’s Crystal City near the Pentagon with eighteen
other government agencies. The program featured lectures, panel discussions, exhibits,
workshops, and video presentations, including a video titled “On Being Gay.” Id.; see also
Rowan Scarborough, Navy Officers Balk at Pro-Gay Seminar, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1994,
at A1; Dep’t of the Navy, Memorandum for All Hands from the Cmdr. G.R. Stermer, Naval
Sea Systems, Subj.: Diversity Day 1994 Training Event, Aug. 26, 1994; Elaine Donnelly,
Heritage Foundation Lecture No. 522, Social Experimentation in the Military (Apr. 3, 1995)
(transcript available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/HL522.cfm).
412. Gary Lee & Linda Wheeler, Gay-Rights March Organizers Say 1 Million May
Participate, WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 1993, at A41; Joyce Price, Possible Clinton No-Show
Angers Gay March Leaders, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1993, at A4; Joyce Price, Clinton Plans
Hookup to Gay-Rights Rally: Meets Leaders in Oval Office, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1993, at
A1; Cindy Loose, Gay Activists Summon Their Hopes, Resolve, WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 1993,
at A1.
413. Michael Hedges & J. Jennings Moss, “The Queer ‘90s”: 300,000 March To
Celebrate Rites with Demand for Rights, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1993, at A1; Ruth Fremson,
Photo (Apr. 25, 1993) (showing estimated 300,000 marchers); Kenneth Lambert, Photo
(Apr. 25, 1993) (showing Pinocchio signs); Michael Hedges, Emotions Bared, Among Other
Things, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1993, at A1; Michael Hedges, Were Marchers Just Too Far
“Out”?, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1993, at A1.
414. See Burr, supra note 403, at 57-61, 98-100.
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Members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were in an awkward situation, but
they did their best to resist the president’s original, radical plan without
challenging his authority as Commander-in-Chief.415 Following pressure
from Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, all of the chiefs of staff were lined up
behind President Clinton for a media event at Fort McNair, Washington,
D.C., when President Clinton announced his “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”
proposal on July 19, 1993.416 Departing significantly from DoD directives
in effect since 1981, President Clinton’s July 19 policy maintained that
“Sexual orientation is considered a personal and private matter, and
homosexual orientation is not a bar to service entry or continued service
unless manifested by homosexual conduct.”417
b. Congress Exercises Oversight Responsibilities
Enactment of Clinton’s proposal appeared possible at first, but in
response to political pressure, members of Congress became engaged. They
exercised effective oversight by asking a lot of questions. For example, in
May 1993, Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn (DGa.) and Ranking Member John Warner (R-Va.) visited several ships and
submarines at Naval Station Norfolk, Virginia. An Associated Press photo
of that visit showed the senators crouched down to solicit the opinions of
three men occupying cramped sleeping spaces in the torpedo room of the
nuclear attack submarine USS Montpelier.418 One gay activist leader called
Nunn’s tour an “inflammatory spectacle,” while another denounced Sen.
Nunn as a “bigot” for having any hearings at all.419
415. See Sia, supra note 409; Detroit News Wire Services, Top Brass: Rethink Gay Ban
Lift, DETROIT NEWS, Jan. 25, 1993, at A1.
416. See Grant Willis, Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, Don’t Pursue: Despite Compromise on Gay
Ban, Congress Will Get the Last Word, ARMY TIMES, Aug. 2, 1993, at 12.
417. See Dep’t of Defense Directive No. 1332.14, Enlisted Administrative Separations, at
encl. 3 ¶ E3.A1.1.8.1.1 (1994), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/
133214p.pdf; cf. Dep’t of Defense Instr. 5505.8, Investigations of Sexual Misconduct by the
Defense Criminal Investigative Organizations and Other DoD Law Enforcement
Organizations, at §§ 4, 6, & encl. 2 (2005), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/
corres/pdf/i55058_012405/i55058p.pdf. The “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” concept announced by
Clinton on July 19, 1993, formed the basis for congressional testimony by Defense
Department officials, and for enforcement regulations announced on December 22, 1993,
with DoD News Release No. 605-93, available at http://www.sldn.org/binary-data/
SLDN_ARTICLES/pdf_file/1100.pdf.
418. Steve Helber, Photo, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 11, 1993.
419. Richard A. Ryan, Senators Take Gay Battle to Sea, DETROIT NEWS, May 11, 1993,
at 1A.; Rowan Scarborough, Witnesses Detail Risks of Lifting Ban, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 30,
1993, at A1.
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Various drafts of a “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” type proposal started to emerge
and draw fire from both sides.420 Proponents of gays in the military saw them as
a betrayal of their justified expectations, while opponents criticized such
proposals as incremental steps in the wrong direction. During this time both
Houses held a total of twelve legislative hearings, which heard from diverse
panels of experts and advocates on all sides of the issue.421
Immediately following President Clinton’s announcement on July 19, 1993,
the House and Senate Armed Services Committees heard testimony from
several prominent officials, including Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, DoD
General Counsel Jamie Gorelick, Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Colin
Powell, the Chief of Staff of each of the services, and key members of the
Pentagon’s Military Working Group. Under close questioning, all gave
candid answers that revealed serious flaws in the July 19 “Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell” concept; in both Houses of Congress, members started to question and

420. See Rowan Scarborough, Furor Grows Over Gay-Ban Policy, WASH. TIMES, June
23, 1993, at A1; Burr, supra note 403, at 56-57. Burr described the concerns of activist
lawyer Chai Feldblum, who tried to achieve a significant (though limited) step in favor of
gays in the military by going along with the original “compromise” reportedly agreed to by
President Clinton and Sen. Sam Nunn. Under what Burr described as the “Clinton-Nunn
political deal,” “service members who stated they were gay would be placed on inactive
reserve, stripped of pay and benefits—essentially given a suspended discharge. (Those found
to have had sex were still expelled under the new terms, which, in Clinton’s formulation,
separated homosexual ‘status’ from homosexual ‘conduct.’)” Id. But attorney Chai
Feldblum, an activist with the Campaign for Military Service Coalition, became
“increasingly concerned” about Clinton’s “‘status versus conduct’ distinction, which the
president repeated whenever he was asked about his forthcoming policy.” She and fellow
activist Tom Stoddard, who headed the Campaign for Military Service and met with Clinton
at the White House on April 16, 1993, maintained that the distinction should be “status
versus misconduct.” They recognized that Clinton’s “status versus conduct” concept was an
“artificial distinction as unworkable as accepting left-handed soldiers while forbidding them
from shooting left-handed.” See id. Those opposed to gays in the military recognized the
same anomaly.
421. See Woodruff, supra note 400, at 144. The Senate Armed Service Committee
conducted hearings on the policy generally on March 29, 31, April 29, May 7, 10, and 11,
1993. Id. at 144 n.137 (citing Policy Concerning Homosexuality in the Armed Forces:
Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Armed Servs., 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 255-56 (1993)).
Oversight hearings on the Administration’s July 19, 1993 policy were held on July 20, 21,
and 22, 1993. Id. (citing Policy Concerning Homosexuality in the Armed Forces: Hearings
Before the S. Comm. on Armed Servs., 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 255-56 (1993)). Oversight
hearings in the House were held July 21, 22, and 23, 1993. Id. (citing Assessment of the Plan
To Lift the Ban on Homosexuality in the Military: Hearings Before the Mil. Forces &
Personnel Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Armed Servs., 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993)).
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doubt the wisdom of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.422 Then-Rep. James Talent (RMo.) commented,
when I listened to the Chiefs and the Secretary yesterday, what I
basically heard them saying was that they had resolved this
debate in favor of essentially keeping the old policy, . . . [but]
[w]hen I read the policy as a totality . . . [it] doesn’t seem
consistent with what I understood the Secretary and the Chiefs
have been saying about the policy.423
The sticking point was an inherent inconsistency that could be easily
exploited by activist lawyers challenging the policy in court: If homosexuality
is not a disqualifying characteristic, how can the armed forces justify
dismissal of a person who merely reveals the presence of such a
characteristic? Members of Congress recognized that such a policy would be
unenforceable, unworkable, and indefensible in court.
With the exception of Clinton administration insiders trying to
finesse what had become a hot-potato issue, and a few gay leaders
who were willing to accept compromise in order to avoid codification
of the ban on gays in the military, 424 there were no significant
constituencies advocating passage of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” by
Congress. Following extensive floor debate in both Houses, Congress
rejected President Clinton’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” proposal with

422. See Woodruff, supra note 400, at 149-50 (citing Policy Concerning Homosexuality
in the Armed Forces: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Armed Servs., 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
255-56 (1993); Assessment of the Plan To Lift the Ban on Homosexuality in the Military:
Hearings Before the Mil. Forces & Personnel Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Armed Servs.,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993)). Senators on both sides of the aisle, including SASC Chairman
Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) and Dan Coats (R-Ind.), expressed concern that the courts would “find
inconsistencies in the policies as written,” and interpret them in a way that would hinder the
goal of maintaining military effectiveness and unit cohesion. Id. at 150.
423. Id. (quoting Assessment of the Plan To Lift the Ban on Homosexuality in the
Military: Hearings Before the Mil. Forces & Personnel Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on
Armed Servs., 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993)).
424. Jim Abrams, Associated Press, Nunn, Frank Trade Jabs Over Gays, DETROIT NEWS,
May 31, 1993, at 1A; Rick Maze, Frank Talk About Compromise: Gay Congressman Backs
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” To Avert Gay-Ban Law, ARMY TIMES, May 31, 1993, at 8. These
articles reported on a version of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” proposed by Rep. Barney Frank
(D-Mass.), which would have drawn a line between “on-base” and “off-base” behavior. The
proposal was seen as a way to provide “political cover” to Clinton, but gay activists rejected
it. Marvin Liebman of the radical group Queer Nation, for example, said in response, “We
will not accept compromise. We will not tolerate appeasement.” See id.
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overwhelming, veto-proof bipartisan majorities.425 Instead, Congress
passed a law that continued the pre-Clinton (1981) policy of excluding
homosexuals from the military.426 In so doing, members wisely chose
language almost identical to the 1981 DoD Directives regarding
homosexuality, which had already been challenged and upheld as
constitutional by the federal courts.427 Congress allowed President
Clinton’s “interim policy” of not asking questions of inductees
regarding homosexuality to standwith the provision that a future
Secretary of Defense can restore such questions, without additional
legislation, if the needs of the service require it.428
Legislation dealing with intensely controversial issues does not
become law by accident. In this case, Congress codified the policy in
place long before Clinton took office. Contrary to frequent
misstatements of the law then and now, there is no way that bipartisan,
veto-proof majorities would have passed a law making it “easier” for
homosexuals to serve. Rep. Steve Buyer (R-Ind.), then-Chairman of the
HASC Personnel Subcommittee, underscored the point in a December 16,
1999, memorandum to his colleagues:

425. On Sept. 9, 1993, the Senate approved language in the FY 1994 Defense
Authorization bill that codified the homosexual ban, using language almost identical to that
in the Defense Department directive that had been in place since 1981. See supra note 404
and accompanying text. An amendment offered by Sen. Barbara Boxer (D-Cal.), which
would have allowed the president to decide policy regarding gays in the military, was
defeated on Sept. 9, 1993, on a bipartisan sixty-three to thirty-three vote. S. amend. 783 to S.
1298, 103d Cong. (1993). On Sept. 28, the House rejected a similar amendment, sponsored
by Rep. Martin Meehan (D-Mass.) and Rep. Patricia Schroeder (D-Colo.), which would
have stricken the Senate-approved language and expressed the sense that the issue should be
decided by the President and his advisors. H. amend. 315 to H.R. 2401, 103d Cong. (1993).
The Meehan/Schroeder amendment was defeated on a bipartisan roll-call vote, 264 to 169.
Id.; see also Rowan Scarborough, Schroeder, Meehan Hope To Alter Compromise on Gays
in Military, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1993, at A4; Rowan Scarborough, Gay-Ban Deal Nearer
to Becoming Law, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1993, at A4; Rowan Scarborough, Senators
Reaffirm Gay Ban: Boxer’s Challenge Rejected by 63–33, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1993, at
A1 [hereinafter Scarborough, Senators Reaffirm Gay Ban].
426. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L. No 103-160,
§ 571, 107 Stat. 1547, 1670 (1993) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2000)) (reprinted infra
Appendix A).
427. See Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989); Dronenberg v. Zech, 741
F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see also Scarborough, Senators Reaffirm Gay Ban, supra note
425.
428. See Pub. L. No. 103-160, § 571(d), 107 Stat. at 1673 (reprinted infra Appendix A).
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Although some would assert that section 654 of Title 10,
United States Code . . . embodied the compromise now referred
to as “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” there is no evidence to suggest
that the Congress believed the new law to be anything other than
a continuation of a firm prohibition against military service for
homosexuals that had been the historical policy. The law, as well
as accompanying legislative findings and explanatory report
language, makes absolutely clear that known homosexuals,
identified based on acts or self admission, must be separated
from the military. After extensive testimony and debate, the
Congress made a calculated judgment to confirm the continued
bar to the service of homosexuals in the military. The case
supporting the Congressional position is well documented and
compelling.
....
Those that claim that the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy has
failed simply do not understand the underlying law. The prospect
of a homosexual openly serving in the military was never
contemplated by the Congress and any policy that suggests that
the military should be receptive to the service of homosexuals is
in direct violation of the law.429
c. Conditional Compromise
In the course of debate, Congress considered whether the armed forces
should be required to assume the risk that homosexuals would remain
celibate. The Senate Report addressed the issue directly:
It would be irrational . . . to develop military personnel policies
on the basis that all gays and lesbians will remain celibate. . . .
[W]hen a person indicates that he or she has a propensity or
intent to engage in homosexual acts, the armed forces are not
required to wait until the person engages in that act before taking
personnel action.430

429. Memorandum from Rep. Steve Buyer to Members of the Republican Conference
(Dec. 16, 1999), available at www.cmrlink.org/cmrnotes/buyer121699.pdf.
430. S. REP. NO. 103-112, at 284 (1993) (maintaining that it would be “irrational . . . to
develop military personnel policies on the basis that all gays and lesbians will remain
celibate”).
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The House Report also discussed the possibility of accommodating
homosexuals, provided that they refrain from homosexual acts:
[A]ny effort to create as a matter of policy a sanctuary in the
military where homosexuals could serve discreetly and still be
subject to separation for proscribed conduct would be a policy
inimical to unit cohesion . . . and discipline, unenforceable in the
field, and open to legal challenge.431
Instead of codifying the legally questionable “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”
concept, Congress chose to adopt unambiguous statements that were
understandable, enforceable, consistent with the unique requirements of the
military, and devoid of the First Amendment conundrums that were obvious
in President Clinton’s July 19 proposal.
The only concession made during this process in 1993 was ommision of
“the question” about homosexuality, which President Clinton had
eliminated with his January 29, 1993 “interim policy.”432 Congress
nevertheless authorized restoration of routine inquiries about homosexuality
by a future Secretary of Defense,433 who can (and should) restore “the
question” without additional legislation. This concession did not nullify the
language of the law itself, but it allowed the Congress, which was controlled
by the Democrats at the time, to give political cover to President Clinton by
calling the plan a “compromise” and referring to it as “Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell.” The politically expedient strategy has caused problems ever since.
Widespread misunderstandings about the rationale and meaning of the law
have continued for four major reasons. First, in 1993, major media
inaccurately reported that Congress had passed Clinton’s “compromise” plan
to accommodate homosexuals in the military, known as “Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell.” Reports did not note that the statute actually said something quite
different: “The prohibition against homosexual conduct is a long-standing
element of military law that continues to be necessary in the unique
circumstances of military service.”434 Second, President Clinton had an
431. H.R.REP. NO. 103-200, at 288 (1993).
432. See Memorandum from President Clinton to the Secretary of Defense, supra note
405.
433. See supra note 425 and accompanying text.
434. 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(13) (1993); see supra note 425. The New York Times and The
Washington Post stayed uncharacteristically silent on the historic House vote that occurred
on September 28, 1993. A thorough search of contemporaneous news accounts reveals only
two reports on the House vote for Senate-passed legislation codifying long-standing Defense
Department regulations banning homosexuals from the military. See Michael Ross, House
Backs Modified Ban on Gays in Armed Forces, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1993, at A11; Rowan
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interest in appearing to deliver on his campaign promise to lift the ban on
gays in the military, even though he had not done so. Disregarding the legal
mandate to provide documents and briefings that “set forth” the
provisions of the law, in December 1993, Clinton issued enforcement
regulations that implement his original proposal, “Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell”even though Congress had rejected that concept as unworkable.435
Third, the law passed by Congress is widely misunderstood because no
one gave it a distinctive and appropriate name. Absent a name of its own,
the law that Congress passed was frequently misidentified with the
catchphrase “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” which is easier to remember than
the utilitarian “Public Law 103-160” or “Title 10, United States Code,
Section 654.” And fourth, there was no individual author or descriptive
“short title” for the legislation because the statutory language came
directly from Defense Department regulations, which were promulgated
in 1981.436
To clarify the difference between the law regarding homosexual
conduct and President Clinton’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” enforcement
policy, this Article hereinafter will refer to P.L. 103-160, Section 654,
Title 10 as the 1993 law regarding homosexual conduct in the military, or
“The Military Personnel Eligibility Act of 1993.”
d. The Purpose of the “Military Personnel Eligibility Act of
1993.”
Referring to 10 U.S.C. § 654 as the “Military Personnel Eligibility Act of
1993” is appropriate because the language of the law that Congress actually
passed makes it clear that homosexuals are not eligible for service in the
armed forces. It restates the rationale of the 1981 DoD Directives almost word
for word,437 and sets forth fifteen points in support of the principle that
homosexuality is incompatible with military service.438

Scarborough, Gay-Ban Deal Nearer to Becoming Law, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1993, at A4.
Neither of these reports quoted key legislative language making it clear that the statute does
not authorize accommodation of homosexuals in accordance with Clinton’s controversial
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” proposal. The only “compromise” involved was administrative, not
substantive, since the law authorizes a reinstatement of the induction form “question”
regarding homosexuality at any time.
435. See supra note 429.
436. See 10 U.S.C. § 654 (1993); S. REP. NO. 103-112, at 263–97 (1993); H.R. REP. NO.
103-200, at 287–90 (1993).
437. See supra note 404 and accompanying text.
438. Woodruff, supra note 400, at 135-42.
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Prof. Woodruff explained the rationale behind the 1981 DoD Directives,
which was carried over into the statute passed by Congress in 1993:
The [1981] policy was an exclusion policy premised upon the
policy determination that “homosexuality is incompatible with
military service.” . . . The policy operated on the logical
conclusion that as a class, homosexuals engaged in or were
likely to engage in homosexual activity. In order to reduce, if not
eliminate, the instances of homosexual activity in military units,
the policy excluded from service the category most closely
associated with homosexual activity: homosexuals.439
The law states, “there is no constitutional right to serve in the armed
forces,” and affirms that military life is fundamentally different from
civilian life.440 Military society “is characterized by its own laws, rules,
customs, and traditions, including numerous restrictions on personal
behavior that would not be acceptable in civilian society.”441 Military
standards of conduct “apply to a member of the armed forces at all times
that the member has a military status, whether the member is on base or off
base, and whether the member is on duty or off duty.”442
The law also distinguishes itself from the July 19 “Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell” policy by affirming “[t]he prohibition against homosexual conduct is
a long-standing element of military law that continues to be necessary in the
unique circumstances of military service.”443
The 1981 policy required separation of persons found to be engaging in
homosexual acts, but also those who disclosed by their own statements that
they were homosexuals within the meaning of the DoD Directives.444 The
statute does the same.445 Prof. Woodruff explained:
The admission of homosexuality placed the soldier in an
excluded class; a class defined by conduct or the propensity to
engage in conduct the military determined was inimical to good
order, morale, unit cohesion, and ultimately, combat
effectiveness. Because the definition of homosexual was tied to
sexual conduct rather than to amorphous concepts of sexual
439.
440.
441.
442.
443.
444.
445.

Id. at 132-33 (citation omitted).
10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(2), (a)(8) (reprinted infra Appendix A).
Id. § 654(a)(8)(B) (reprinted infra Appendix A).
Id. § 654(a)(10) (reprinted infra Appendix A).
Id. § 654(a)(13) (reprinted infra Appendix A).
See supra note 404 and accompanying text.
See 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(2) (reprinted infra Appendix A).
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tendencies, preferences, or orientation, the policy presumed that
one who claimed to be a homosexual has, will, or was likely to
engage in the conduct that defines the class.446
As was the case with the 1981 Directives, the 1993 homosexual conduct
law allows a military person to “rebut the presumption” of homosexual
conduct, but only under narrow circumstances—i.e., a service member says
or does something entirely out of character while intoxicated, or to escape
military service. In general, however:
Discharging soldiers based solely upon their self-identification
as a homosexual without additional evidence of homosexual
conduct avoided the necessity for intrusive investigations and
inquiries into the soldiers’ sexual practices. Furthermore,
because it is reasonable to believe homosexuals will engage in
the conduct that defines the class, discharging those who claim
to be homosexuals served the goal of preventing the disruption
and adverse impact upon unit readiness, morale, and discipline
that homosexual conduct within the military environment
causes.447
The “Military Personnel Eligibility Act” recognized the need for military
people to be always ready for possible deployment worldwide to a combat
environment. The statute also respects the power of sexuality and the desire
of human beings for sexual modesty, even when they must accept living
conditions offering little or no privacy.
In gender-neutral terms, the law states that persons living in conditions
of “forced intimacy” should not have to expose themselves to persons who
might be sexually attracted to them.448 To the greatest extent possible, the
same principle applies to the housing of men and women in the military.
Prof. Woodruff noted that the statute’s findings reveal several important
principles that remain unchanged and support the statute’s legitimacy:
First, Congress was acting pursuant to a clear grant of
constitutional power to establish the qualifications and
conditions of service in the military. Second, American society
demands unique rules that may not be the same as those found in
other countries or in civilian society. Third, Congress made clear
the statutory policy was aimed at creating and preserving
446. Woodruff, supra note 400, at 134.
447. 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(1)(A)–(D).
448. Id. § 654(a)(11), (12).
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military effectiveness and cohesion. Noticeably absent from the
findings section is any indication that military readiness was
being balanced against the individual interests of homosexuals
who wished to serve. In other words, combat effectiveness, not
accommodation of homosexuals, either individually or as a class,
was the purpose of the statute. Fourth, Congress set out the
factual predicate for the long-standing professional military
judgment that homosexuality is incompatible with military
service and carried that principle forward into the new law. Both
the House and Senate reports specifically note that the statute
recognizes and adopts the principle that homosexuality is
incompatible with military service.449
The “Military Personnel Eligibility Act” defines homosexual conduct but
avoids using the vague phrase “sexual orientation.” As explained by
Professor Woodruff:
Significantly, Congress did not say that “sexual orientation” was
a private matter or that it was a benign, non-disqualifying factor.
The law did not define “sexual orientation” or try to artificially
separate homosexual orientation from homosexual conduct. . . .
Equally as important, Congress made no mention of passing a
law to accommodate homosexuals or creating a situation where
they could serve under color of law like the July 19, [1993]
policy contemplated.450
It is unfortunate that constant, inaccurate references to the law as “Don’t
Ask, Don’t Tell” have perpetuated confusion about its meaning. As a result
of this mislabeling, many young people who are homosexual are being
misled about their eligibility to serve.
2. Enforcement Regulations Inconsistent with the Law
a. The “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” Policy/Enforcement Regulations
President Clinton signed the “Military Personnel Eligibility Act” on
November 30, 1993, as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1994.451 Two months later, he released enforcement regulations,
known as the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy, which are inconsistent with
449. Woodruff, supra note 400, at 153 (citations omitted).
450. Id. at 154-55 (citations omitted).
451. Pub. L. 103-160, § 571, 107 Stat. 1670 (1993) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2000)
(reprinted infra Appendix A)).
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the law.452 It is significant to note that the DoD news release announcing
regulations to enforce 10 U.S.C. § 654 made reference to the “Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell” policy announced by President Clinton on July 19, 1993. The
release and accompanying documents claimed that the enforcement
regulations were “consistent” with the law, but they were actually written to
implement Clinton’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” proposal, which was not
“consistent” with the law at all.453 Few members of the media noticed (or
chose to write about) the glaring discrepancy, which has been the source of
confusion and controversy ever since.454
Prof. Charles Moskos, the respected military sociologist who proposed
the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” idea in 1993, noted in a Wall Street Journal
article that “[t]he Pentagon policies are, in fact, somewhat more lenient than
the language of the statute.”455 Indeed, the key passage in the Clinton
Administration’s inconsistent interpretation of the law, as stated in this
regulatory language, was an attempt to redefine its meaning to fit Clinton’s
July 19, 1993, proposal: “Sexual orientation is considered a personal and
private matter, and homosexual orientation is not a bar to service entry or
continued service unless manifested by homosexual conduct.”456
The December 22, 1993, news release, an overview, and a memorandum
from Defense Secretary Les Aspin to the Service Secretaries directing them
to implement the new policy, which referred to “the policy as announced by
President Clinton on July 19, 1993,”457 simply overlooked the fact that
Congress had forseen problems with that concept and rejected it. The plain
language of the statute is not based on the vague phrase “sexual
orientation.” It is based on conduct.458
In effect, the DoD attempted to help Clinton deliver on his campaign
promise to gay activists by simply redefining the law and calling it “Don’t
Ask, Don’t Tell.” The Pentagon also failed to comply with the legal
452. See supra note 417 and accompanying text.
453. See DoD News Release No. 605-93, supra note 417 (announcing regulations to
“implement the policy that was announced by President Clinton in July”; claiming that the
new directives were “fully consistent with the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1994”).
454. Rowan Scarborough, Joint Chiefs Were Muzzled on Gay Policy, WASH. TIMES, Jan.
3, 1994, at A1.
455. Charles Moskos, Don’t Knock “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 1999,
at A22.
456. See Dep’t of Defense Directive No. 1332.14, supra note 417, at encl. 3
¶ E3.A1.1.8.1.1.
457. See DoD News Release No. 605-93, supra note 417.
458. Woodruff, supra note 400, at 168 n.255.
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requirement that entering servicemembers should be informed of the law,
10 U.S.C. § 654, which excludes homosexuals from the military. A
subsequent amendment to the DoD Directives changed the wording of the
quoted sentence slightly but still used the phrase “sexual orientation,”
which Congress pointedly had not used in the statutory language because it
was so vague. The Clinton administration’s regulatory interpretation reads:
“A person’s sexual orientation is considered a personal and private matter,
and is not a bar to service entry or continued service unless manifested by
homosexual conduct in the manner described in paragraph B.8.b.,
below.”459 Current briefing materials and training manuals still do not
include the actual text of the law, or accurate summaries of its meaning.
Instead, instructional materials keep repeating the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”
mantra: “Sexual orientation is considered a personal matter and is not a bar
to military service unless manifested by homosexual conduct.”460
b. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
In 1996, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit looked
beyond the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” catch-phrase and recognized the
difference between Clinton’s policy and the law.461 In a nine-to-four
decision that denied the appeal of Navy Lt. Paul G. Thomasson, a professed
homosexual who wanted to stay in the Navy, U.S. Circuit Judge Michael
Luttig wrote about the exclusion law: “Like the pre-1993 [policy] it
codifies, [the statute] unambiguously prohibits all known homosexuals
from serving in the military . . . .”462 Judge Luttig added that the Clinton
Administration “fully understands” that the law and DoD enforcement
regulations are inconsistent and has engaged in “repeated
mischaracterization of the statute itself . . . .”463

459. See Dep’t of Defense Directive No. 1332.14, supra note 417, at encl. 3
¶ E3.A1.1.8.1.1.
460. See, e.g., Center for Military Readiness, Army Comic Book Misrepresents Law on
Gays in the Military (Jan. 14, 2002), http://www.cmrlink.org/Hmilitary.asp?docID=112
(describing an Army comic book titled “Dignity and Respect: A Training Guide on
Homosexual Conduct Policy”); Joel P. Engardio, The Adventures of Capt. GayMan, S.F.
NEWS WEEKLY, Aug. 22, 2001, available at http://www.sfweekly.com/2001-08-22/news/theadventures-of-capt-gayman/print; Office of the Chief of Public Affairs, U.S. Army,
Questions and Answers About Army’s Policy on Homosexual Conduct, HOT TOPICS, Winter
2000, at 6, available at http://www.army.mil/soldiers/HotTopics/winter00.pdf.
461. Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir. 1996).
462. Id. at 937 (Luttig, J., concurring).
463. Id. at 939.
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Actually overruling the DoD enforcement regulations was not within the
purview of the Court. Still, the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Thomasson,
affirming the constitutionality of the law, should have prodded the
Administration to correct inconsistencies in its administrative policy. But
this was the Clinton Administration, which was fully committed to
accommodating homosexuals in the military, one way or another.
c. Confusion Caused by “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”
The difference between what should be called the “Military Personnel
Eligibility Act” and the Clinton enforcement policy explains why factions
on both sides of the issue are critical of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.” Even
though Congress rejected, with good reason, the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”
concept in 1993, the Clinton Administration inscribed it in enforcement
regulations that remain in effect today.
Activists keep complaining that “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” does not work.
The most relevant question is, “Work to do what?” If the goal is to allow
homosexuals to serve, Clinton’s permissive “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”
regulations do not go far enough. But if the goal is to preserve military
morale, discipline, and readiness for combat (and it is), then the Clinton
policy goes too far—in the wrong direction.
Describing the law as “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” effectively slanders
the statute. The result is widespread confusion and inconsistent
enforcement. Whether intended or not, the unnecessary confusion gives an
advantage to activists who want to repeal both the policy and law, in order
to achieve the goal of open homosexuality in the military.
When President George W. Bush took his oath of office in 2001, he
assumed the obligation to enforce all laws, including the 1993 law
regarding homosexual conduct. President Bush is not obligated to retain the
enforcement regulations of his predecessor. Because the “Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell” regulations are inconsistent with the law, President Bush should have
directed the Secretary of Defense, early in his administration, to eliminate
and replace them with enforcement regulations that include the language
and truly reflect the intent of the statute.
The Department of Justice has successfully defended the
constitutionality of the law in several cases, but the Bush Administration
has done little to improve understanding and enforcement of the law.
Unnecessary confusion has continued since December 1994, even though
the “Military Personnel Eligibility Act of 1993” mandates “Entry Standards
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and Documents” and “Required Briefings” that accurately describe the
language and meaning of the statute.464
That mandate could be fulfilled by simply providing to potential
enlistees and military personnel the actual text of the law and its legislative
history, as set forth concisely in the House and Senate Reports issued in
support of the 1993 legislation. This would help to clear up widespread
confusion about potential enlistees’ eligibility to serve, and be a significant
improvement over the convoluted instructional materials prepared by the
Department of Defense to explain Bill Clinton’s inexplicable “Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell” policy. Activist groups and the Department of Defense should
stop misleading young people about their eligibility to serve in the military.
Practicing homosexuals are among many groups of people who may serve
their country in many ways but who remain ineligible to serve in
uniform.465
3. Campaign To Repeal the Law
a. Legal Efforts Post-Lawrence v. Texas
On June 26, 2003, in the controversial Lawrence v. Texas decision,466 the
Supreme Court overturned Bowers v. Hardwick467 and invalidated a Texas
law regarding private, consensual sodomy.468 The decision excited
homosexual activist groups because several members of the Court quoted
foreign court rulings that had been cited in an amicus brief filed by the
United Nations’ High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson.469
The Robinson amicus brief cited one such ruling, handed down by the
European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, France, which upheld gay
rights in Ireland. In 1996, the same European Court quoted by Justice
Kennedy in the Lawrence decision ordered Britain to repeal all restrictions

464. See 10 U.S.C. § 654 (c)–(d) (2000) (reprinted infra Appendix A).
465. Henry Levins, Military Bans Go Far Beyond Gays, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb.
8, 1993.
466. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
467. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
468. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (“Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is
not correct today. It ought not to remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be
and now is overruled.”).
469. See id. at 573; Brief of Mary Robinson, Amnesty International U.S.A., Human
Rights Watch, Interights, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, and Minnesota
Advocates for Human Rights as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 10, Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2004) (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 164151.
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on homosexuals in the military.470 In a January 2003 treatise posted on the
website of Human Rights Watch,471 the $14 million international activist
group signaled its intent to use both European Court decisions and
international law as battering rams to bring down all restrictions on open
homosexual service in the military.472
The Bush Administration vigorously and successfully defended the law,
resulting in three legal victories in 2006. Cook v. Rumsfeld, filed by the
Servicemembers Legal Defense Network on behalf of twelve former
servicemembers, was dismissed by U.S. District Judge George A. O’Toole,
Jr., on April 24, 2006.473 Also, in April 2006, U.S. District Judge George
Schiavelli dismissed a lawsuit brought by the Log Cabin Republicans on
behalf of anonymous past and present servicemembers, due to a lack of
names in the complaint.474 And on July 26, 2006, U.S. District Judge

470. See Lustig-Prean & Beckett v. United Kingdom, 29 Euro. Ct. H.R. 548, 587 (1999)
(finding that plaintiffs were wrongly discharged “on the grounds of their homosexuality”);
Smith & Grady v. United Kingdom, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 493, 523 (1999) (finding that the
applicants were denied “respect for their private lives” when dismissed from military service
on the grounds of their homosexuality).
471. Human Rights Watch: Defending Human Rights Worldwide, http://www.hrw.org;
see also Lawrence v. Texas: Constitutional Right to Privacy of Gays and Lesbians in the
United States, July 2, 2003, available at http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/07/hrw-amicusbrief.
htm.
472. See Human Rights Watch, Human Rights News, U.S. Military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell” Policy Panders to Prejudice (Jan. 23, 2003) [hereinafter Human Rights Watch News
Release], available at http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/01/us012303.htm; HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, UNIFORM DISCRIMINATION: THE “DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL” POLICY OF THE U.S.
MILITARY 38-45 (Jan. 2003) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH: UNIFORM
DISCRIMINATION], available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/usa0103/USA0103.pdf.
473. See Cook v. Rumsfeld, 429 F. Supp. 2d 385 (D. Mass. 2006) (granting
government’s motion to dismiss), reh’g denied, 2006 WL 2559766, No. 04-12546-GAO,
slip op. at *1 (D. Mass. Sept. 5, 2006), appeal argued sub nom., Cook v. Gates, No. 06-2313
(1st Cir. argued Mar. 7, 2007); see also Denise LaVoie, Judge Tosses “Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell” Suit, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 12, 2006, available at http://abcnews.go.com/US/
print?id=1885164; Shelly Murphy, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” Suit Dismissed, BOSTON GLOBE,
Apr. 25, 2006, at B1; Associated Press, Gay Veterans Challenge “Don’t Ask,” AIR FORCE
TIMES, Nov. 14, 2006, available at http://www.airforcetimes.com/print.php?f=1-2929252356305.php.
474. Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, No. 04-08425 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 2006)
(dismissing complaint for lack of standing), refiled sub nom., Nicholson v. United States,
No. 04-08425 (C.D. Cal. May 2, 2006); see also Bob Egelko, Suit Challenging “Don’t Ask”
Dismissed for Lack of Names, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 5, 2006, at B2.
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Ronald B. Leighton dismissed a challenge filed in Washington by an Air
Force Reserve nurse and lesbian, Maj. Margaret Witt.475
All courts are unpredictable, but the 1993 homosexual conduct law
should continue to withstand constitutional challenge for four basic reasons:
(1) the federal courts have historically ruled with “deference to the
military” in such matters; (2) unlike the circumstances of Lawrence, there is
no such thing as “privacy” in the military; (3) the validity of the statute
regarding homosexual conduct does not hinge on the overturned Bowers
precedent; and (4) the 1993 exclusion law and the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ) ban on sodomy applies to men and women in
precisely the same way, so “equal protection” is not a valid issue.
Opening the military to professed homosexuals remains a key goal of a
determined activist movement, which has worked relentlessly to repeal the
homosexual conduct law since 1993. For purposes of clarity in future cases,
it would help to administratively repeal the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”
regulations, while faithfully enforcing the 1993 homosexual conduct law.476
b. Legislative Strategy
Rep. Marty Meehan (D-Mass.), whose amendment to strike
regarding homosexual conduct was defeated overwhelmingly in
introduced legislation to repeal the statute in March 2005478 and
March 2007.479 When first introduced, the bill gained a total of

the law
1993,477
again in
122 co-

475. Witt v. U.S. Air Force, 444 F. Supp. 2d 1138 (W.D. Wash. 2006), appeal docketed,
No. 06-35644 (9th Cir.); see also Gene Johnson, Associated Press, ACLU Plans To Appeal
Ruling on 19-Year AF Veteran, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER (online ed.), July 27, 2006,
http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/local/278980_suit27.html.
476. In Able v. United States, U.S. District Judge Eugene H. Nickerson struck down both
the law and the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy because Justice Department lawyers failed to
justify numerous anomalies in the policy/enforcement regulations. See Able v. United States,
968 F. Supp. 850, 858-61 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), rev’d, 155 F.3d 628 (2d Cir. 1998). For example,
the lawyers could not explain why the military could say that a certain characteristic
(homosexuality) is unacceptable, but persons may join or stay in the military as long as they
do not say they are homosexual. See 968 F. Supp at 858-61. The Second Circuit Court of
Appeals later upheld the law, see 155 F.3d at 628, but such an outcome is by no means
assured in the future. To reduce that risk, the Clinton Administration’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell” regulations, announced on December 22, 1993, should be administratively dropped.
477. H. amend. 316 to H.R. 2401, 103d Cong. (1993) (voting record available at
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/1993/roll460.xml).
478. See H.R. 1059, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. (Mar. 2, 2005); see also Deborah Funk,
Lawmaker Pitches Bill To Let Gays Openly Serve, AIR FORCE TIMES, Mar. 21, 2005.
479. H.R. 1246, 110th Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 28, 2007); see also Ted McKenna, “Don’t
Ask Don’t Tell” Repeal Faces Long Odds, PR WEEK USA, Mar. 2, 2007, at 2.
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sponsors, but did not make it past the House Armed Services Committee.480
Meehan is now Chairman of the House Armed Services Oversight and
Investigations Subcommittee. The number of co-sponsors has increased on
Meehan’s bill, but many of the members signing on seem primarily critical
of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” the Clinton administration’s policy and
regulations that are inconsistent with the 1993 law.481
There is no need for legislation to repeal the problematic enforcement
regulations known by the catch-phrase “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.” President
Bush or the Secretary of Defense can eliminate that Clinton-era policy with
a stroke of the pen. The statute is another matter, requiring an act of
Congress to change the “Military Personnel Eligibility Act” that a
Democratic Congress passed in 1993 with a veto-proof majority. Nothing
has changed that would justify the turmoil that would occur in and outside
of Congress if Meehan’s legislation were seriously considered or passed.
c. Public Relations Campaign
The only thing that has changed since 1993 is an illusion of momentum
for repeal of the law created by a skilled and persistent public relations
campaign that began in 2003, the tenth anniversary of passage of the law.
The campaign was energized by the Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence
v. Texas,482 which the Servicemembers Legal Defense Network predicted
would help them to win the Cook case.483
Every four to six weeks, homosexual activist groups have generated
some sort of “news” event, which usually gets national coverage when it
appears (almost always) in the Associated Press and major papers such as
the New York Times and the Washington Post. These stories, which rarely
describe the law accurately, usually focus on “celebrity” (military)
endorsers or human-interest stories, such as homosexuals who used to be in
the military or gay students trying to enlist in the military.484 Other student
480. H.R. 1059, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. (Mar. 2, 2005) (co-sponsors and status available
at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:h.r.01059:).
481. See McKenna, supra note 479.
482. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
483. See Human Rights Watch News Release, supra note 471.
484. See, e.g., Joseph A. Slobodzian, Walk-In Test Confirms Military’s Gay Ban, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Aug. 2, 2006, available at http://calbears.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_kmtpi/is_
200608/ai_n16603720. The “Right to Serve” campaign of Soulforce, located in Lynchburg,
Virginia, has organized visits to recruiting stations by homosexual men or women who say
they want to enlist. See Soulforce, Right to Serve, http://www.soulforce.org/righttoserve
(last visited Apr. 14, 2007). Camera crews and reporters are invited to witness the contrived
events, which consume the time of recruiters and usually portray them in a negative light.

2010]

CONSTRUCTING THE CO-ED MILITARY

747

groups have protested the homosexual conduct law by trying to keep
recruiters or ROTC units off of high school and college campuses—
sometimes with anti-military demonstrations.485
Activist groups also have visited the military service academies486 and
publicized an award given by the U.S. Military Academy’s Department of
English to a cadet writing a paper advocating the inclusion of gays in the
military.487 In 2004 and 2005, a San Francisco-based group of Naval
Academy graduates calling itself “USNA Out” (later changed to the “Castro
Chapter”) unsuccessfully demanded official recognition for a group of
homosexual alumni.488
The public relations campaign has been advanced most often by periodic
releases of various “studies,” reports, or polls produced, sponsored, or
influenced by the University of California, Berkeley-based Center for the
Study of Sexual Minorities in the Military (CSSMM), now called the

485. See Joe Chenelly, Frontline, Recruiters Stay Away: Protest Prompts Office Closing,
ARMY TIMES, May 30, 2005, at 3; Campus Antiwar Network, Open Letter from the Antiwar
Movement to SFSU President Corrigan (Apr. 19, 2006), http://www.traprockpeace.org/
campus_antiwar_network/index.php/2006/04 (“On Friday, April 14, [2006,] ten SFSU
students protested military recruitment at the university’s career fair. . . . You should be
proud of students who will not condone hate against their peers by a homophobic and sexist
military.”).
486. See Gay Riders To Challenge “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” at West Point, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Apr. 26, 2006; Kristen Wyatt, Protesters Object to Naval Academy Policy on Gays,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 21, 2005.
487. Center for the Study of Sexual Minorities in the Military, West Pointer Wins FirstEver Military Award for Challenging Gay Ban (Aug. 9, 2006), http://www.gaymilitary.ucsb.
edu/PressCenter/press_rel_2006_0808.htm; Thesis Challenges Gay Policy, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Aug. 9, 2006; Roger Brigham, West Point Grad Takes Aim at DADT, BAY AREA
REPORTER (S.F.) (online ed.), Aug. 24, 2006, http://ebar.com/news/article.php?sec=
news&article=1108. The Center for Military Readiness raised questions about the suitability
of this award. Then-Cadet Raggio had every right to express his opinions, but the paper was
thinly sourced and did not even cite or accurately describe the text of the 1993 law. See
CMR Issues Analysis (Oct. 2006), available at http://cmrlink.org/cmrnotes/
analysisraggiothesis.pdf.
488. See Gretchen Parker, Gay Academy Alums To Apply Again for Official Recognition,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 12, 2004; Molly Knight, OK for Gay Group Sought: Naval
Academy Alumni Resume Efforts for Chapter, BALT. SUN, Nov. 12, 2004, at 1B; Jamie
Stiehm, Gay Academy Alumni Seek Anti-Bias Policy: Graduate Association Board Insists No
Such Action Is Needed, BALT. SUN, Nov. 29, 2005, at 5B; see also Gretchen Parker, Naval
Alumni Association Rejects Gay Group, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 2, 2004. Recognition was
not granted because affiliate groups are organized geographically, not by affiliations of
gender, race, service community, or other factors. An affiliated chapter for alumni who live
in recreational vehicles is the exception that proves the rule.

748

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:617

Michael D. Palmer Center, and like-minded groups.489 A closer look at
materials produced by the activist groups usually reveals questionable
methodology and unsupported conclusions.
d. Surveys and Polls
In January 2007, retired Army Gen. John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1993 to 1997, became a “celebrity endorser”
for the gays-in-the-military cause by writing an op-ed for publication in The
New York Times, a newspaper that has been in the forefront of efforts to
repeal the 1993 homosexual conduct law.490 The General’s article drew
attention to a December 2006 poll of 545 service members conducted by
Zogby International, indicating that seventy-three percent of the
respondents said they were “comfortable interacting with gay people.”491
The only surprising thing about this innocuous question was that the
favorable percentage was not closer to one hundred percent. The Zogby poll
asked another, more important question that was not even mentioned in the
news release announcing the poll’s results: “Do you agree or disagree with
allowing gays and lesbians to serve openly in the military?” On that
question, twenty-six percent of those surveyed “Agreed,” but thirty-seven
percent “Disagreed.” The Zogby poll also found that thirty-two percent of
respondents were “Neutral” and only five percent were “Not sure.”492

489. See infra notes 510-12 and accompanying text.
490. John M. Shalikashvili, Op-Ed, Second Thoughts on Gays in the Military, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 2, 2007, at 17.
491. ZOGBY INTERNATIONAL, OPINIONS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL ON GAYS IN THE
MILITARY, DEC. 2006, SUBMITTED TO AARON BELKIN, DIRECTOR, MICHAEL D. PALM CENTER
[hereinafter ZOGBY POLL], available at http://www.zogby.com/news/ReadNews.dbm?ID=
1222.
492. See id. at 14-15. Responses to this question revealed additional findings that
received little notice:
Within military subgroups, the highest agreement rates [supporting gays in the
military] were found among Veterans (thirty-five percent) and those having
served less than four years (thirty-seven percent). The lowest acceptance rates
were among Active Duty Personnel (twenty-three percent), officers (twentythree percent), those serving between ten and fourteen years (twenty-two
percent) and those serving more than twenty (nineteen percent). Active Duty
Personnel were also among those with the highest disapproval rates (thirty-nine
percent), as were those serving between fifteen and nineteen years (forty
percent), those serving more than twenty (forty-nine percent), and officers
(forty-seven percent).
Id. at 6.
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If this poll were considered representative of military personnel, the
twenty-six percent of respondents who wanted the law repealed could not
compete with the combined sixty-nine percent of people who were opposed
to or neutral on repeal. This minority opinion was hardly a mandate for
radical change.
Polling organizations recognize that respondents who believe a policy is
already in place are more likely to favor that policy, while those who know
otherwise are less likely.493 Incorrect assertions that “homosexuals can
serve in the military provided that they do not say they are gay” are
probably skewing polls of civilians, who mistakenly believe that
homosexuals are already eligible to serve, due to the “Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell” policy.
People in the military, however, are more likely to understand what the
law is.494 In the most recent poll announced by the Military Times
newspapers, in response to the question “Do you think openly homosexual
people should be allowed to serve in the military?” thirty percent answered
“Yes,” but fifty-nine percent answered “No,” and ten percent answered “No
Opinion.”495 The same percentage—fifty-nine percent in opposition—was
reported by the Military Times survey in the previous year.496
A closer look at the Zogby poll reveals more interesting details that
should have been recognized by news media people reporting on it.497 First,
the Zogby poll news release clearly states that it was designed in
conjunction with Aaron Belkin, Director of the Michael D. Palm Center,
formerly the Center for Sexual Minorities in the Military.498 This is an

493. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at C-135 (Commissioner
Generated Finding 14) (citing ROPER ORGANIZATION, INC., ATTITUDES REGARDING THE
ASSIGNMENT OF WOMEN IN THE ARMED FORCES: THE PUBLIC PERSPECTIVE (Sept. 1992)).
494. See Robert Hodierne, We Asked What You Think. You Told Us, NAVY TIMES, Jan. 3,
2005, at 14-15 (citing the section on Race, Gender, Gay, Question 6), available at
http://www.militarycity.com/polls/2004_chart3.php. Annual Military Times surveys are done
by mailing questionnaires randomly to subscribers to the affiliated newspapers Air Force
Times, Army Times, Navy Times, and Marine Corps Times. The polls tabulate only responses
from active-duty personnel. Results are published in all four affiliated newspapers.
495. See Robert Hodierne, Down on the War, ARMY TIMES, Dec. 29, 2006, at 12-14. The
Military Times survey was done by mailing questionnaires randomly to subscribers of
affiliated newspapers, but the poll only tabulated responses (954) from active-duty
personnel. Results were published in all four affiliated newspapers.
496. See id. (presenting bar graphs of polling results).
497. See ZOGBY POLL, supra note 491.
498. See id. The cover page and news release were titled “Zogby Poll: ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell’ Not Working.”
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activist group promoting homosexuals in the military.499 Second, the poll
claims to be of 545 people “who have served in Iraq and Afghanistan (or in
combat support roles directly supporting those operations), from a
purchased list of U.S. Military Personnel.”500 However, the U.S. military
does not sell or provide access to personnel lists. Due to security rules that
were tightened in the aftermath of 9/11, personal details and even general
information about the location of individual personnel is highly
restricted.501 Third, the apparent absence of random access undermines the
credibility of the poll, which inflates the claim that, “The panel used for this
survey is composed of over 1 million members and correlates closely with
the U.S. population on all key profiles.”502 Fourth, activists frequently claim
that the greater comfort of younger people with homosexuals is evidence
enough to justify changing the law; however, if that were the case, all
referenda banning same-sex marriage would have been soundly defeated.
On the contrary, the voters of several states have approved twenty-six of
twenty-seven such referenda, often with comfortable majorities.503
499. See The Michael D. Palm Center, About Us, http://www.palmcenter.org/about (last
visited May 10, 2007).
500. See ZOGBY POLL, supra note 491, at 2.
501. Memorandum from Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz to Secretaries of
the Military Departments et al. (Oct. 18, 2001) (addressing “Operations Security Throughout
the Department of Defense”) (on file with author); Memorandum from Office of the
Secretary of Defense, Administration and Management Director D.O. Cooke to DoD FOIA
Offices (Nov. 9, 2001) (addressing “Withholding of Personally Identifying Information
Under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)”) (on file with author). Zogby International
did not respond to a telephone request from this author for more information on its selection
of survey participants.
502. See ZOGBY POLL, supra note 491, at 2. Zogby’s polling sample is somewhat
questionable, but “internal” data in the poll reveals interesting insights on the question of
whether opinions among younger people might make it more acceptable to accommodate
gays in the military. The Zogby poll seems to indicate that opinions on this issue have more
to do with military occupation than they do with age. Active duty people in the younger and
older ranks are more favorable to the idea, but the ones in the middle age and experience
group, who are more likely to be involved in close combat situations, are more strongly
opposed. It is possible that an objective poll of identified military personnelsimilar to the
official survey done by the Roper Organization for the 1992 Presidential Commission on the
Assignment of Women in the Armed Forceswould show similar results. See ZOGBY POLL,
supra note 491, at 14-15; see also supra note 492.
503. See Human Rights Campaign, State Prohibitions on Marriage for Same Sex Couples
1 (Nov. 2006), http://www.hrc.org/TemplateRedirect.cfm?Template=/ContentManagement/
ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=28225 (listing twenty-six states that have a voter-approved
constitutional amendment prohibiting same-sex marriage and nineteen states that have a law
prohibiting same-sex marriage). To date, Arizona is the only state in which voters have
repudiated an attempt to amend a state constitution to ban same-sex civil marriage. See

2010]

CONSTRUCTING THE CO-ED MILITARY

751

e. The National Security Argument: Too Many Discharges of
Homosexuals
Supporters of legislation to repeal the 1993 homosexual conduct law
have tried to reframe their argument in terms of military necessity, rather
than equal opportunity. The “national security” argument for gays in the
military usually centers on the number of discharges of homosexual
servicemen and women that have occurred and suggests that recruiting
problems and shortages could be solved if only the military were open to
professed homosexuals.504
A report done by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) early in
2005 provided statistical data on the number of “unprogrammed
separations.”505 The GAO report essentially estimated the “replacement
costs” of discharging and replacing homosexual service members from FY
1994 through FY 2003 to be approximately $190.5 million.506
Dr. David Chu, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness, responded to the GAO report with a two-page memorandum.507
Figures cited by Dr. Chu indicated that discharges due to the homosexual
exclusion policy between 1994 and 2003 amounted to only 0.37% of
discharges for all reasons (about five percent of unplanned separations)
during that period.508 There were, for example, 26,446 discharges for
pregnancy; 36,513 for violations of weight standards; 38,178 for “serious
offenses”; 20,527 for parenthood; 59,098 for “drug offenses/use”; and 9501
for homosexuality.509
CNN.com, America Votes 2006, Key Ballot Measures, http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/
2006/pages/results/ballot.measures/ (reporting on the failure of Arizona Proposition 107 on
November 7, 2006).
504. John Henren, Ban on Gays in Military Assailed, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2005, at A24;
Josh White, “Don’t Ask” Costs More Than Expected, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2006, at A04;
John Files, Military’s Discharges for Being Gay Rose in ’05, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2006, at
A17.
505. See generally GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, MILITARY PERSONNEL: FINANCIAL
COSTS AND LOSS OF CRITICAL SKILLS DUE TO DOD’S HOMOSEXUAL CONDUCT POLICY
CANNOT BE COMPLETELY ESTIMATED (Feb. 2005) [hereinafter GAO, FINANCIAL COSTS
CANNOT BE ESTIMATED], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05299.pdf.
506. Id. at 3.
507. Memorandum from Dr. David Chu, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel &
Readiness, to Derek Stewart, Director of Defense Capabilities and Management at the GAO
(Feb. 7, 2005), reprinted in GAO, FINANCIAL COSTS CANNOT BE ESTIMATED, supra note 505,
at 42-43.
508. Memorandum from Dr. David Chu, supra note 507.
509. GAO, FINANCIAL COSTS CANNOT BE ESTIMATED, supra note 505, at 42.
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The Berkeley-based Center for the Study of Sexual Minorities in the
Military (CSSMM) was not satisfied with the $190 million dollar estimate.
CSSMM Executive Director Aaron Belkin organized a “Blue Ribbon
Commission,” which he chairs.510 This non-governmental “Blue Ribbon
Commission” claimed in a February 2006 report that the GAO estimate of
“replacement costs” was too low.511 The CSSMM argued that a more
accurate estimate of the costs of discharges for homosexuality would be
$363 millionapproximately $173.3 million, or ninety-one percent higher,
than the GAO estimate.512
The Comptroller General responded by addressing a letter to Sen.
Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) on July 13, 2006, which “stood by” the
original GAO estimate.513 The entire debate about numbers generated
publicity, but it missed the point. The cost of personnel losses related to the
homosexual conduct law, whatever it is, could be reduced to near-zero if all
potential recruits were fully and accurately notified that the 1993 law means
that homosexuals are not eligible to serve. It is bad policy to enforce a
regulatory policy such as “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” which misinforms
potential recruits about the conditions of eligibility and encourages people
to be less than honest about their homosexuality—only to be subject to
discharge later.
The GAO document provided useful information, but you do not get the
right answers if you do not ask the right questions. The issue is not
“replacement cost.” It is the cost of recruiting and training individuals who
are not eligible to serve in the military because they are homosexual.
f.

Contradiction: Too Few Discharges Due to the War

Many of the same people who claim that the military is losing too many
homosexual personnel simultaneously make a contradictory claim:

510. FRANK J. BARRETT ET AL., THE PALM CENTER, FINANCIAL ANALYSIS OF “DON’T ASK,
DON’T TELL”: HOW MUCH DOES THE GAY BAN COST?, at 1, 3 (Feb. 2006), available at
http://www.palmcenter.org/files/active/0/2006-FebBlueRibbonFinalRpt.pdf. In addition to
Prof. Belkin, this non-governmentally authorized, private group includes Lawrence Korb,
Adm. John D. Hutson, USN (Ret.), and other activists supporting repeal of the law regarding
homosexual conduct in the military. The report also acknowledges receiving help from the
offices of Rep. Marty Meehan (D-Mass.) and Sen. Frank Lautenberg (D-N.J.), sponsors of
legislation to repeal the 1993 law.
511. Id. at 2.
512. Id. at 3.
513. Letter from David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, to Sen.
Edward Kennedy (July 13, 2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/htext/d06909r.html.
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Dismissals have declined because gays are needed to fight in the war.514 A
Congressional Research Service Report to Congress discussed this
argument:
Some have claimed that discharges decline during time of war,
suggesting that the military ignores homosexuality when soldiers
are most needed, only to “kick them out” once the crisis has
passed. It is notable that during wartime, the military services
can, and have, instituted actions “to suspend certain laws relating
to . . . separation” that can limit administrative discharges. These
actions, know [sic] as “stop-loss,” allow the services to minimize
the disruptive effects of personnel turnover during a crisis.
However, administrative discharges for homosexual conduct are
not affected by stop-loss. It can be speculated that a claim of
homosexuality during a crisis may be viewed skeptically and
under the policy would require an investigation. . . . [But if] such
a claim were found to be in violation of the law on homosexual
conduct, the services could not use “stop-loss” to delay an
administrative discharge.515
Two news releases from the Center for the Study of Sexual Minorities in
the Military in September 2005 claimed to have evidence that homosexual
service members were being retained to serve the needs of war, despite the
homosexual conduct law.516 But a spokesman at the Forces Command
Army base at Fort McPherson, Georgia, where this evidence allegedly was
found, has countered that argument with a clarification. According to the
spokesman, if a soldier declares himself to be homosexual just prior to a
deployment, an investigation ensues, lasting eight to ten weeks, which may
not be completed prior to deployment. If the investigation does find that a
514. Associated Press, “Don’t Ask” Dismissals Drop in Wartime, WASH. POST, Mar. 24,
2004, at A22; Evelyn Nieves & Ann Scott Tyson, Fewer Gays Being Discharged Since 9/11,
WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 2005, at A01.
515. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, HOMOSEXUALS AND U.S. MILITARY POLICY:
CURRENT ISSUES 9-10 (May 27, 2005) (citations omitted), available at http://www.fas.org/
sgp/crs/natsec/RL30113.pdf.
516. The Michael D. Palm Center, Researchers Locate Army Document Ordering
Commanders Not To Fire Gays (Sept. 13, 2005), available at http://www.palmcenter.org/
press/dadt/releases/researchers_locate_army_document_ordering_commanders_not_to_fire_
gays; The Michael D. Palm Center, Pentagon Acknowledges Sending Openly Gay Service
Members to War (Sept. 23, 2005), available at http://www.palmcenter.org/press/dadt/
releases/pentagon_acknowledges_sending_openly_gay_service_members_to_war_acknowle
dgement_follows_discovery_of_regulat.
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person is homosexual and therefore not eligible to serve, an honorable
discharge is ordered, even if the person is deployed.517
Anecdotes about homosexuals being allowed to remain in the military
demonstrate the need for accurate information on what the “Military
Personnel Eligibility Act” actually says. Commanders who do not
understand or enforce the law should be given accurate information and
support when taking steps to comply with it. Officials who choose to
disregard this law should be held accountable in the same way that they
would be for other failures to comply with duly enacted law.
g. Linguists and the Defense Language Institute
The “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy/regulations have caused widespread
confusion and costly errors, such as the admittance of twelve homosexual
language trainees to the Army’s Defense Language Institute (DLI) in
Monterey, California. Two of the students were found in bed together, and
the others voluntarily admitted their homosexuality.518
All were honorably discharged.519 Gay activist groups decried the
dismissals as a loss for national security. The true loss occurred, however,
when twelve students who were not eligible to serve occupied the spaces of
other language trainees who could be participating in the current war. This
wasted time and money was a direct result of President Clinton’s calculated

517. E-mail correspondence from Major Nate Flegler, Chief, Media Division,
FORSCOM Public Affairs, to author (Nov. 15, 2005) (on file with author).
When a Guard or Reserve unit is mobilized to active duty, Forces Command
Regulation 500-3-3 . . . identifies 35 different criteria that may prevent a
Soldier from deploying with his or her unit. Examples include being
overweight, facing criminal prosecution, or medical problems. . . . Should a
Soldier declare him or herself homosexual, a process defined not by
FORMDEPS but by other regulations is begun to determine the veracity of the
assertion and whether the assertion constitutes grounds to discharge the Soldier
from military service. This process can last eight to ten weeks. . . . While our
spokesman may have been accurately quoted as saying, “they still have to go to
war and the homosexual issue is postponed until they return to the U.S. and the
unit is demobilized,” we wish to clarify that the Soldier’s case is not postponed
until the unit returns. The review process continues while the unit is deployed
and there is no delay in resolving the matter or discharging the Soldier if that is
the resolution.
Id.
518. See Nathaniel Frank, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” v. the War on Terrorism, NEW
REPUBLIC, Nov. 18, 2002, at 18; Op-Ed, Alistair Gamble, A Military at War Needs Its Gay
Soldiers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2002.
519. See Frank, supra note 518.
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action to accommodate homosexuals in the military, despite prohibitions in
the law.
Military specialty schools such as the DLI should not be misusing scarce
resources to train linguists who are not eligible to serve in the military. The
problem here is not the 1993 homosexual conduct law, but “Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell,” a set of inconsistent enforcement regulations that ought to be
administratively eliminated.520
h. Alleged Shortages in Critical Specialties
In July 1994, the Center for the Study of Sexual Minorities in the
Military (CSSMM) claimed the military was discharging valuable
personnel in important military specialties. These included, for example,
“49 nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare specialists; 212 medical-care
workers; 90 nuclear power engineers; 52 missile guidance and control
operators; 10 rocket, missile and other artillery specialists; 340
infantrymen; 88 linguists; and 163 law-enforcement specialists.”521 The
story was based on data that the CSSMM obtained from the Defense
Manpower Data Center (DMDC) by means of a Freedom of Information
Request.522
A closer look at the same data, obtained from the DMDC, reveals several
disparities with those quoted in the “study” released by the CSSMM. For
example, according to the official who provided the same DMDC data to
this author, the category of persons in the “nuclear power” field does not
necessarily mean that all the people in question were “nuclear power

520. On December 11, 2002, the Center for Military Readiness filed a formal Request for
Assistance with the Army Inspector General, asking for an investigation of this waste of
educational resources by authorities at DLI. No response was received. A subsequent
Freedom of Information (FOIA) request, which did not ask for individual information, was
addressed in a letter to the DoD Inspector General on November 17, 2003. The FOIA
request was initially denied and later “answered” with largely blank pages marked with
FOIA exemption code “(b)(7)(c).” That code is used when government officials refuse to
confirm or deny that disciplinary proceedings have taken place.
521. Vince Crawley, Hundreds of Discharged Gays Served in Critical Specialties, AIR
FORCE TIMES, June 12, 2004, available at http://docs.newsbank.com/openurl?ctx_ver=
z39.88-2004&rft_id=info:sid/iw.newsbank.com:AFNB:AFTB&rft_val_format=info:ofi/
fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rft_dat=103F530765572C3E&svc_dat=InfoWeb:aggregated4&req_dat=
0F56A02D68496F45; see also Kim Curtis, Report: Number of Gay Linguists Discharged
Higher Than Thought, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 13, 2005.
522. Defense Manpower Data Center, tables titled “Separations Due to Homosexual
Conduct, FY 1998–2003,” and “Duty Base Facility Identifier, (FY 1998–2003)” (on file
with author).
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engineers.”523 As for the eighty-eight discharged linguists, the list of
“Primary DoD Occupation Code” titles includes, at number 241, “Language
interrogation,” an occupation from which a total of fifteen persons were
separated due to homosexuality. But that is seventy-three persons short of
the number of discharged “linguists” cited. How to account for the
discrepancy? A Duty Base Facility Identifier Table, also provided by the
DMDC, indicates that a total of seventy-three persons were separated from
the Presidio of Monterey, where the Defense Language Institute is
located.524 It is not clear how the CSSMM came up with the the claim that
“eighty-eight linguists” were discharged due to the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”
policy. Fifteen plus seventy-three, coincidentally, equals eighty-eight.
There is no “linguist” category listed among the DMDC categories of
occupations.525
Another round of news reports and hand-wringing commentaries
centered on the loss of “fifty-four Arabic linguists” trained for military
service.526 This number is in a column of personnel losses noted by the
General Accountability Office (GAO) in 2005.527 The referenced number is
broken down, however, by type and level of proficiency of the language
trainees, which varied considerably. Again, the number of language trainees
lost after any time in training could be reduced to near zero if the “Military
Personnel Eligibility Act” were accurately explained and enforced by the
Department of Defense.
i.

The Urban Institute

In September 2004, the Urban Institute, a nonpartisan social policy and
research organization, issued a report estimating that approximately 65,000
gay personnel are now serving in the U.S. military, and another one million
gays and lesbians are veterans.528 Activists frequently cite this report when

523. See id.
524. See id.
525. Id.
526. See, e.g., Mackubin Thomas Owens, Ask, Tell, Whatever?: Gays-in-the-Military
Comes Up Again, NAT’L REV., Apr. 16, 2007; Debra Saunders, Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell for the
Devout, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2007, at A13.
527. GAO, FINANCIAL COSTS CANNOT BE ESTIMATED, supra note 505, at 21.
528. GARY J. GATES, THE URBAN INSTITUTE, GAY MEN AND LESBIANS IN THE U.S.
MILITARY: ESTIMATES FROM CENSUS 2000, at iii (2004), available at http://www.urban.org/
UploadedPDF/411069_GayLesbianMilitary.pdf.
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advocating repeal of the 1993 homosexual conduct law529—sometimes
touting the data as if it is brand new and “solid.”530
The document, however, reveals questionable methodology, based on
presumptions about the percentage of homosexuals in the general
population and about the sexuality of persons interviewed by the census.531
The speculative claim that three percent of women and four percent of men
are homosexual was applied to 2000 census data on the number of persons
of the same sex living in the same household—one of whom is a
“veteran.”532 Citing mathematical computations, the study speculated that
household-mates of the same sex are homosexual.533 Next came the leaping
conclusion that sixty-five thousand gay men and lesbians are serving or
used to be in the military. This number is frequently trumpeted by gay
activists and like-minded journalists, who overlook or fail to mention the
fact that the census does not ask questions about sexual orientation or
behavior. All estimates are based on sheer speculation, dressed up with a
public relations spin.
The Urban Institute report, which was prepared in consultation with the
activist Center for the Study of Sexual Minorities in the Military and the
Servicemembers Legal Defense Network, is more like an urban legend than
a serious piece of scholarship.
j.

Harassment of Homosexuals

Contrary to exaggerated claims by activist groups, more than eighty
percent of homosexual service members discharged since the law was
enacted left the service not because of witch hunts rooting them out but
because of voluntary statements admitting homosexuality. According to a
529. See Joanne Kimberlin, Study Finds 65,000 Gay Men, Women in the Military,
VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Oct. 21, 2004, at A10; Denise M. Bonilla, Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell: A Policy
Under Fire, NEWSDAY, Aug. 6, 2006, at G05.
530. See Deb Price, UCLA Researcher Mines Data To Make Gays Visible, DETROIT
NEWS, Apr. 2, 2007, at 13A. In this article, self-identified gay columnist Deb Price praises
Gary J. Gates, now affiliated with the progressive Williams Institute at the University of
California at Los Angeles, for producing “solid numbers” that will help persuade Congress
to lift the ban on homosexuals in the military. The public relations strategy at work here may
be a reflection of what is known about surveys of public opinion. People are more likely to
favor a policy if they think it is already in place. See supra note 493.
531. GAO, FINANCIAL COSTS CANNOT BE ESTIMATED, supra note 505, at 1-4. The report,
which includes many caveats, concedes that “the census does not ask any questions about
sexual orientation, sexual behavior, or sexual attraction (three common ways used to identify
gay men and lesbians in surveys).” Id. at 1.
532. Id. at 3.
533. Id. at 1-4.
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1998 DoD Task Force report, there were only four cases of antihomosexual harassment reported since 1994.534 Two of those cases
involved anonymous letters that could not be traced.535
In 1999, homosexual activists crafted a polemic campaign that focused
on the brutal murder of Army Pfc. Barry Winchell, an alleged homosexual,
at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, in July of that year.536 The savage killing of
Pfc. Barry Winchell has been cited as evidence that more must be done to
end “hate crimes” and harassment of homosexuals.537
The confessed killer, Pvt. Calvin Glover, assaulted Winchell in the
barracks with a baseball bat on July 4, 1999, several hours after Winchell
had beaten him in a drunken brawl.538 Evidence of Glover’s hostile attitude
toward Winchell, who was involved with a transgender male nightclub
entertainer who appeared to be a woman, was a factor in his trial and
sentencing to life in prison.539 An Army Inspector General investigation
cleared Fort Campbell commanders, but noted poor morale and a tolerance
of underage drinking and anti-gay language by the senior sergeant in the
534. OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL AND READINESS,
REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, REVIEW OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE APPLICATION
AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT’S POLICY ON HOMOSEXUAL CONDUCT IN THE
MILITARY 6 (Apr. 1998) [hereinafter DOD TASK FORCE REPORT 1998], available at
http://dont.stanford.edu/casestudy/appendixG_short.pdf; Dep’t of Defense News Release,
No. 158-98 (Apr. 7, 1998).
535. DOD TASK FORCE REPORT 1998, supra note 534.
536. Jane McHugh, Murder in the Barracks, ARMY TIMES, Aug. 23, 1999, at 12; Jane
McHugh, Second Soldier Implicated in Possible Hate Crime, ARMY TIMES, Aug. 2, 1999, at
8.
537. See Dep’t of Defense News Release No. 432-00, Department of Defense Issues
Anti-Harassment Guidelines (July 21, 2000); Tom Ricks, Pentagon Vows To Enforce
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” WASH. POST, July 22, 2000, at 1A (quoting Carol Battiste, head of
a Pentagon panel set up to review the seven-year-old “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy in
2000). Battiste said that military leaders face a “dilemma” when they try to counter
discrimination against homosexuals, who cannot identify themselves. Id. Ricks added, “One
reason the military establishment continues to be uncomfortable with ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell’ is that it is a policy that is purposely ambiguous, while military culture tends to value
clarity.” Id. Actually, a policy that encourages deception is not workable in any institution.
This is one of the reasons why members of Congress did not vote for the proposal known as
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.” Instead of wringing their hands about “ambiguity” and
“dilemmas,” Pentagon officials should scrap the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” regulations and
issue informational materials that reflect the clarity of the law.
538. Id.
539. See David France, An Inconvenient Woman, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 28, 2000,
available at http://www1.nytimes.com/library/magazine/home/index.html; Brian Dunn,
Private Confessed to “Gay Bash” Slaying, Inmate Says, ARMY TIMES, Sept. 13, 1999, at 16.
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battalion. The report also noted the reluctance of battalion commanders to
ask questions about matters involving alleged homosexuality.540 Military
discipline requires constant awareness of what is happening in military
units, throughout the chain of command. A policy such as “Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell” that discourages the asking of legitimate questions interferes
with sound leadership. In this tragic case, a failure to ask questions
apparently was a factor in the creation of a volatile situation that exploded
with violence. Perpetrators of this crime have been rightly punished, but
there is no need for additional legislation to stop harassment or murderous
assaults—of anyone—in the barracks.
Some recent cases of harassment involving persons of the same sex
deserve closer scrutiny and objective analysis of whether the “Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell” policy created conditions conducive to abuse. For example, the
Associated Press reported that a drill sergeant at Fort Eustis, Virginia, faced
molestation charges for forcing a trainee to dress as Superman and submit
to sexual acts. A Fort Eustis spokeswoman, Karla Gonzalez, confirmed that
Army Staff Sgt. Edmundo F. Estrada, thirty-five-years-old, was accused of
indecent assault, having an inappropriate relationship with a trainee, and
cruelty and maltreatment of subordinates.541
Air Force Captain Devery L. Taylor was convicted and sentenced to
twenty-eight to fifty years in prison for raping four men, allegedly with
date-rape drugs. According to a report in Air Force Times, an investigator
interrogating Taylor, now a convicted serial rapist, said that he would not
540. Jane McHugh, 1st Sgt. Faulted in Report on Gay Beating Death, ARMY TIMES, July
31, 2000, at 8. This article reported on the Army Inspector General’s Investigation of the
July 1999 beating death of Army Pfc. Barry Winchell. The report found that the command
environment at Fort Campbell, Kentucky was generally positive, but the unit in which the
killing occurred suffered from poor morale and a tolerance for underage drinking—a major
factor in the case. According to The Army Times, the report also found that commanders
were frustrated and confused by the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy. Id.
[Some were] afraid to violate military law by retaining soldiers who admit
homosexuality. But they are also afraid that some of these soldiers might be
saying they are gay just to get out of the Army. Either way, commanders are
reluctant to investigate. They fear that looking into the matter would only hurt
unit and soldier morale.
Id.
541. Fort Eustis Drill Sergeant Faces Charges of Molesting Trainees, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Mar. 4, 2007. Sgt. Estrada pleaded guilty to the charges at his court-martial on April
23, 2007, to three counts of mistreating soldiers, as well as to violating regulations not to
develop relationships with subordinates. Associated Press, Sgt. Pleads Guilty to Sexually
Harassing Trainees, ARMY TIMES, May 7, 2007, at 45. He faces six months in prison, a badconduct discharge and reduction in rank. Id.
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ask any questions about the man’s sexual practices because such questions
are not allowed. This statement demonstrated how misunderstandings about
the 1993 homosexual conduct law help to create volatile conditions that
undermine good order and discipline.542 Sexual assault of any kind is wrong
and especially demoralizing in a military setting, where people live in
conditions of “forced intimacy” and are not free to change jobs if someone
threatens them. Such misconduct should not be considered “off limits” to
questioning just because it happens to occur between persons of the same
sex.
k. Foreign Militaries
The Center for the Study of Sexual Minorities in the Military and other
activist groups frequently point to the experiences of other countries, such
as Great Britain, Canada, Australia, the Netherlands, and Israel, which have
no restrictions on professed homosexuals in their militaries.543
The United Kingdom was ordered by the European Court of Human
Rights to open its ranks to homosexuals in September 1999.544 There was
some controversy in the Parliament, but instead of appealing or challenging
the ruling, ultimately the nation complied—something the United States
would be unlikely to do. Contrary to the notion that all has gone well,
European newspapers have reported recruiting and disciplinary problems in
the British military.545
542. See Captain Sentenced to 50 Years for Raping 4 Men, AIR FORCE TIMES, Mar. 12,
2007, at 15; Officer Accused of Rape Says He Rejected Alleged Victim, AIR FORCE TIMES,
Mar. 5, 2007, available at http://buzztracker.org/2005//01/19/cache/441692.html. The March
5 article, reported from Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, reported that in a video of an
interview with Taylor, shown during his February 22 court-martial, an Air Force Office of
Special Investigations investigator told Taylor, “[It] doesn’t concern me if it (the sexual
encounter) was consensual . . . I’m not allowed to talk about your preferences. That has
nothing to do with your military career as far as the people who do my job are concerned.”
Id. This was an astonishing statement for the investigator to have made, particularly in view
of Capt. Taylor’s convictions for raping four men.
543. See Aaron Belkin, Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell: Is the Gay Ban Based on Military
Necessity?, PARAMETERS (U.S. Army War Coll. Q.), Summer 2003, at 108-19.
544. See Lustig-Prean & Beckett v. United Kingdom, 29 Euro. Ct. H.R. 548, 587 (1999);
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH: UNIFORM DISCRIMINATION, supra note 472, at 38; Delight and
Despair at Gay Ban Ruling, BBC NEWS, Sept. 27, 1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
uk_news/458842.stm (reporting that the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights was
“not binding on the UK Government”).
545. See, e.g., BBC News, Deepcut Army Sex Attacker Jailed, Oct. 22, 2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/southern_counties/3634474.stm; Nicholas Hellen, Navy
Signals for Help To Recruit Gay Sailors, TIMESONLINE (London), Feb. 20, 2005,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article516647.ece; Tony Czuczka, Associated
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Canada, Australia, and the Netherlands have cultures quite different from
the United States546 and live under the protection of the American military.
Prof. Charles Moskos has noted that nations without official restrictions on
gays in the military are also very restrictive in actual practice. Germany, for
example, dropped criminal sanctions against homosexual activities in 1969,
but also imposed many restrictions on open homosexual behavior and
imposed career penalties such as denial of promotions and access to
classified information.547 Israel’s situation differs from the United States
because all able-bodied citizens, including women, are compelled to serve
in the military. Israeli soldiers usually do not reveal their homosexuality
and are barred from elite combat positions if they do.548
The CSSMM frequently claims that no problems have been experienced
in all of the countries listed above and is critical of those who support the
ban, demanding that opponents provide “empirical” evidence to support
their case. The irony is that the CSSMM and other activist groups base most
of their arguments on anecdotal information and opinion, largely gathered
from like-minded sources.
In a letter to Parameters responding to a Summer 2003 article by Aaron
Belkin, Maj. Joseph A. Craft, USMC, pointed out that the CSSMM
Executive Director had based his case on interviews with only 104
“experts” in four countries—all of whom were advocates of gays in the
military.549 Wrote Craft,
One of Belkin’s key arguments is that Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell
(DADT) is based on anecdotes and misleading surveys instead of
Press, British Soldier Admits to Assault on Captive, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2005, available
at http://www.buzztracker.org/2005//01/19/cache/441692.html; Michael Evans, War Blamed
As 6,000 Quit Territorial Army, TIMES (London), Oct. 30, 2005, at 2; Michael Evans, Iraq
Factor Takes Toll on the TA, TIMES (London), Oct. 31, 2005, at 8. The reported abuse of
male Iraqi soldiers with a forklift involved forced sexual acts, but details are not known
because of court-ordered gag orders.
546. See, e.g., Kate Monaghan, Dutch Political Party Wants To Normalize Pedophilia,
CNSNEWS.COM, July 26, 2006, http://www.cnsnews.com/ViewSpecialReports.asp?Page=/
SpecialReports/archive/200607/SPE20060726a.html.
547. See, e.g., Otto Kreisher, Few Armies Accept Homosexuals, SACRAMENTO UNION,
June 7, 1993, at A5.
548. See Tom Philpott, In Israel: The Hard Reality—Gays Are Allowed To Serve in the
Military but They Are Not Fully Accepted, ARMY TIMES, Jan. 11, 1993, at 11; Tom Philpott,
Gay Israelis Avoid Ridicule, Get Ahead by Staying in Closet, ARMY TIMES, Jan. 11, 1993, at
13; Charles Moskos, Services Will Suffer If Used for Social Experiments, RICHMOND-TIMES
DISPATCH, Feb. 28, 1993, at F1.
549. Joseph A. Craft, Letter to the Editor, Legitimate Debate or Gay Propaganda?,
PARAMETERS (U.S. Army War Coll. Q.), June 22, 2004, at 132.
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quantitative evidence. . . . Yet Belkin’s article is entirely
anecdotal. It is nothing more than selected quotes from supposed
experts who claim that homosexual integration has had no
impact on unit cohesion or military readiness. A quick review of
the author’s endnotes, cross-checked with an internet search,
reveals the questionable credentials and political leanings of
most of these experts. At one point, Belkin refers to a 1995
Canadian government report, which supposedly indicates that
lifting the ban on gays in the military had “no effect.” However,
his endnote does not cite the report but a “personal
communication with Karol Wenek.”550
The issue of homosexuals in the military is a major political question that
has been dealt with through the political system, as established by the U.S.
Constitution. Major decisions such as this should not be decided by
international courts, federal courts in the United States, or by politicians
who are misinformed about the nature of the 1993 law and the rationale
behind it.
l.

Religious Bias

Finally, advocates of gays in the military have attempted to fire up their
cause by criticizing Marine Gen. Peter Pace, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, who expressed his personal views regarding gays in the military
and personal morality during an interview on March 11, 2007.551 A wave of
name calling and demands for an apology ensued, but Gen. Pace had no
reason to apologize for a law duly enacted by Congress. The statute reflects
the views of people who see the issue in moral terms, but it uses secular
language emphasizing military discipline. Duly enacted laws—including
prohibitions against lying, stealing, and murder—should not be repealed
just because they coincide with religious principles and moral codes such as
the Ten Commandments.

550. Id.
551. See, e.g., Aamer Madhani, Top General Calls Homosexuality “Immoral,” CHI.
TRIB., Mar. 12, 2007, at 1; Group Wants Gen. Pace Apology for Calling Gays “Immoral,”
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 13, 2007; Editorial, Old Prejudice Dishonors New Military
Generation, USA TODAY, Mar. 14, 2007, at 10A; Elaine Donnelly, Gen. Pace vs. PC Police,
WASH. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2007, at B3.
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IV. CONCLUSION
A. The Military/Civilian Connection
Today’s military is not a conservative institution. It is on the cutting edge
of liberal cultural change. Many times in our history the military has
advanced positive social change, especially in the area of civil rights. The
armed forces were very much ahead of the civilian world in overcoming
prejudice against minorities and promoting women to leadership positions
at rates equal to or faster than men.552
Since 9/11, cultural change in the all-volunteer force has accelerated. We
are accustomed to seeing female soldiers in fatigues, boots, and helmets,
piloting aircraft, navigating ships, carrying weapons, and driving humvees
in support of combat operations. We always knew that women were
courageous, but never in our history have we seen so much evidence of
bravery among servicewomen who are choosing to live—and in
unprecedented numbers, diein a man’s very dangerous world. Women
are in our military to stay, and no one is seriously suggesting otherwise.
Given the prominence of gender issues in today’s military, it is wise to
consider the cultural implications of the current course. Pentagon officials,
feminist activists, politicians, media, and bureaucratic forces are uniting to
push for elimination of all of women’s exemptions from direct ground
combat. Many of the same people expect officially mandated acceptance of
professed homosexuals in the armed forces, with career penalties for
anyone who dares to object or show resistance.
Some advocates attempt to wrap their agenda in the flag of military
necessity, but the two social movements share the same hierarchy of values.
Both movements assign higher priority to “equal opportunity”
considerations than they do to the needs of the military. The advocates of
these movements are asking the armed forces to pay any price, and carry
any burden, in order to advance acceptance of their viewpoints and the
career opportunities of a few.
If this paramount standard of review is adopted and applied consistently,
the consequences inevitably will be felt not only in the military, but in the
civilian world as well. In the matter of gays in the military, that is the
552. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at C-131 (Finding 4.24); Army,
Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force Responses to DACOWITS (Spring 2001) (on file with
author); see also Defense Data Manpower Center and Service’s Human Resource Staffs and
Commands, Annual Report on Status of Female Members of the Armed Forces of the United
States, FY 2002–2005, available at http://www.dtic.mil/dacowits/docs/feb2006/
statusofwomenfinal_05.doc (last visited Apr. 21, 2007).
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underlying objective. It is reasonable to ask, where is this powerful and
respected institution taking us now?
1. What Our Military Says About Cultural Values
a. Respect for Women
One of the biggest human interest news stories in recent years was the
mysterious disappearance of eighteen-year-old Natalie Holloway, in 2005,
during a high school graduation trip to Aruba. After months of controversy,
in March 2006, Fox News correspondent Greta van Susteren—who
“owned” the story—interviewed the prime suspect, eighteen-year-old Joran
van der Sloot.553 Experts who watched the three-part interview thought that
the young man came across as surprisingly credible and that he probably
did not kill Natalie. Yet no one analyzed the broader implications and
message conveyed by the young man’s defense. Joran van der Sloot
claimed he was innocent because he left the intoxicated Natalie Holloway
alone, late at night, on a beach in Aruba. His indifference and self-centered
neglect that night did not violate any law. But it did say something about
respect for women and the eroding values of Western Civilization. The
parents of Joran, apparently, did not teach him a fundamental lesson: Good
men protect and defend women. It is a concept that we purge from our
culture at great risk.
In the summer of 1995, near downtown Detroit, Michigan, a 260-pound
man, Martell Welch, brutally assaulted a 115-pound woman, Deletha Word,
on the Belle Isle Bridge. Approximately forty people reportedly watched
but did not intervene when Welch chased Word with a tire iron. The
desperate woman fled and leaped off the bridge to her death.554 At the
conclusion of Welch’s trial in April 1996, foreman William Brown
announced the jury’s maximum verdict: second degree murder. Brown also
made front-page news by reaffirming civilized cultural values. Repeating a
simple maxim that he had learned at his mother’s knee, Brown conveyed a
message that the jury intended to be heard by the young men of the city of
Detroit: “Never hit a woman. You can’t go around battering young ladies.
The people aren’t going to take it anymore.”555 With that unequivocal
statement, the thirty-two-year-old security guard demonstrated civilized
cultural values. If mothers everywhere taught the same lesson to their sons,
violent crime rates would drop significantly.
553. On the Record (Fox News Broadcast Mar. 1–3, 2006).
554. Melinda Wilson, Belle Isle Bridge Death Was Murder, Jury Says, DETROIT NEWS,
Apr. 30, 1996, at 1A.
555. Id.
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In contrast to the two stories above, the campaign to force young women
into or near the violence of close combat depends on psychological
acceptance of the idea that men can and should place women in physical or
mortal danger.556 Even in some forms of military training, men have to
learn to “hit” female trainees and not think twice about it.557 Kate O’Beirne,
as a member of the Presidential Commission and now an author, forcefully
defended Western cultural values and civilization on the issue of violence
against women. Feminist advocates had difficulty answering Commissioner
O’Beirne’s compelling argument, which she restated in 2006:
Good men protect and defend women in the face of a physical
threat. If men in uniform are going to be expected to be sex blind
when it comes to protecting their comrades, American mothers
will have to get to work instructing their sons that it’s okay to hit
girls. Women have no “right” to serve in combat if their presence
puts the men they serve with in jeopardy because these decent
men are determined to protect the weaker sex. Instructors at the
military’s [Survival, Evasion, Resistance & Escape (SERE)]
school for pilots saw that male students reacted more negatively
to the simulated torture of female trainees and concluded that the
men would have to be trained to inure themselves to the plight of
women in pain.558
Feminists recognize the vulnerability of women when they are
concerned with the plight of women who are victims of domestic
abuse. . . . Their position on integrating combat ranks puts them
in the position of saying that violence against women is a terrible

556. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at C-127 (Finding 4.13). The
commission established that different assignment policiesallowing women the option of
volunteering for close combat but not the burden of being involuntarily assignedwould
have a deleterious effect on morale.
557. Pamela Martineau & Steve Weigand, A Dad Soldiers On, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar.
9, 2005, available at http://dwb.sacbee.com/content/news/projects/women_at_war/story/
12533035p-13388315c.html. An accompanying photo by Renee C. Byer shows 2nd Lt.
Emily Morris in training at Fort Lewis, Washington. Lt. Morris is trying to break away from
her instructor, Sgt. Keith Chesser, who has her pinned to a mat with his large hand throttling
her neck. Id.
558. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at C-45–46 (Findings 1.48–1.50)
(referencing SERE trainers’ testimony before the Commission on June 8, 1992).
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thing unless it is at the hands of the enemy, in which case it’s a
welcome tribute to women’s equality.559
b. Cultural Amnesia and the “New Chivalry”
Do we as a nation still believe that good men protect and defend women?
The answer is unclear. In the military, traditional chivalry has been replaced
with a peculiar form of “new chivalry.”560 The new concept promotes
professional paternalism, as defined and provided by “victim advocates”
who get paid to help women who encounter problems in the brave, new,
gender-free world.561
The military service academies have become a prime market for
professionally paternalistic Department of Women’s Studies graduates who
are seeking to become a growth service industry in the DoD and military
bases everywhere.562 Many officials in Congress, the Pentagon, and the

559. KATE O’BEIRNE, WOMEN WHO MAKE THE WORLD WORSE AND HOW THEIR RADICAL
FEMINIST ASSAULT IS RUINING OUR SCHOOLS, FAMILIES, MILITARY, AND SPORTS 119-20
(2006). Mrs. O’Beirne is the Washington Editor of National Review.
560. Duke Selwyn, The New Chivalry, AMERICANTHINKER.COM, Jan. 5, 2006,
http://www.americanthinker.com/2006/01/the_new_chivalry.html.
So, the great white knight of chivalry is supposed to be dead, slain by the
feminist dragon of androgyny. . . . You see, while [the] old chivalry’s habitat
has been denuded, relegating it to a few pristine bastions of traditionalism, it
has not left a void. It has been replaced. Replaced by a new chivalry . . . . Like
the old chivalry, the new version involves social codes and social pressure to
enforce them, but also much, much more. The new chivalry has also been
written into law; it is embodied by affirmative-action and set aside programs
that favor women, and by legislation such as the Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA), which now serves as a vehicle through which to empower and fund
feminist groups.
Id.
561. While misogyny or women hating is politically incorrect, misandry or men hating is
socially acceptable. American Enterprise Institute scholar Christina Hoff Sommers notes that
“gender feminists” relentlessly portray women as “victims” by frequently concocting
evidence that cannot stand up to scrutiny. See CHRISTINA HOFF SOMMERS, WHO STOLE
FEMINISM? 11-25 (1994).
562. See DEFENSE TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 11-19, 27. The Task Force
Report recited a long list of officials and institutions that are available for the support of
(alleged) victims of sexual harassment or assault. At all three military service academies,
these include chaplains, psycho-therapists, medical staff and family support counselors,
military and civilian “victim advocates,” volunteer crisis support organizations and offices
with various names, judge advocates who provide counsel and prosecutors on campus,
associated civilian hospitals and law enforcement agencies, academy boards of visitors and
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service academies are eager to establish ubiquitous “victim advocate”
offices, staffed by professionals who vow to protect military women from
the slightest form of harassment, real or imagined.
The same officials simultaneously promote the deliberate exposure of
military women to extreme abuse and violence in close, lethal combat,
where females do not have an equal opportunity to survive or to help fellow
soldiers survive. Some observers think this is acceptable because the
women volunteered for military service and knew what they were getting
into. Indications are, however, that many female recruits are not being
informed, prior to enlistment, that regulations no longer exempt women
from assignments known to involve a “substantial risk of capture.”563 Nor
are the female recruits being told that their “job description” might involve
involuntary placement in ground-combat-collocated units, despite
regulations requiring those units to be coded for men only.564 Army
officials have been misleading members of Congress and female recruits
about the possibility of involuntary placement in ground-combat-collocated
units since 2004, primarily by playing word games in order to justify the

superintendents, plus numerous Defense Department officials charged to enforce DoD
directives guaranteeing numerous rights to persons deciding to pursue legal remedies.
563. See Thomas, supra note 58; Kris Axtman, Guard Recruiters Try Realism and
Succeed, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 12, 2006, at 1 (reporting on a seventeen-year-old
girl who tells a recruiter: “‘I don’t want to do the military thing. I don’t want to be trained or
none of that.’ . . . ‘I just want to go to college.’” When the recruiter assured her that she
“won’t be on the front lines because women are not allowed in combat positions,” the girl
said, “‘OK, I want to go. I’m ready.’”).
564. See also E-mail and telephone correspondence from Pfc. Stephanie Filus and her
father to author (Jan. 2005–June 2006) (on file with author). Spec. Filus had served as an
Army light wheeled vehicle mechanic for twelve years, but she had no desire to be placed in
or near direct ground combat. Recruiters had assured her that that would never happen. But
in December 2004, officers of the 101st Airborne at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, told Filus and
several other female soldiers that their next deployment would involve placement in a
forward support company (FSC), with an infantry company headed to Iraq. The local
officers assured the female soldiers that they would be “assigned” to a support unit at the
brigade level, so nothing would change. Filus was aware, however, that the FSC would be
physically attached and collocated with an infantry maneuver battalion, despite the
collocation rule. Her attempts to obtain a discharge prior to that deployment were denied,
and she was sent to Fort Polk, Lousiana, for pre-deployment training. Filus finally obtained
her discharge from the Army in May 2005, but only after she took the desperate and
dangerous step of attempting suicide with pills in front of the commanding officer at Fort
Polk.
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illicit “employment” of women in certain support units that collocate, or
embed, with all-male infantry battalions.565
The general public is confused and conflicted. Allegations of sexual
abuse in the military inspire outrage, but news stories about unprecedented
numbers of women killed and injured in the war are met with stoic and
resigned acceptance. This reaction was presaged in 1992 by prisoner of war
survival (SERE) instructors, who favored repeal of all exemption rules. The
SERE trainers told the Presidential Commission that the culture would have
to change before great numbers of women could be sent into combat.566 A
type of “de-sensitization,” similar to coping mechanisms that are taught to
men in training scenarios simulating abuse of female captives, would have
to occur in the nation.567
565. See Cathy Booth Thomas, Taken by Surprise: This Single Mom Joined the Army To
Be a Cook. How Did She Become a POW?, TIME, Apr. 7, 2003, at 64; Axtman, supra note
563.
566. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at C-45 (Finding 1.50
(referencing June 8, 1992 testimony of SERE trainers regarding heightened sensitivity of
men when women are subjected to simulated abuse)); id. at C-46 (Finding 1.51 (also
referencing testimony of SERE trainers, who said that there was no sexual abuse of male
U.S. POWs substantiated from the Vietnam conflict forward)).
567. Id. at C-45–C-46 (Findings 1.50–1.51); id. at 103 (Trip Report Summary of
Commissioner Elaine Donnelly). During her two-day trip to Fairchild AFB, Washington,
August 9–11, 1992, Donnelly talked to instructors about their realistic “rape scenario,” in
which male trainees are taught to manage more intense feelings when a female colleague is
threatened with sexual assault or worse, so that enemy captors cannot exploit those
emotions. Donnelly described parts of the SERE training that she saw at Fairchild Air Force
Base during her visit:
Without knowing what to expect, I found myself locked in a cramped black
box that was both physically and psychologically uncomfortable. I also
participated in and witnessed interrogation exercises designed to suggest but
not duplicate the physical and emotional stress of being a POW. As the night
wore on, a sense of cultural dissonance began to overcome the camp’s logic of
equality in the simulation of brutality.
A woman I watched being interrogated was very capable, but she was totally
in the power of a man much stronger than she. What I saw was an unmistakable
element of inequality that—in the opinion of many Commission witnesses—
cannot be overcome by peacetime training programs or psychological
techniques. As the interrogation continued, it was easy to visualize the
possibility of sexual abuse as well as physical harm at the hands of a menacing
enemy. For reasons of survival, the SERE training for aircrew members makes
sense. . . . However, the politically-correct unisex nature of the resistance
training is very seductive; it is easy to become “desensitized,” meaning
accustomed, to the idea that men and women are interchangeable equals in a
world of torture and abuse. The SERE trainers asserted that the entire nation
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Are we already there? An insightful New Yorker cartoon, showing a
group of bureaucrats discussing disturbing news while seated around a
conference table, may be close to the truth. In the caption one of the men
says to the others, “Let’s just sit tight till the cultural amnesia sets in.”568
There are several reasons, including cultural amnesia, that explain why
the public reaction to the numbers of women killed in the current war has
been somewhat muted. One is that people understand the power of
international media and the Internet. We are reluctant to react in a way that
encourages murderous anarchists in Iraq to deliberately target more of our
women for capture, brutality, and death.569 Another reason is that many
Americans find it hard to believe that a Republican administration would
ignore or contradict the president’s stated position that women should not
be in land combat. And we respect the sacrifices of our female soldiers. No
one wants to say anything that might add to the grief of the families.
Reaction is also diffuse because news stories about the deaths and injuries
being suffered by our women usually appear only in the soldiers’
hometown newspapers, with little information provided. Rarely do we hear
heartbreaking details, such as circumstances surrounding the death of Staff
Sgt. Kimberley Voelz, who lost her life during a courageous attempt to
defuse a bomb in Iraq.570

must prepare itself for this very real possibility if women are assigned to
combat positions.
Id.; see also id. at C-46 (Finding 1.51 (finding that there was no sexual abuse substantiated
of male U.S. POWs from the Vietnam conflict to the time of the panel’s inquiry)).
568. P.C. Vey, Let’s just sit tight till the cultural amnesia sets in., NEW YORKER, Oct. 14,
2002 (cartoon), available at http://www.cartoonbank.com/product_details.asp?sitetype=
1&sid=52827.
569. In the aftermath of Abu Ghraib, there were reports that Iraqi insurgents, enraged by
photos from Abu Ghraib, wanted to kidnap and kill an American woman for purposes of
revenge. Rowan Scarborough, Zarqawi Targets Female Soldiers, WASH. TIMES, July 1,
2004, at A01.
570. Chris A. Courogen, She “Died in His Arms,” PATRIOT NEWS (Harrisburg, Penn.),
Dec. 16, 2003, at A01; David Zucchino, Equal Right To Fight, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2004, at
A1. On December 13, 2003, a male soldier escorted Staff Sgt. Voelz, an explosive ordnance
disposal expert, to disarm a device taped to an electrical tower. When the bomb exploded,
shrapnel ripped her body, nearly severing her left arm and lower leg. Her husband, a soldier
also on duty nearby in Iraq, rushed to her side, and she died in his arms. As of May 2007,
more than seventy-five American military women have been killed in Afghanistan, Iraq, and
Kuwait. See Center for Military Readiness, Grim Toll of Military Women Lost in War (Feb.
27, 2007), http://www.cmrlink.org/printfriendly.asp?docID=288.
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A news report from Britain reflects a kind of concern about combat
violence against women that has been muted in the United States.571 Two
women, a nurse and an interpreter, were among four soldiers killed in a
bomb attack near the southern Iraq city of Basra.572 Col. Bob Stewart, who
was the first British commander of UN forces in Bosnia, said that he was
against women being close to combat as their deaths or injuries had a
debilitating effect on male soldiers.573 “It’s disquieting for a lot of people in
this country when women are put into the front line because when they are
wounded or killed, the men around them find it very difficult to operate.”574
Col. Stewart added that he had twice been present when women soldiers
died.575 “One was in my arms after a bomb in Northern Ireland and I was
inconsolable afterwards. I could not operate. If you put women in the front
line because they are equal then you have to expect that there will be
operational casualties.”576
In the New Gender Order, we are not supposed to care about female
soldiers any more than we do about male soldiers, who die in far greater
numbers. Some men who resent feminists take it a step further, expressing
eagerness to see more female soldiers injured and killed in combat. “You
wanted equal rights,” they argue. “Why shouldn’t you be expected to lose
limbs, bleed, and die in combat along with the men?” This attitude
represents a small but significant cohort of men, which was detected in a
survey of Army men and women done for the Presidential Commission by
one of its members, noted sociologist Charles C. Moskos, Ph.D.577 Prof.
Moskos and his Northwestern University colleague, doctoral candidate
Laura Miller, identified a group of survey respondents that they called

571. Thomas Harding, Outrage As Two Female Soldiers Die in Basra, TELEGRAPH
(London), Apr. 6, 2007, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/
news/2007/04/06/wireaq 06.xml.
572. Id.
573. Id.
574. Id.
575. Id.
576. Id.
577. Charles C. Moskos & Laura Miller, 1992 Survey on Gender in the Military, Aug.
28, 1992, presented to the Presidential Commission by Moskos and Miller on Sept. 10, 1992
(transcript on file with author); see also Kathleen Parker, Separate the Genders During
War?, JEWISH WORLD REV., Mar. 28, 2007, available at http://www.jewishworldreview.
com/kathleen/parker032807.php3?printer_friendly (describing the simmering resentment of
women among some men in the military, which results when they are forced to pretend that
women are or should be “equals” in combat); cf. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 5, at C-114 (Findings 3.31, 3.32).
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“egalitarian sexists” or “hostile proponents.”578 These were men who
advocated forced combat for women for vindictive reasons.579
A West Point graduate challenged that attitude: “Ninety years ago, the
Titanic men gave their lives for the women and children ‘because it was the
civilized thing to do;’ now women are masculinized to serve in wars for
American males [who are] relaxing at golf and tennis clubs declaring it
‘progress.’”580
Syndicated columnist Kathleen Parker has expressed similar concerns:
[O]ur military is gradually weaning men of their intuitive
inclination to protect women—which, by extrapolation, means
ignoring the screams of women being assaulted. At the point
when our men can stand by unfazed while American
servicewomen are raped and tortured, then we will have no cause
to fight any war. We will have already lost.581
c. Untold Consequences of Family Separation
This “progress” has affected not only women, but thousands of young
children left behind while their sole parent, one parent, or both are deployed
to the war zone—sometimes for a year or more. The military does regular
assessments of the impact of military operations on wild animals, birds, and

578. See Moskos & Miller, supra note 577.
579. Id. Ms. (now Dr.) Miller commented that some men said, “Well, yeah, I’m for
women in combat. Let them fall on their faces.” Id. When asked to explain further she
added,
[The egalitarian sexists] said those comments directly. Let them go out there
and see how hard it is and then they won’t want to be in combat; that it’s just a
principle, they are just complaining on the principle. They don’t really want to
do it, so if you just open it up then we won’t have to deal with the issue. They’ll
get themselves killed and we won’t have to hear from those women
anymore. . . . It’s also a sort of treatment of like a third gender of Army women.
I mean, they say, “Oh, those aren’t real women,” and they talk about them in
different terms, so it’s not like they’re really sacrificing women in that case.
They still have, you know, this sense of traditional women elsewhere and that
those are women to be gotten rid of.
Id. Prof. Moskos estimated, subjectively, that about one-third to one-half of male
respondents favoring women in combat shared this view. Id.
580. Letter from W. Edward Chynoweth to author (July 14, 2005) (on file with author).
Mr. Chynoweth graduated from the United States Military Academy at West Point in 1946
and earned graduate degrees from the University of California at Berkeley and Stanford
University.
581. Kathleen Parker, The Mother of All Blunders, WASH. POST, April 7, 2007, at A13.
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whales.582 In contrast, thousands of children are being conscripted for an
unprecedented social experiment, but there have been few studies done or
revealed that have examined the psychological effects of prolonged
wartime separation on children and their parents.583
The last time the subject was officially researched at all was in 1992,
when several experts in the fields of child psychology, psychiatry, and
human development presented testimony to the Presidential Commission.584
Some witnesses focused on the impact of long-term wartime separation on
children. Others described the coping mechanisms of deployed mothers—
including deliberately setting aside their maternal feelings while abroad—

582. See Kenneth R. Weiss, Navy Gets 2-Year Exemption to Sonar Limits, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 24, 2007, at A21; Editorial, Degrading Our Military, FORBES, Sept. 15, 2003, at 25;
Marc Kaufman, Sonar Used Before Whales Hit Shore, WASH. POST, Aug. 31, 2004; Marc
Kaufman, Whale Stranding in N.C. Followed Navy Sonar Use, WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 2005,
at A03.
583. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at C-117 (Finding 3.39). The
smaller Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS), established
with a new charter in 2002, has produced several reports that deal with family issues, but has
not followed up on research available. In its 2004 Report, for example, DACOWITS made
reference to “studies [that] have found a significant negative relationship between
deployment-related parental absence and one or more aspects of children’s well-being.” See
REPORT OF THE DACOWITS 32-33 (2004) [hereinafter DACOWITS 2004 REPORT]
(referencing Michelle L. Kelly, The Effects of Deployment on Traditional and
Nontraditional Military Families: Navy Mothers and Their Children, in MILITARY BRATS
AND OTHER GLOBAL NOMADS: GROWING UP IN ORGANIZATIONAL FAMILIES (M.G. Ender ed.,
2002) (finding that “[a]bout 12 percent of children of deployed mothers exhibited
internalizing behavior scores in the clinical range, compared to 1 percent of children of nondeployed mothers”)). The DACOWITS made several recommendations for reducing the
impact of long-term separation on children, but the committee apparently has not pursued
those proposals. See DACOWITS 2004 REPORT, supra, at 76-77.
584. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at C-118 (Finding 3.43).
Child development experts agree that the psychological and emotional effects
of parental separation on young children is [sic] greatly increased when there is
a risk of death in war. Their research demonstrated that separation from the
primary caregiver (mother or father, mother in particular) greatly reduces a
child’s feelings of security. An infant/toddler who does not have a secure
attachment is less likely to explore his/her surroundings and relate to others.
The mother is most often cited by experts as the preferred and most critical
parent for childcare. After prolonged and/or repeated separations, attachment
theory research showed that children tended to be more depressed and anxious,
and less willing to re-attach to the parent upon reunion.
Id.
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and the difficulty of reestablishing those feelings upon their return,
especially when the child emotionally withdraws.585
There have been many recent reports of emotional scars in military
families, indicating that this subject ought to be studied in more depth.586
Instead, the DoD continues to subsidize and encourage the recruitment and
deployment of single mothers and moms with large families, buying into
the politically correct notion that it makes no difference who does the
soldiering and who does the mothering.
2. Rumpelstiltskin Recruiting
In addition to personal patriotism, fathers and mothers join or stay in the
military for the same reasons they work in any occupation. But in the
military, generous education, housing, and medical benefits serve as an
almost irresistible magnet for single parents with custody, the greater
proportion of which are mothers.587 Gender-based recruiting quotas increase
numbers of deployable mothers even more, especially in the National

585. Testimony of Dr. Jay Belsky, Penn State University, Before the Presidential
Commission (June 9, 1992) (on file with author) (“[W]e have this new emergency language
of child development. All we hear about is their resilience. Lost is a language of
vulnerability. And I contend to you, every time you hear resilience spoken, you will hear
simultaneously, really, a driving motivation, which is an adult’s career development.”); see
also PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 55-56 (Issue H: Parental and
Family Policies, Alternative Views).
586. See, e.g., Donna St. George, Yearning To Be Whole Again, WASH. POST, Nov. 24,
2006, at A01 (describing the effects of war on a single mother soldier and her family);
Pamela Martineau & Steve Wiegand, Scarred Survivors, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 8, 2005,
available at http://www.truthout.org/docs_docs_2006/112406X.shtml; Pamela Martineau &
Steve Weigand, A Dad Soldiers On, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 9, 2005 (describing what
happened when Lt. Emily Morris’s soldier husband was called up for duty at the same time
that she was—their six-year-old son, Julian, threw all of his toys out of his bedroom, and
hung a sign on the door reading “No dog, no toys, no aunt, no mom, no dad.”), available at
http://www.sacbee.com/content/news/pprojectrs/women_at_war/v-print/story/12528269p13383679c.html; Shia Kapos, Internal Wars: Family Separation Adds Another Layer of
Stress for Women Serving in the Military, CHI. TRIB., May 26, 2004, at C1.
587. Quarterly Data Collection on Non-Deployables, DAPE-MPE (Dec. 15, 2002) (on
file with author) (quoting Dr. Betty D. Maxfield, Chief, Army Demographics Office, G-1,
Q.6) (“In FY 02, 36,531 Soldiers are single with children. Of that number, 26,495 are male
(or 72.5% of total) and 10,036 are female (or 27.5% of total). The latter figure is
disproportionate to the number of women in the Army.”); see also Sandy Davis, Single Mom
Has Right Stuff for U.S. Army, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE, June 23, 2001, at 1A;
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at C-116 (Finding 3.35).
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Guard, which allows single parents with custody to sign up for deployable
positions.588
In this and many other situations involving single- or dual-service
parents, family subsidies that are needed to support stable families have had
the unintended effect of creating more unstable families. As in the civilian
world, when you subsidize something you get more of it.
Due to pressures from feminists inside and outside of the Pentagon, the
military seems incapable of striking a more reasonable balance between the
needs of three parties at interest: (1) the mother, who wants a good job and
career advancement; (2) field commanders, who rely upon the readiness of
deployable personnel; and (3) the children, whose needs for mother-care
have not changed to conform with feminist theories.
The military’s answer to this monumental problem is to throw money at
it. Millions of defense dollars are spent on expensive, heavily subsidized
childcare—the largest system in the nation. Family support is a necessity in
the all-volunteer force, sixty percent of which is composed of married
people.589 Funds spent to sustain stable families have also attracted
thousands of young custodial single parents. Many of these young families
live beneath the poverty line, and depend on food stamps as well as
financial support and benefits from the DoD.590
The job of recruiters is tough enough, without having to spend more time
and money recruiting female trainees, who drop out at higher rates.591
Pressures from the Pentagon, however, have forced recruiters to become
like the fairy tale character Rumpelstiltskin—offering help to young women

588. National Guard units used to serve primarily within the borders of individual states,
but in the early 1990s, Guard missions were expanded to include overseas deployments in
combat zones. The Army’s liberal policy of inducting single parents drew national attention
in 2003, when Spec. Simone Holcomb, an Army National Guard medic and mother of seven
children in a “blended” family, was called to duty in Iraq at the same time as her Army
husband. See, e.g., Associated Press, Army Medic, Mom Faces Punishment: Carson Soldier
Refuses To Leave 7 Kids, COLO. SPRINGS GAZETTE, Nov. 6, 2003, at 1. The problem actually
began years earlier when the Guard recruited Holcomb as a single mother of three or
possibly five children—the exact number is not known due to military privacy rules. For the
same reason, the ages of the children could not be revealed.
589. Allan Carlson, The Howard Center for Family, Religion & Society, Families and
War: Two Cautionary Tales, 16 FAMILY AM. 2 (Oct. 2002).
590. Id. at 3. According to Dr. Carlson, direct and indirect military expenditures for child
care tripled in the decade prior to 2002. Id. He added, “Although military people are more
likely to be married than others in their age group, young service couples are 64% more
likely to be divorced by age 24 than comparable civilian couples.” Id.
591. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at C-96 (Finding 2.6.3C).
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in need, with painful separations from their children being the ultimate
tradeoff later on.592
This does not mean that mothers should not serve in the military, but
some situations are less workable and acceptable than others, especially
where the needs of the child are concerned.593
Pentagon leaders need to acknowledge this reality. It is not sound policy
to perpetuate false assurances and illusions about the psychological
resiliency of children, while assigning lower priority to the most important
needs of the military.
B. Constructing a Stronger Military
1. Recommendations for the Secretary of Defense
When former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld gave his farewell
address at the Pentagon in December 2006, he said that the single worst day
of his time in office occurred when he learned of the Abu Ghraib prisoner
scandal in Iraq.594 This was not a military defeat, but it put the American
forces on the defensive and diverted untold thousands of man-hours for
intense damage control.
An internationally scandalous breakdown in discipline as serious as Abu
Ghraib is likely to happen again. One way to guarantee that result is to
allow social engineers to continue volatile social experiments with
servicemen and women, conducted without accountability or objective
evaluation. Unlike the mechanical engineers of NASA, social engineers do
592. For a summary of the tale of Rumpelstiltskin, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Rumpelstiltskin (last visited Apr. 21, 2007).
593. During the first Persian Gulf War, many dependent care plans fell apart, forcing
many soldiers to leave their children behind in makeshift care arrangements. Sen. John
Heinz (D-Penn.) and other members of Congress sponsored “Gulf Orphan” bills, which
would have allowed one parent in military couples and single parents to exempt themselves
from combat voluntarily. See, e.g., S. 325, 102d Cong. (1991). The Senate voted against the
bill and instead passed a non-binding resolution sponsored by Sen. John Glenn (D-Ohio)
calling for the Pentagon to develop consistent regulations regarding military couples, single
parents and newborn children. S. amend. 7 to S. 320, 102d Cong. (1991); see also Helen
Dewar, Senate, Yielding to Pentagon, Rejects Parent Exemption Plan, WASH. POST, Feb. 21,
1991, at A27. The Presidential Commission recognized, however, that changes in family
policies should be implemented long before a major war begins. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 5, at C-134–C-135 (Findings 10-13); id. at 15-18 (Issue H: Parental and
Family Policies, Recommendations); id. at 54-56 (Issue H: Parental and Family Policies,
Alternative Views).
594. Robert Burns, Rumsfeld Bids Farewell to Pentagon, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 8,
2006.
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not even try to learn from their mistakes. And when something bad
happens, they blame men (not women) who “don’t get it,” instead of
accepting responsibility for their own policies.
The social engineering blueprint for an ungendered military incorporates
elitist assumptions, Amazon myths, double standards, social fiction, highlevel dissembling, and arrogance held together with a fragile web of
carefully spun public relations. It is a shaky structure, not stable enough for
what must be the strongest military in the world.
To reinforce the social infrastructure of our military, the Secretary of
Defense should:
x

Be vigilant.

x

Take these issues seriously.

x

Set forth sound priorities, putting the needs of the military
first.

x

Mandate complete candor about the consequences of cultural
change in the military, forbidding retribution or career
penalties for anyone expressing inconvenient truth.
a. End Illusions in Military Basic and Advanced Training

In a 1997 article published by The Weekly Standard, former Secretary of
the Navy James Webb, now the junior Senator from Virginia, wrote about
the importance of getting candid, firsthand information from military
commanders who have to deal with the consequences of sexual misconduct
in the military:
Consider the commander who knows that the culprit in such
situations is not one or a half-dozen individuals, but a system
that throws healthy young men and women together inside a
volatile, isolated crucible of emotions—a ship at sea or basic
training, to take two notable examples. Whom does this
commander tell if he believes that the experiment itself has not
worked, that the compressed and emotional environment in
which these young men and women have been thrust together by
unknowing or uncaring policymakers actually encourages
disruptive sexual activity?
....
Present-day generals and admirals, constantly under political
pressure, sometimes unsure of where to draw the line between
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military and civilian control, often constrained by legal edicts,
and wishing to be fair to those females who do perform well,
have issued unenforceable orders rather than confront the
politicians who dreamed them up. They have muddled about for
years from incident to incident while many junior leaders have
been forced to deal directly with impossible, ethically
compromising positions.595
In 1981, President Ronald Reagan summarily ended a five-year
experiment with co-ed basic training in the Army. Women were suffering
too many injuries, and men were not being challenged enough.596 The
Marines retained separate-gender training, which continues to be superior
for teaching discipline to both men and women during and after basic
training.
In 1993, Army officials reinstated co-ed basic training and introduced
various types of gender-norming techniques to disguise physical
differences. An editorial cartoonist illustrated the illogic of this by
portraying ten beribboned Army generals sitting around a conference table:
“It’s agreed then,” says the presiding general. “We will reduce the physical
requirements of warfare so that women may participate.”597
A Marine officer serving in Fallujah addressed that illusion directly:
Please think about this: when things really go wrong, that is not
the time to remember why the military has upper body strength
requirements. When there are casualties, no soldier or Marine
should die because his buddy couldn’t get him to safety because
she wasn’t strong enough.598
The Secretary of Defense should:

595. James Webb, The War on Military Culture, WEEKLY STANDARD, Jan. 20, 1997, at
17.
596. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at C-71, C-78 (Findings 2.1.5,
2.4.1A).
597. Peter Steiner, It’s agreed then. We will reduce the physical requirements of warfare
so that women may participate., WASH. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1996. During the 2000 presidential
campaign, the American Legion magazine asked then-Texas Gov. George W. Bush about his
views on co-ed basic training. Candidate Bush replied, “The experts tell me, such as
Condoleezza Rice [formerly a member of the Kassebaum-Baker Commission], that we ought
to have separate basic training facilities.” Bill Gertz & Rowan Scarborough, Inside the Ring,
WASH. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2003, at A7.
598. E-mail from senior Marine officer serving in Iraq to author (July 20, 2005) (on file
with author).
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x

Take this matter out of the hands of social engineers and
restore separate-gender basic training without apology or
further delay. Mixed-gender training occurs at advanced
levels, but new recruits need to concentrate on learning the
basics first.

x

Require the various services to maintain height, weight, and
physical capability standards that are commensurate with
occupational demands in time of war and are not obscured
by evaluations of entire groups in training. The National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 mandated
“Gender-Neutral Occupational Performance Standards,” but
none have yet been established.599

x

Direct all military officials responsible for physical training
that, if it is necessary to have different, gender-normed
grading systems for men and women in order to avoid
disproportionate injuries among female trainees, they must
avoid describing the standards as “the same” or “identical,”
because “equal effort” is not the same as “equal results.”

x

Instruct advanced training commands that special
concessions and double standards involving women (DSIW)
are not acceptable, particularly in aviation and other forms of
training for hazardous positions on land, sea, and in the air.
b. Restore Compliance with Policy and Law

The issue of women in combat should not be treated as a “women’s
issue.” It is condescending, if not sexist, to treat these issues as less
important than other matters of Defense policy. DoD regulations regarding
women in combat were set forth in 1994, and the services are obligated to
comply. Army officials do not have the right to rewrite, redefine, bend,
break, or contrive rules on their own. Nor should Pentagon bureaucrats
expect junior officers to resolve contradictions and confusion caused by
high level officials who are trying to shift their own responsibilities
elsewhere.

599. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L. No 103-160,
§ 543(a)(1),(3), 107 Stat. 1547, 1660 (1993).
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“Fem fear”600 is an emotion that grips the hearts of men who are terrified
that feminists—including women on the Armed Services Committees—
might get angry at them. The Defense Secretary has to be prepared to take
some heat, but ultimately it is much easier to defend coherent policies that
are based on sound principles than it is to satisfy implacable ideologues.
Solid information can be produced to support constructive directives, but
only if the Secretary asks the right questions and insists on complete,
candid answers.
“Fatherly favoritism” is another emotion that seems to be influencing
some policies in the military. A number of Pentagon policymakers have
daughters in uniform—some of them graduates of the military academies
who want to follow their dads’ footsteps into flag rank.601 Paternal feelings
are understandable, but they are the last reason why a policymaker should
take a position either for or against women in ground combat.
Even if direct combat experience were required for promotions (it is not),
fatherly favoritism is not a good enough reason to send other women into
combat. Nor should these policies be influenced primarily by the opinions
of wives or female officers seeking promotions.
Absent intervention by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the
Army’s assignment system has become needlessly confused and chaotic.
Field commanders are expected to accommodate female soldiers in
formerly all-male units, coping with personnel losses that are common in
gender-mixed support units.602 At the same time, junior female officers are
600. This term was first used by Marine Staff Sgt. Charlotte Crouch. See Charlotte
Crouch, “Fem Fear” Widening the Corps’ Gender Gap, NAVY TIMES, Sept. 30, 1996, at 29.
601. Confidential personal conversations between individuals at the Pentagon and author
(Summer 2004).
602. E-mail from ground-combat soldier to author (Dec. 11, 2006) (on file with author).
The soldier wrote that a forward support company (FSC) associated with his former unit was
“totally [gender-]integrated,” resulting in two pregnancies for the first time in the history of
the battalion. Id.; see also E-mail from ground combat solider to author (Dec. 9, 2006) (on
file with author).
On another note, the line between the FSC and our battalion has completely
broken down. Females from the FSC’s are being attached to all male infantry
and armor companies with no regard whatsoever. Interestingly, this same FSC
is now having its [rank omitted] and one of its senior NCO’s fired over sexual
misconduct. This is a pretty tremendous shock for a company and it will
definitely shake, if not ruin, the confidence in the company’s chain of
command for the foreseeable future. . . . Those of us who are combat arms
officers are not envious of the FSC commander’s job who has to hold his
company together after his [rank omitted] has been taken down.
Id.
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being allowed to assign female soldiers almost anywhere they please.603
Male officers rarely are asked what they think about all this, but if they are,
their answers appear to be influenced by career considerations.604
It is a demoralizing situation, unguided by policy or law, and another
example of DSIW. If (when) another explosive international incident
involving our military occurs, people will wonder why the Pentagon
officials did not see the “perfect storm” coming.605
Some observers insist that regulations do not matter anymore because
there is no “front line” in the current war. But in the last major mobilization
of American ground forces, the Persian Gulf War, there was a violent “front
line” attack to liberate Kuwait. It is impossible to predict what the
requirements of the next war will be, but even in the current war the
missions of direct ground combat troops, such as the infantry, Special
Operations Forces, and Marine infantry, have not changed. “Tip of the

603. Jontz & Dougherty, supra note 143; Tyson, For Female GIs, Combat Is a Fact,
supra note 122 (describing the actions of Lt. Col. Cheri Provancha, who decided to “bend”
(actually break) Army rules by allowing a female soldier, Spec. Jennifer Guay, to serve as a
medic for an infantry company of the 82nd Airborne).
604. E-mail from combat-experienced officer in Iraq to author (Oct. 26, 2006) (on file
with author) (explaining that some male officers enhance their careers by enthusiastically
embracing feminism in the military).
I guess something I have not really mentioned is the NCO responsibility for
implementing bad policy. Senior officers come up with bad ideas and as much
as the good NCO’s know it will not work, they feel professionally obligated to
implement it because that is what they do. They are just as, or even more
reluctant to fight bad policies for the sake of their careers and many feel that at
a certain time, it is not worth fighting the system.
Id.
605. E-mail from deployed infantryman in Iraq to the author (Dec. 11, 2006) (on file with
author) (explaining the risks of gender integrating Military Training Teams).
The Iraqis, as you know, are not prepared to deal with women in a professional
capacity. They have no EO or sensitivity training. Women to them are almost
cattle and they will see no problem in making aggressive sexual advances,
particularly since American women are seen as petite and exotic. The tough girl
attitude loses its charm when a 300 man battalion of Iraqis have no problem
groping, leering and raping a gung ho female American. The CA [Civil Affairs]
team . . . replaced a team with a female captain. What happened to the previous
team illustrates the very worst that could happen to an integrated MTT team.
The female CA captain was sleeping with all of the powerful local Iraqi
contacts. She compromised her mission and her team. She was removed and
her disgraced team replaced. Who knows how much classified information she
could have given away. At the very least, her team was unable to do its job.
Id.
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spear” ground-combat troops should not be managed as if they are the “tip
of the spoon.”
DoD regulations are clear, but Army officials keep arrogating to
themselves the power to order young female soldiers into units that are
required to be all-male. Because responsible decisions on this issue are long
overdue—and are too important to be decided without accountability—the
Secretary of Defense should:
x

Direct Army officials to comply with current DoD
regulations regarding female soldiers, including the
collocation rule.

x

Ensure compliance in new units requiring close combat
experience and readiness, such as small combat Military
Transition Teams (MTTs), which train male Iraqi troops in
combat skills.

x

Order a reevaluation of some positions, such as the military
police, to determine areas that resemble direct ground
combat. To ensure compliance with regulations, it may be
necessary to divide the occupational title to reflect current
realities.

x

Direct female search team (FST) leaders to begin the process
of training Iraqi women to assist their own forces in doing
searches of female Iraqi civilians.

x

Instruct Army officials that if they want to change or repeal
the 1994 Aspin regulations, including the collocation rule,
they first must obtain the written approval of the Secretary of
Defense. (This responsibility is too important to be delegated
to a subordinate.)

x

Provide formal notice of proposed regulation changes to
Congress well in advance, as mandated by law, together with
the legally required analysis of the consequences for
Selective Service obligations.

x

Provide long-overdue information to Congress on how many
female soldiers have been physically placed in groundcombat-collocated units—and explain why this has been
permitted.

x

Dismiss or demote civilian and military officials who are
responsible for any shortages of male soldiers for the combat
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arms, and those who have ordered the placement of female
soldiers in units that are required to be all male.
x

If the Army is allowed to continue status-quo placements of
women in or near formerly all-male units, the Secretary
should issue a formal news release announcing that female
soldiers can and will be assigned involuntarily in or near
direct-ground-combat units, such as the infantry. This
information should be posted in all recruiting offices.

x

Officials who are reluctant to provide this information
publicly should honestly assess why they are reluctant.
c. Recruit To Meet Requirements

If there is a greater need of men for the combat arms, the President
should speak directly to young men and ask them to consider serving in
uniform. In the years since 9/11, the President has yet to issue such a call,
but it is likely that sufficient numbers of young men would respond
affirmatively if he were to do so.
The various branches of the services are required to recruit people to fill
anticipated needs. The military service academies have the responsibility to
tailor the makeup of each incoming class, and the service departments make
assignments of graduates to meet current and future requirements. The
Secretary of Defense should:
x

Instruct leaders of the various services to adjust recruiting
goals and drop gender-based quotas, in order to provide the
proper “inventory” of soldiers for commanders in Iraq and
Afghanistan, including those responsible for combat training
Military Transition Teams (MTTs).606

x

Protect the volunteer force by defending, without apology,
the right of access for recruiters and ROTC units at high
schools and colleges.607

606. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 mandated an end to
gender quotas, goals, and ceilings. See Pub. L. No 103-160, § 543(a)(2), 107 Stat. 1547,
1660 (1993).
607. The “Solomon Amendment,” legislation passed in 1996 to protect access for
recruiters, was upheld by the Supreme Court on March 6, 2006. See Forum for Academic &
Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR) v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006); see also Guy Taylor,
Colleges’ Military Bans Rejected, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2006, at A1.
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Instruct all military service academy superintendents to
increase the number of cadets and midshipmen who are
eligible for the combat communities that are needed most:
Combined infantry/armor battalions, Special Operations
Forces, Marine Infantry, Navy SEALS, and submarines.

x

Instruct all recruiters that they should provide accurate
information about the risks involved in military service—
i.e., that there are no laws exempting women from “combat”
and regulations regarding women do not exempt them from
being “In Harm’s Way.”

x

Encourage recruiters to spend primary time and effort with
the cohort of people who are most likely to sign up and
finish basic training—i.e., young men, who are also needed
in greater numbers for the combat arms.
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d. Encourage Discipline, Not Indiscipline
Both civilian and military policy makers have the responsibility to set
conditions so that troops in the field can succeed. Given the many social
disruptions that have occurred in recent years, Pentagon policy makers have
a responsibility to deter similar incidents in the future. A senior Marine
officer wrote,
As for [sic] the unit cohesion argument is concerned, you cite
studies. I can tell you, first hand, that females and males in
forward deployed units do not mix well. Flirtations and
relationships on ships and remotely deployed units do have an
adverse effect on morale and unit cohesiveness. We deal with it
every day here in Iraq.608
Behavioral perfection is beyond the human condition; personnel policies
should encourage discipline rather than indiscipline. The Indiana National
Guard has provided a small but significant demonstration of how sound
policies can work to reduce incidents of misconduct.
In 2005, the Indiana National Guard was dealing with serious allegations
of rape and sexual misconduct between military recruiters and teenagers.
The GAO reported 629 confirmed cases of sexual misconduct in FYs 2004
and 2005. The Associated Press reported that the highly inappropriate

608. E-mail from senior Marine officer in Fallujah, Iraq, to author (July 20, 2005) (on file
with author).
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incidents involved trusting girls—and some boys—who were offered
alcohol and sexual attention in the recruiting stations after hours.609
The GAO also reported that only ten percent of the allegations of sexual
misconduct were substantiated or corroborated (629 of 6602).610 Even if the
remaining ninety percent of cases were discounted by half, a large portion
of the recruiters were being falsely accused.
Instead of panicking and sacking any recruiter accused of misconduct,
the Indiana Guard adopted a policy, called “No One Alone,” which
addressed both problems: sexual misconduct and false allegations of the
same. This policy simply states that adult recruiters may not be alone with
teenage prospects in offices, cars, or anywhere else. If they are, or if they
fail to report another recruiter’s misconduct, they risk immediate
disciplinary action. Wallet-sized “Guard Cards” advise parents and students
of the rules and a telephone number to call if they experience anything
improper.
As a result of this sensible program, which deters inappropriate conduct
and discourages false accusations, morale is more secure, community trust
is up, and misconduct reports are down.611 The Congress included language
in the report accompanying the 2007 Defense Authorization Act,
encouraging the Defense Department to adopt the Indiana National Guard’s
“No One Alone” policy as a DoD standard.612
Policies to deter sexual misconduct between adults are more complicated
but have a better chance of succeeding if they acknowledge human failings,
instead of operating on the assumption that men and women are
interchangeable beings who can be perfected with a few “sensitivity
training” sessions run by “victim advocate” professionals. The Secretary of
Defense, the service chiefs, academy superintendents, and all military
installations should:
609. Martha Mendoza, Preying on Recruits, NAVY TIMES, Sept. 4, 2006, at 14-16; James
Gillaspy & Dan McFeely, Military Recruiter Accused of Sex Assaults, INDIANAPOLIS STAR,
Mar. 1, 2005, available at http://www.notinourname.net/youth/recruiter-sex-assault-1mar05.
htm.
610. GOV’T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MILITARY RECRUITING, DOD AND SERVICES NEED
BETTER DATA TO ENHANCE VISIBILITY OVER RECRUITER IRREGULARITIES 19 (Aug. 2006),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06846.pdf.
611. See Elaine Donnelly, Remedies for Recruiter Abuse, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2006, at
B3.
612. Rick Maze, Lawmakers Want Tougher Recruiting Rules, AIR FORCE TIMES, Oct. 4,
2006, available at http://www.airforcetimes.com/story.php?f=1-292925-2150102.php; H.R.
REP. NO. 109-702 (2006) (Conf. Rep.); see also Bryan Bender, Pentagon Acts To Crack
Down on Recruiter Misconduct, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 19, 2007, at A1.
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x

Adopt social policies that are rooted in reality, not social
fiction.

x

Enforce “No One Alone” policies for all recruiters who work
with teenagers and potential recruits for all the services.

x

End or discourage gender-mixed housing arrangements and
other situations that encourage unprofessional relationships,
including the use of alcohol.

x

Decline requests for funding of an “office of victim
advocate” in the Pentagon, and avoid mandates to needlessly
increase such services, which are readily available at the
local installations.

x

Investigate all reports of sexual misconduct or abuse, having
respect for the privacy of a person alleging abuse prior to the
filing of a complaint, but also providing full protection for
the rights of the accused after a complaint is filed.
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e. Respect for Family and Cultural Values
At times in history our leaders have had no choice but to send young
men to fight. We do have a choice, however, about sending women and
single mothers. America is a large and patriotic country; there is no
demographic or military reason why we must send so many young women
and mothers to fight our wars.
Since the September 11, 2001 attacks on America, some individuals,
including single and dual-service parents, have been rotated in and out of
the war zone several times, on deployments lengthened by several months.
It is long past time for policymakers to implement policies that alleviate the
psychological damage done to emotionally vulnerable children. There are
several things that the Secretary of Defense should do to address these
problems:
x

Review and revise all family policies that do not provide a
reasonable balance between the interests of the parent, field
commanders, and vulnerable children.613

x

Order appropriate DoD offices to consider or act upon the
various recommendations regarding family issues that were

613. Single parents who want to join the active duty force frequently surrender custody
of their children to others in order to sign up.
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made by the Presidential Commission in 1992, but not
implemented.614
x

Order the National Guard and Reserves to revise recruitment
policies and benefit subsidies, which have the effect of
increasing the number of single parents with custody, and
the number of dependent children separated from their
parents during lengthy deployments.

x

Issue guidelines for disciplining military personnel who fail
to make secure arrangements for the care of their children.

x

Conduct and release studies of military post-traumatic stress
disorder, which monitor and report on gender differences,
plus additional studies providing information on the impact
of long separations on military parents and children.
f.

Enforce the 1993 Homosexual Conduct Law

Activists who want to repeal the law banning homosexuals from the
military are determined to impose their agenda on the military. This would
include the full range of benefits and “sensitivity training” programs
designed to promote acceptance of the homosexual lifestyle and conduct.615
For the sake of civilian institutions as well as the military, they should not
be allowed to succeed.616

614. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 54 (Issue H: Parental and
Family Policies, Alternative Views).
In order to reduce the number of children subjected to prolonged separation or
the risk of becoming orphans during deployment, long-term DoD policies
regarding the recruitment, deployment and retention of single and dual-service
parents should be revised on a phased-in basis. Such policies should allow for
voluntary or involuntary discharges at the discretion of local commanders, or
reasonable incentives for separation. They may also include waivers by local
commanders in certain circumstances.
Id.
615. See supra note 411.
616. Closing scenes in the 1947 film Miracle on 34th Street suggest a strategy for the
movement to gain legitimacy. The classic Christmas film ends happily when a kindly
gentleman named Kris Kringle is recognized as Santa Claus by the U.S. Postal Service,
which forwards thousands of children’s letters to him. If another respected government
agency, the U.S. military, bestows legitimacy on the campaign for homosexual rights,
recognition would soon be extended to other federal, state, and local agencies, and even
private institutions that receive public support.
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President George W. Bush is obligated by the U.S. Constitution to
enforce all laws, but he is not required to retain administrative regulations
written by his predecessor, including the policy known by the catch phrase
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.” Whether intended or not, inconsistencies between
Clinton’s policy and the 1993 homosexual conduct law create an advantage
for activists who want to repeal both.
In doing this, the Department of Defense should not apologize or be
intimidated by civil rights analogies and pejorative accusations. Gen. Colin
Powell, who was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff early in the Clinton
Administration, wrote a classic letter addressing the subject to then-Rep.
Patricia Schroeder (D-Colo.) in 1993. Dismissing Schroeder’s argument
that his position reminded her of arguments used in the 1950s against
desegregating the military, Gen. Powell replied:
I know you are a history major but I can assure you I need no
reminders concerning the history of African-Americans in the
defense of their nation and the tribulations they faced. I am part
of that history. . . . Skin color is a benign, non-behavioral
characteristic. Sexual orientation is perhaps the most profound of
human behavioral characteristics. Comparison of the two is a
convenient but invalid argument.617
Columnist Charles Krauthammer agreed:
Powell’s case does not just rest on tradition or fear. It rests on the
distinction
between
behavioral
and
non-behavioral
characteristics. Skin color is a non-behavioral trait.
Homosexuality is not.
Consider the behavioral implications of gender differences:
Men and women are sexually attracted to each other and sexual
attraction engenders feelings not just of desire but shame and a
wish for privacy. . . .
That is why if a white person refuses association with blacks,
the military tells him that the refusal is irrational and will not be
respected. But the military does respect the difference between
men and women. Because the cramped and intimate quarters of
the military afford no privacy, the military sensibly and non-

617. Elmo R. Zumwalt & J.G. Zumwalt, Schroeder Ignores Wise Advice from Powell,
HUM. EVENTS, June 1, 1992.
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controversially does not force men and women to share
barracks.618
In recent years, advocates of gays in the military have been promoting
the idea that sexual modesty does not matter, since modern military
facilities provide more privacy than older ones. Even if people are exposed
to others in the field, they say, younger people are used to it, and this is not
a big deal.619 This is an elitist argument, which is contradicted in numerous
ways that usually escape notice.
A midwestern family-oriented recreation center, for example, has
separate locker rooms for men and women, next to the community pool.
Inside the entrance of the women’s locker room is a sign clearly stating that
boys of any age are not permitted. A similar sign, regarding girls, is posted
in the men’s locker room. The signs are there not as an affront to young
boys (or girls). They are there because the community respects the desire
for sexual modesty in conditions of forced intimacy. This is the case even
though people who use the recreation center do not live and sleep there for
months at a time.
Servicemen and women in the military deserve the same consideration,
and much more. As columnist Thomas Sowell wrote, “Military morale is an
intangible, but it is one of those intangibles without which the tangibles do
not work.”620 Military people depend on policymakers to remember basic
realities and to guard their best interests. Considerations such as this
strengthen vertical cohesion—the indispensable bond of trust between
military leaders and the troops they lead.
To ensure that the intent of Congress is carried out with regard to
homosexuals in the military, the Secretary of Defense should:
x

Improve understanding and enforcement of the law by
eliminating the Clinton Administration’s enforcement
regulations, known as “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” which are
inconsistent with the 1993 law that Congress actually
passed, and (better yet) restore “the question” about
homosexuality that used to be on induction forms prior to
January 1993.

618. Charles Krauthammer, Op-Ed, Powell Needs No Lectures, WASH. POST, Jan. 29,
1993, at A23.
619. Aaron Belkin & Melissa Sheridan Embser-Herbert, A Modest Proposal, 27 INT’L
SEC. 178 (Fall 2002).
620. Thomas Sowell, The Anointed and Those Who Aren’t, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1993,
at E3.
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x

Oppose any legislative attempt to repeal the 1993
homosexual conduct law in Congress.

x

Ensure that the 1993 statute is vigorously defended every
time it is challenged in the federal courts.

x

Prepare and distribute accurate instructional materials for
potential recruits, recruiters, and all military personnel that
include the text and legislative history of the 1993 law.

x

Remind the media that everyone can serve his or her country
in some way, but not everyone is eligible to be in the
military.
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2. The Only Military We Have
Many institutions in civilian life have been affected negatively by
unsuccessful social experimentation. The baby boomer and “Gen-X”
generations, for example, have been subjected to “look-say” reading, “new
math,” and “civics” courses that fail to teach students fundamentals about
history and the U.S. Constitution. In matters of urban policy, whole cities
have been threatened by unrestrained crime, ruinous taxes, and crumbling
neighborhoods.
Parents who are dissatisfied with the public schools can choose private
ones or teach their children at home. If residents do not like the way their
city is being managed, they can run for local office or move to another city.
Some states gain population while others lose. Consumers constantly
choose favored products over less desirable ones. This is a free country, and
limitless choices are always available.
When it comes to national defense, however, there are no options from
which to choose. Today’s volunteer force is the only military we have. All
of our freedoms are guaranteed by a strong national defense, which cannot
be taken for granted in a dangerous world.
Our national security depends on the men and women of the military.
For our own sake as well as theirs, the co-ed military must be constructed
on foundations that are sound. We have to get this right; it is the only
military we have. Ours is the strongest military in the world, and we have
an obligation to keep it that way.
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APPENDIX A
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1994, PUB. L.
NO. 103-160, § 571, 107 STAT. 1547, 1670 (1993) (CODIFIED AT 10 U.S.C.
§ 654 (2000))
(a) Codification.—(1) Chapter 37 of title 10, United States Code, is
amended by adding at the end the following new section:
§ 654. Policy concerning homosexuality in the armed forces
(a) Findings.—Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Section 8 of article I of the Constitution of the United
States commits exclusively to the Congress the powers to
raise and support armies, provide and maintain a Navy, and
make rules for the government and regulation of the land and
naval forces.
(2) There is no constitutional right to serve in the armed
forces.
(3) Pursuant to the powers conferred by section 8 of article I
of the Constitution of the United States, it lies within the
discretion of the Congress to establish qualifications for and
conditions of service in the armed forces.
(4) The primary purpose of the armed forces is to prepare for
and to prevail in combat should the need arise.
(5) The conduct of military operations requires members of
the armed forces to make extraordinary sacrifices, including
the ultimate sacrifice, in order to provide for the common
defense.
(6) Success in combat requires military units that are
characterized by high morale, good order and discipline, and
unit cohesion.
(7) One of the most critical elements in combat capability is
unit cohesion, that is, the bonds of trust among individual
service members that make the combat effectiveness of a
military unit greater than the sum of the combat effectiveness
of the individual unit members.
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(8) Military life is fundamentally different from civilian life in
that—
(A) the extraordinary responsibilities of the armed forces,
the unique conditions of military service, and the critical
role of unit cohesion, require that the military community,
while subject to civilian control, exist as a specialized
society; and
(B) the military society is characterized by its own laws,
rules, customs, and traditions, including numerous
restrictions on personal behavior, that would not be
acceptable in civilian society.
(9) The standards of conduct for members of the armed forces
regulate a member’s life for 24 hours each day beginning at
the moment the member enters military status and not ending
until that person is discharged or otherwise separated from the
armed forces.
(10) Those standards of conduct, including the Uniform Code
of Military Justice, apply to a member of the armed forces at
all times that the member has a military status, whether the
member is on base or off base, and whether the member is on
duty or off duty.
(11) The pervasive application of the standards of conduct is
necessary because members of the armed forces must be
ready at all times for worldwide deployment to a combat
environment.
(12) The worldwide deployment of United States military
forces, the international responsibilities of the United States,
and the potential for involvement of the armed forces in actual
combat routinely make it necessary for members of the armed
forces involuntarily to accept living conditions and working
conditions that are often spartan, primitive, and characterized
by forced intimacy with little or no privacy.
(13) The prohibition against homosexual conduct is a
longstanding element of military law that continues to be
necessary in the unique circumstances of military service.
(14) The armed forces must maintain personnel policies that
exclude persons whose presence in the armed forces would
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create an unacceptable risk to the armed forces’ high
standards of morale, good order and discipline, and unit
cohesion that are the essence of military capability.
(15) The presence in the armed forces of persons who
demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual
acts would create an unacceptable risk to the high standards of
morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion that are
the essence of military capability.
(b) Policy.—A member of the armed forces shall be separated
from the armed forces under regulations prescribed by the
Secretary of Defense if one or more of the following findings is
made and approved in accordance with procedures set forth in
such regulations:
(1) That the member has engaged in, attempted to engage in,
or solicited another to engage in a homosexual act or acts
unless there are further findings, made and approved in
accordance with procedures set forth in such regulations, that
the member has demonstrated that—
(A) such conduct is a departure from the member’s usual
and customary behavior;
(B) such conduct, under all the circumstances, is unlikely
to recur;
(C) such conduct was not accomplished by use of force,
coercion, or intimidation;
(D) under the particular circumstances of the case, the
member’s continued presence in the armed forces is
consistent with the interests of the armed forces in proper
discipline, good order, and morale; and
(E) the member does not have a propensity or intent to
engage in homosexual acts.
(2) That the member has stated that he or she is a homosexual
or bisexual, or words to that effect, unless there is a further
finding, made and approved in accordance with procedures set
forth in the regulations, that the member has demonstrated
that he or she is not a person who engages in, attempts to
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engage in, has a propensity to engage in, or intends to engage
in homosexual acts.
(3) That the member has married or attempted to marry a
person known to be of the same biological sex.

(c) Entry standards and documents.—
(1) The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that the standards
for enlistment and appointment of members of the armed
forces reflect the policies set forth in subsection (b).
(2) The documents used to effectuate the enlistment or
appointment of a person as a member of the armed forces
shall set forth the provisions of subsection (b).
(d) Required briefings.—The briefings that members of the
armed forces receive upon entry into the armed forces and
periodically thereafter under section 937 of this title [10 U.S.C.
§ 937] (article 137 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice) shall
include a detailed explanation of the applicable laws and
regulations governing sexual conduct by members of the armed
forces, including the policies prescribed under subsection (b).
(e) Rule of construction.—Nothing in subsection (b) shall be
construed to require that a member of the armed forces be
processed for separation from the armed forces when a
determination is made in accordance with regulations prescribed
by the Secretary of Defense that—
(1) the member engaged in conduct or made statements for
the purpose of avoiding or terminating military service; and
(2) separation of the member would not be in the best interest
of the armed forces.
(f) Definitions.—In this section:
(1) The term “homosexual” means a person, regardless of sex,
who engages in, attempts to engage in, has a propensity to
engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual acts, and
includes the terms “gay” and “lesbian.”
(2) The term “bisexual” means a person who engages in,
attempts to engage in, has a propensity to engage in, or
intends to engage in homosexual and heterosexual acts.
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(3) The term “homosexual act” means—
(A) any bodily contact, actively undertaken or passively
permitted, between members of the same sex for the
purpose of satisfying sexual desires; and
(B) any bodily contact which a reasonable person would
understand to demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage
in an act described in subparagraph (A).
(b) Regulations.—Not later than 90 days after the date of
enactment of this Act [Nov. 30, 1993], the Secretary of Defense
shall revise Department of Defense regulations, and issue such
new regulations as may be necessary, to implement section 654
of title 10, United States Code, as added by subsection (a).
(c) Savings Provision.—Nothing in this section or section 654 of
title 10, United States Code, as added by subsection (a), may be
construed to invalidate any inquiry, investigation, administrative
action or proceeding, court-martial, or judicial proceeding
conducted before the effective date of regulations issued by the
Secretary of Defense to implement such section 654.
(d) Sense of Congress.—It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) the suspension of questioning concerning homosexuality
as part of the processing of individuals for accession into the
Armed Forces under the interim policy of January 29, 1993,
should be continued, but the Secretary of Defense may
reinstate that questioning with such questions or such revised
questions as he considers appropriate if the Secretary
determines that it is necessary to do so in order to effectuate
the policy set forth in section 654 of title 10, United States
Code, as added by subsection (a); and
(2) the Secretary of Defense should consider issuing guidance
governing the circumstances under which members of the
Armed Forces questioned about homosexuality for
administrative purposes should be afforded warnings similar
to the warnings under section 831(b) of title 10, United States
Code (article 31(b) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice).

